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Abstract
This thesis is made of two connected parts, the ﬁrst one about limit order book modeling and
the second one about tick value eﬀects.
In the ﬁrst part, we present our framework for Markovian order book modeling. The queue-
reactive model is ﬁrst introduced, in which we revise the traditional zero-intelligence approach by
adding state dependency in the order arrival processes. An empirical study shows that this model
is very realistic and reproduces many interesting microscopic features of the underlying asset
such as the distribution of the order book. We also demonstrate that it can be used as an eﬃcient
market simulator, allowing for the assessment of complex placement tactics. We then extend the
queue-reactive model to a general Markovian framework for order book modeling. Ergodicity
conditions are discussed in details in this setting. Under some rather weak assumptions, we
prove the convergence of the order book state towards an invariant distribution and that of the
rescaled price process to a standard Brownian motion.
In the second part of this thesis, we are interested in studying the role played by the tick value
at both microscopic and macroscopic scales. First, an empirical study of the consequences of
a tick value change is conducted using data from the 2014 Japanese tick size reduction pilot
program. A prediction formula for the eﬀects of a tick value change on the trading costs is
derived and successfully tested. Then, an agent-based model is introduced in order to explain
the relationships between market volume, price dynamics, bid-ask spread, tick value and the
equilibrium order book state. In particular, we show that the bid-ask spread emerges naturally
from the fact that orders placed too close to the eﬃcient price have in general negative expected
returns. We also ﬁnd that the bid-ask spread turns out to be the sum of the tick value and the
intrinsic bid-ask spread, which corresponds to a hypothetical value of the bid-ask spread under
inﬁnitesimal tick value.
Keywords: Limit order book, market microstructure, high frequency data, queuing model,
Markov jump process, ergodic properties, volatility, mechanical volatility, market simulator,
execution probability, transaction costs analysis, market impact, tick value, market participants’
intelligence, priority value, information propagation, equilibrium state.
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Introduction
In this thesis, we aim at building a general mathematical framework for order book modeling
which enables us to link the macroscopic features of the price dynamics with the microscopic
properties of the underlying asset. On the one hand, we want to shed light on some of the
fundamental issues in order book modeling, such as the ergodicity of the order book and the role
played by the tick value. On the other hand, our goal is also to provide relevant tools for market
participants and regulators, helping them analyzing complex trading algorithms or eﬀects of
some regulatory measures.
Motivations
Can we explain the price dynamics of a stock from a microstructural point of view? This question
is at the heart of market microstructure literature for decades. Many interesting results have
been obtained and are nowadays used by practitioners as theoretical guidelines in the three
main branches of high frequency trading: optimal execution, market making and statistical
arbitrage. Such results usually aim at building a link between the high frequency dynamics
of the the asset and the well established macroscopic features of the underlying stock. One
of the most fascinating challenges in this context is to explain those links starting from the
very ﬁnest microstructural scale, that of the limit order book. This limit order book modeling
problem consists in establishing a tractable and relevant mathematical formulation for the market
mechanics of order matching and order queueing, and for the complex behavior of market
participants.
Although important advances have been made in the recent years about limit order book
modeling, market participants still often ﬁnd themselves in lack of applicable models when
dealing with practical problems. In particular, in strong contrast to empirical ﬁndings, most
existing limit order book models use an homogenous Poisson assumption on the order arrival
process. Moreover, several models consider only the dynamics at the best bid/ask limits or
assume constant bid-ask spread. These simpliﬁcations largely reduce the applicability of such
models, as many algorithms used in practice operate on non-best limits and are very sensitive
to their orders’ priority in the queue. Our goal being to provide relevant tools for market
participants and regulators, the ﬁrst question we want to address in this thesis is obviously the
following one:
Question 1. How to build realistic order book models?
At the microscopic level, market activities are random and unpredictable. Yet when properly
scaled in time, they exhibit many interesting regularities. For example, the price dynamics
at the macroscopic level can be quite well approximated by a Brownian motion and the limit
order book’s average shape tends to follow the same distribution across diﬀerent trading days.
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This last regularity is closely related to the ergodicity of the limit order book system. In our
ﬁrst chapter, we introduce a state-dependent order book model, the queue-reactive model, that
is particularly suitable for large tick assets1. This model is then extended to a more general
Markovian framework, enabling us to deal with small tick assets and including most of the
classical order book models. Thus we want to give an answer to the following important
theoretical question for Markovian order book modeling:
Question 2. In a general Markovian framework for limit order book modeling, what are the required
conditions to obtain ergodic dynamics?
In our theoretical Markovian framework, market participants react diﬀerently under diﬀerent
market conditions. In the empirical study associated to the queue-reactive model, we ﬁnd a
strong contrast in traders behavior given various order book states, which validates our intuition
that this state-dependent hypothesis is far more realistic than the traditional Poisson assumption.
Interestingly, the estimated intensity functions for various assets for limit/market order insertion
and limit order cancellation share many similarities. For example, the cancellation intensities
are all found to be concave functions of the queue size, and the limit order insertion intensities
at best limits tend to be essentially increasing functions. These common patterns can be seen as
results of market participants intelligence. While they may be explained qualitatively by intuitive
arguments such as the existence of market priority and risk of overrun, the following question
remains very intricate:
Question 3. How to get a quantitative agent-based approach enabling us to understand the behavior
of market participants towards various states of the book and to retrieve the most important limit
order book features?
One microstructural parameter having a strong inﬂuence on the trading practice of market
participants is the tick value. We are particularly interested in this quantity since it is often
considered the most relevant device to regulate the behavior of high frequency traders and to
control market eﬃciency. Although several tick value change programs have been conducted
in the recent years, most of them are designed using only empirical analysis and focus on
the outcomes of the tick value modiﬁcation in an ex post basis. Hence the eﬀects of tick
value changes have not been really understood and prediction tools enabling us to forecast the
consequences of a tick value change are missing. Here we wish to ﬁll this gap, with the aim to
help market regulators to better determine the target tick values of such programs. Therefore we
are considering the following question:
Question 4. How to predict the consequences of tick value changes?
Outline
This thesis is made of two main parts: order book modeling and tick size eﬀects. Each question
presented above corresponds to a chapter in one of these two parts.
In Part I, we present our work on order book modeling. In Chapter I, we answer Question 1
by building the queue-reactive model, in which state dependency is included in the order ﬂow
dynamics. We propose to split the order book modeling issue into two steps: i) dynamics of the
order arrival processes around a constant reference price; ii) dynamics of the reference price.
This enables us to design three diﬀerent versions of the model, with various hypotheses on the
1A large tick asset is deﬁned as an asset whose bid-ask spread is almost always equal to one tick.
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information set used by market participants when making their trading decisions. Unlike the
traditional Poisson assumption, order arrival intensities are assumed to be functions of the state
of the order book. Estimation methods are provided and empirical studies are conducted on
some large tick assets, showing that many macroscopic features can be explained adding state
dependency in the order book dynamics. In particular, the distribution of the order book’s state
is very well explained in this framework. We then show how to use this model as a market
simulator for analyzing complex trading algorithms.
The answer to Question 2 is given in Chapter II. We ﬁrst extend the queue-reactive model
to a general Markovian framework, including most classical order book models. This new
framework, while respecting the double-auction mechanism of the order book, imposes very little
constraints. For example, the order size is allowed to be random, with distribution depending
again on the order book’s state, and the reference price dynamics can also be linked to order
book information such as the bid-ask imbalance. Ergodicity conditions in this framework are
then discussed in details. Essentially, we show that if the incoming order ﬂow (that is the limit
order insertion rate) does not exceed the outgoing order ﬂow (that is the sum of the market
order and cancellation rates), then the order book state is an ergodic process. Furthermore, the
price dynamics converges to a Brownian motion when properly rescaled.
Results about the role of the tick value are presented in Part II. To answer Question 4, we
conduct in Chapter III an empirical study of the eﬀects of tick value changes based on data from
the Japanese tick size reduction pilot program between June 2013 and July 2014. We demonstrate
that the approach introduced in Dayri and Rosenbaum (2012) allows for an ex ante assessment
of the consequences of a tick value change on the microstructure of an asset. We focus on
forecasting the future costs of market and limit orders after a tick value change and show that
our predictions are very accurate. Furthermore, for each asset involved in the pilot program, we
are able to deﬁne ex ante an optimal tick value.
We ﬁnally present in Chapter IV a preliminary attempt to answer Question 3. We split market par-
ticipants into three types: informed traders, noise traders and market makers. Informed traders
receive market information such as the current eﬃcient price, which is hidden to noise traders.
Market makers have also access to this information but with some delay, and they place limit
orders when it is proﬁtable. In a ﬁrst model, we consider an idealized setting where the tick value
constraint is removed, and assume that both informed traders and market makers have an inﬁnite
reaction speed to new information. In that case, we obtain a link between the price dynamics, the
market volume and the equilibrium order book shape. We then study the eﬀects of introducing
the tick value constraint. We ﬁnd that when the traded price becomes discrete, the priority value
of a limit order can be properly deﬁned and computed. Furthermore, the consequences of the
uncertainty faced by market makers about the eﬃcient price are discussed in our framework.
We also provide insights on how a new piece of information is digested and propagated between
informed traders and market makers and on the speed of order book recovery after a transaction.
We now give a rapid overview of the main results obtained in this thesis.
1 Part I: Limit Order Book Modeling
Understanding the limit order book dynamics is one of the fundamental issues in modern
electronic ﬁnancial markets. Many practical problems, such as the design of a realistic market
simulator and the performance evaluation of a high frequency trading algorithm, rely heavily on
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a reasonable limit order book model. Existing models often assume zero intelligence for market
participants and focus only on dynamics at best limits, see for example Smith, Farmer, Gillemot,
and Krishnamurthy (2003) and Cont and De Larrard (2013). This largely reduces their appeal
for practice. In this part, we aim at building a complete order book model in which limits several
ticks away from the best ones are considered and where market participants act in an intelligent
way towards various order book states.
In Chapter I, we introduce the queue-reactive model for order book dynamics. The key idea in
this model is to split the order book modeling issue into two parts: the order arrival dynamics
during period of constant reference price and the dynamics of the reference price. This approach
enables us to deal with the strong dependencies between the diﬀerent limits and to study
the sensitivity of the trading activities towards various order book states. We show that the
queue-reactive model explains very well the asymptotic distribution of the order book and
demonstrate its applicability to assess complex trading algorithms by conducting a detailed
analysis of two order placement tactics. The ergodicity conditions of an extended Markovian
order book framework are discussed in Chapter II. We prove that the rescaled price process
converges to a Brownian motion and the order book state to an invariant distribution under
some very general assumptions.
1.1 The Queue-reactive Model
1.1.1 Dynamics of the limit order book in a period of constant reference price
We model the limit order book as a 2K dimensional vector, where K denotes the number of
available limits on the bid and ask side. By deﬁning the reference price pre f as the center of
these 2K limits and assuming it is constant, the limit order book dynamics can be described by a
continuous time Markov jump process X (t )= (Q−K (t ), ...,Q−1(t ), ...,Q1(t ), ...,QK (t )), where Qi (t )
is the number of available orders at the i-th limit. The quantity pre f can be viewed as some
current consensus price level and is used to index the limits. Three types of orders are considered:
limit orders, cancellations and market orders, and their sizes are assumed to be constant for
each limit (we set them here to one for simplicity). Under these assumptions, the inﬁnitesimal
generator matrix Qx,y of the process X (t ) can be written as follows (ei = (a−K , ...,ai , ...,aK ),
where a j = 0 for j 6= i and ai = 1):
Qq,q+ei = fi (q)
Qq,q−ei = gi (q)
Qq,q = −
∑
p∈Ω,p 6=q
Qq,p
Qq,p = 0,otherwise.
Ergodicity conditions
Write Ω for the state space of q . The two following assumptions are needed for the ergodicity of
the process X (t ):
Assumption 1. (Negative individual drift) There exist a positive integer Cbound and δ > 0, such
that for all i and all q ∈Ω, if qi >Cbound ,
fi (q)− gi (q)<−δ.
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Assumption 2. (Bound on the incoming ﬂow) There exists a positive number H such that for any
q ∈Ω, ∑
i∈[−K ,...,−1,1,...,K ]
fi (q)≤H .
The ﬁrst assumption states that the queue size of a limit should have a tendency to decrease
when it becomes too large, while the second one ensures no explosion in the system. Under
these two assumptions, we have the following ergodicity result for the 2K -dimensional queuing
system with constant reference price, which will be the basis for our asymptotic study as well as
for the estimation procedures.
Theorem 1. Under the above two assumptions, the 2K -dimensional Markov jump process X (t ) is
ergodic.
Ergodicity conditions are discussed in more details in Chapter II.
The functions fi and gi model the state dependency of market participants’ behavior. Then
diﬀerent assumptions on the information set used by traders lead to diﬀerent models in the above
framework. Three models are proposed to describe the order book dynamics under constant
reference price.
Model I: Collection of independent queues
In Model I, we assume independence between the ﬂows arriving at diﬀerent limits:
fi (q) = λLi (qi )
gi (q) = λCi (qi )+λMi (qi ),
where λLi , λ
C
i , λ
M
i correspond to the intensities of limit orders, cancellations and market orders
respectively.
Model I enables us to study the inﬂuence of the target queue size on market participants’
behavior. In our empirical study conducted on large tick stocks, we ﬁnd the following interesting
repetitive patterns on the intensity functions (we take K = 3 in our experiments, the estimated
intensities for the stock France Telecom are shown in Figure .1):
• Limit order insertion:
Q±1: The intensity of the limit order insertion process is approximately a constant function
of the queue size, with a signiﬁcantly smaller value at 0. This can be explained by
the fact that creating a new best limit is viewed as risky (inserting a limit order in an
empty queue creates a new best limit and the market participant placing this order is
the only one standing at this price level).
Q±2,3: The intensity is approximately a decreasing function of the queue size. This interest-
ing result probably reveals a quite common strategy used in practice: posting orders
at the second limit when the corresponding queue size is small to seize priority.
• Limit order cancellation:
Q±1: In contrast to the classical hypothesis of linearly increasing cancellation rate, see for
example Cont, Stoikov, and Talreja (2010), the intensity of order cancellation is found
to be an increasing concave function for Q±1. Such result can be explained by the
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Figure .1: Intensities at Q±i , i = 1, 2, 3, France Telecom
existence of the priority value, that is the advantage of a limit order compared with
another limit order standing at the rear of the same queue. Actually, orders with
lower priority are more likely to be canceled, see Gareche, Disdier, Kockelkoren, and
Bouchaud (2013).
Q±2: The rate of order cancellation attains more rapidly its asymptotic value, which is
lower than that for Q±1. Compared to the ﬁrst limit case, market participants at the
second limit have even stronger intention not to cancel their orders when the queue
size increases. This is probably due to the fact that these orders are less exposed to
short term market trends than those posted at Q±1 (since they are covered by the
volume standing at Q±1 and their price level is farther away from the reference price).
Q±3: The priority value is smaller at the third limit since it takes longer time for Q±3 to
become the best quote if it does. The rate of order cancellation increases almost
linearly.
• Market orders:
Q±1,2,3: The rate decreases exponentially with the available volume at Q±1,2,3. This phenom-
ena is easily explained by market participants “rushing for liquidity” when liquidity
is rare, and “waiting for better price” when liquidity is abundant.
In Model I, each queue is actually a birth-death process whose invariant distribution can be
computed explicitly: denote by pii the stationary distribution of the limit Qi , and deﬁne the
arrival/departure ratio vector ρi by
ρi (n)=
λLi (n)
(λCi (n+1)+λMi (n+1))
.
Then we have:
pii (n) = pii (0)
n∏
j=1
ρi ( j −1)
pii (0) =
(
1+
∞∑
n=1
n∏
j=1
ρi ( j −1)
)−1.
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Figure .2: Model I, invariant distributions of q±1,q±2,q±3, France Telecom
In Figure .2, we compare the theoretical asymptotic distributions with the empirical distributions
observed at Q±1,Q±2,Q±3, and with the invariant distributions from a Poisson model with
constant limit/market order arrival rate and linear cancellation rate. The theoretical asymptotic
distributions are found to be very good approximations of the empirical ones estimated from
market data. This suggests that the empirical order book shape can be explained by the
asymptotic equilibrium of order ﬂow dynamics with state dependency.
Model II: Dependent case
In the dependent case, we diﬀerentiate best and non-best limits and also add dependence
between the bid and ask limits. The generator of the process takes the following form:
fi (q) = λLi (q)
gi (q) = λCi (q)+λMbuy (q)1bestask(q)=i , if i > 0
gi (q) = λCi (q)+λMsel l (q)1bestbid(q)=i , if i < 0.
Model IIa : Two sets of dependent queues
In Model IIa , we propose to consider λL±2 and λ
C
±2 as functions of q±2 and 1q±1>0. Intensities at
Qi , i 6= ±2 remain functions of qi only. Thus, in the empirical study of Model IIa , we focus on
understanding market participants’ behavior under two diﬀerent situations: q±1 = 0 and q±1 > 0.
One of our interesting ﬁndings is the following one on the limit order arrival process:
• Limit order insertion: both intensities are decreasing functions of the queue size. In the
ﬁrst case (q±1 = 0), the limit order insertion intensity reaches very rapidly its asymptotic
value. In the second case (q±1 > 0), the intensity starts at a higher value for q2 = 0 but
continues to go down to a much lower value. This is likely related to the following arbitrage
strategy: post passive orders at a non-best limit when its size is small, wait for this limit to
eventually become the best limit and then gain the proﬁt from having the priority value.
For example, when the considered limit becomes the best one, one can decide to stay in
the queue if its size is large enough to cover the risk of short term market trend, or to
cancel the orders if the queue size is too small.
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The joint asymptotic distribution for the limit order book state (q1,q2) can be computed nu-
merically in Model IIa , using the fact that it is a quasi-birth-and-death process, see Latouche
and Ramaswami (1999), and is found to be again a very good approximation of the empirical one.
Model IIb : Modeling the bid-ask dependences
To study the interactions between the bid side and the ask side, we deﬁne the function Sm,l (x)
for representing four diﬀerent ranges of values for the queue sizes (empty, small, usual and large):
Sm,l (x) = Q0 if x = 0
Sm,l (x) = Q− if 0< x ≤m
Sm,l (x) = Q¯ if m < x ≤ l
Sm,l (x) = Q+ if x > l ,
for well chosen m and l .
In Model IIb , market participants at Q±1 adjust their behavior not only according to the target
queue size, but also to the size of the opposite queue. The rates λL±1 and λ
C
±1 are thus modeled
as functions of q±1 and Sm,l (q∓1). Regime switching at Q±2 is kept in this model: λL±2, λ
C
±2 are
assumed to be functions of q±2 and 1q±1>0.
Some remarks are in order:
• Limit order insertion: the limit order insertion rate is a decreasing function of the opposite
queue size. In particular, when the opposite queue is empty, it is signiﬁcantly larger. Indeed,
in that case, the “eﬃcient" price is likely to be closer to the opposite side. Therefore limit
orders at the non empty ﬁrst limit are likely to be proﬁtable.
• Limit order cancellation: the cancellation rates for diﬀerent ranges of Q−1 are similar in
their forms but have diﬀerent asymptotic values. This rate is not surprisingly a decreasing
function of the liquidity level on the opposite side. Indeed, when this level becomes low,
many market participants cancel their limit orders and send market orders since the
market is likely to move in an unfavorable direction.
• Market orders: we see that when the liquidity available on the opposite side is abundant,
more market orders are sent. Indeed, in that case, transactions at the target queue are
relatively cheap as its price level is temporarily closer to the eﬃcient price. In the special
situation q−1 = 0, the price level at Q1 can seem relatively attractive since it is much closer
to the reference price than the opposite best price, which is in that case 1.5 ticks away
from it. This explains why the market order intensity is larger when the opposite queue is
empty than when its size is small.
Invariant distributions for the limit order book in Model IIb can be obtained using Monte-
Carlo simulations, and the comparison results with the empirically estimated ones are still very
satisfactory.
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1.1.2 A time consistent model with stochastic limit order book and dynamic reference
price
We then propose a model accommodating a dynamic limit order book center: the queue-reactive
model.
The queue-reactive model
Dynamics of the reference price is added by linking pre f with the mid price pmid : we assume
that changes of pre f are triggered by changes of the mid price with some probability θ. We also
add another parameter θreini t to incorporate price jumps resulting from external information:
in such case, the order book state is redrawn from some invariant distribution around the new
reference price. These two parameters are calibrated using 10 min price volatility and the mean
reversion ratio η from Robert and Rosenbaum (2011).
Maximum mechanical volatility
When θreini t = 0, price ﬂuctuations are only endogenously generated by the order book dynamics.
In such case, the volatility is an increasing function of θ and attains its maximum value when
θ = 1. The associated volatility is called maximum mechanical volatility, and is found to be often
smaller than the empirical volatility, which justiﬁes the use of the parameter θreini t .
1.1.3 Order placement analysis
In practice, an execution algorithm gives answers to the two following questions:
• Order Scheduling: how to distribute the target volume across the trading horizon?
• Order Placement: how to send individual orders to the order book?
The ﬁrst question is widely studied in the literature, see for example Bertsimas, Lo, and Hummel
(1999); Almgren and Chriss (2000); Bouchard, Dang, and Lehalle (2011). Answers to it often
rely on some “optimal trading curve”, which depends mainly on intraday factors such as the
average volume curve, the intraday volatility and the average market impact proﬁle. The second
question can be seen as the microstructural version of the ﬁrst one, but is much more diﬃcult to
solve since the dynamics are more complex. Related academic works address the problem of
determining the optimal order type (whether to send limit or market order) Harris and Hasbrouck
(1996), or of ﬁnding the best position to place the order Laruelle, Lehalle, and Pagès (2013). In
practice, order placement tactics are usually much more complex.
While most existing approaches for post-trade performance analysis focus on the overall per-
formance, it is actually more reasonable to separate the order scheduling part from the order
placement part. Performance of order placement tactics depends more on ultra-high frequency
features such as the latency, the queue priority, bid-ask imbalance, etc, which have generally
little inﬂuences over the choice of the “optimal trading curve”. Moreover, the same order
scheduling strategy can be coupled with diﬀerent order placement tactics to build diﬀerent
execution algorithms. In such cases, it is important to be able to understand the pros and cons
of each placement tactic so that an informed choice can be made to determine the best tactic
under diﬀerent market conditions.
9
Introduction
We present in this introduction an application example to show how the queue-reactive model
can be used in the context of order placement analysis for sophisticated tactics.
Denote ntotal for the total quantity to execute and M for the number of trading slices. An
order scheduling strategy gives the target quantity to be executed in each slice, denoted by ni
(
∑M
i=1ni = ntotal ). Two types of order scheduling strategies, denoted by S1 and S2, are considered
in this example:
• S1: A linear scheduling (ni = ntotal/M ), used for the VWAP benchmark (volume weighted
average price).
• S2: An exponential scheduling ni = ntotal (e−(i−1)/4− e−i/4), used for the benchmark S0
(arrival price).
An order placement tactic can be seen as a predeﬁned procedure of order management, ensuring
the execution of the target quantity within the slice. The following two tactics will be considered
in our analysis: in the i-th slice, both tactics post a limit order of size ni at the best oﬀer queue
at the beginning of the period, and send a market order with all the remaining quantity to
complete the execution of the target volume at the end time of the slice. In between:
• T1 (Fire and forget): When pmid (the mid price) changes, cancel the limit order and send
a market order on the opposite side with all the remaining volume if any.
• T2 (Pegging to the best): When the best oﬀer price changes or our order is the only
remaining order at the best oﬀer limit, cancel the order and repost all the remaining
volume at the newly revealed best oﬀer queue.
Performance measure
To understand the eﬀects of order placement tactic on the execution’s slippage, we propose the
two following measures on an execution’s performance: Slippage and Slippagetheo .
Slippage = Pbenchmark −Pexec
Pbenchmark
,
Slippagetheo = Pbenchmark −P
theo
exec
Pbenchmark
,
where P theoexec =
∑M
i=1niVWAP
i represents the average execution price if the algorithm obtains the
same price as the market VWAP in each trading slice. Essentially, Slippage measures the overall
performance of the execution algorithm as a combination of order placement tactic and order
scheduling strategy, while Slippagetheo measures the quality of the scheduling strategy alone and
neglects the randomness in executed price due to the order placement tactic in each trading slice.
2000 simulations are launched for each couple of (S1/S2, T1/T2). We then estimate the probability
density functions of Slippagetheo and Slippage. The results are shown in Figure .3. The
simulation results suggest that the same order scheduling strategy can have very diﬀerent
performance when being coupled with diﬀerent order placement tactics: T2 (“Pegging to the best”)
performs better than T1 (“Fire and forget”) when being coupled with a linear scheduling strategy
with VWAP benchmark, while T1 slightly outperforms T2 when an exponential scheduling
strategy with arrival price benchmark is considered. By executing most of the target quantity
via limit orders, T2 obtains on average a better price than that of a more market orders based
10
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Figure .3: Simulation results for the tactics
tactic. However, at the same time, it creates a larger impact than T1 since the order stays longer
in the queues. Note that market impact proﬁles for these two tactics can also be obtained using
Monte-Carlo simulations.
1.2 A General Framework for Markovian Order Book Modeling
In Chapter II, we extend the queue-reactive model to a general Markovian framework.
1.2.1 Order book dynamics
We represent the order book X (t ) by two elements: its center position denoted by pre f (which
plays the same role as pre f in the queue-reactive model) and its form [q−K , ...,q−1,q1, ...,qK ].
The use of one unique reference price that is not directly observable from the order book state
gives us ﬂexibility for modeling the order book and enables us to diﬀerentiate two types of
jumps in the order book dynamics: pure order book state jumps (for which the order book cen-
ter pre f stays invariant) and common jumps (jumps in which a reference price change is involved).
Pure order book jump
We assume that a pure order book jump can only happen at one speciﬁc queue at each jump
time. Unlike the queue-reactive model, buy/sell limit orders are allowed to be inserted on both
parts of the reference price. Moreover, the jump size is now random. Thus, in term of generator,
we have, with 2K functions fi ,gi :
Q(q,p),(q+nei ,p) = fi (q,n)
Q(q,p),(q−nei ,p) = gi (q,n)
Q˜(q,p),(q ′,p) = 0, otherwise.
Common jump
New information such as the arrival of a market order may aﬀect the value of the consensus
price, and such eﬀect takes place with some delay in practice. In our framework, we use a
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discretized pre f (with tick value denoted by α) and model the jump rate of pre f as function of
the order book state q(t ): ∑
q ′∈Ω
Q(q,p),(q ′,p+α) = u(q)∑
q ′∈Ω
Q(q,p),(q ′,p−α) = d(q)∑
q ′∈Ω
Q(q,p),(q ′,p±nα) = 0, for n ≥ 2.
Note that when the order book center changes, the values of qi switches immediately to the
value of one of its neighbors. We thus introduce two boundary distributions pi−K and piK for
generating new queue sizes at Q±K as we keep only K limits on each side. As in the queue-
reactive model, we assume that q±K is redrawn from some distribution (piinc if pre f increases,
pidec if it decreases) with some probability θreini t whenever a reference price jump happens.
For q ∈Ω (Ω denotes the state space of all possible order book shape) and l ∈ R, write q+ =
[q−K , ...,q−1,q1, ...,qK−1], q− = [q−K−1, ...,q−1,q1, ...,qK ], [q+, l ]= [q−K , ...,q−1,q1, ...,qK−1, l ] and
[l ,q−]= [l ,q−K−1, ...,q−1,q1, ...,qK ]. We have for any q,q ′,q ′′ such that q ′+ 6= q+ and q ′′− 6= q−:
Q(q,p),([q+,l ],p+α) = (1−θreini t )u(q)piK (l )+θreini tu(q)piinc ([q+, l ])
Q(q,p),(q ′,p+α) = θreini tu(q)piinc (q ′)
Q(q,p),([l ,q−],p−α) = (1−θreini t )d(q)pi−K (l )+θreini td(q)pidec ([l ,q−])
Q(q,p),(q ′′,p−α) = θreini td(q)pidec (q ′′).
The inﬁnitesimal generator matrix of the order book process
Gathering all the above hypotheses together, we obtain the following description for the inﬁnites-
imal generator matrix of the Markovian jump process X (t ):
Assumption 3. For any q,q ′,q ′′, q˜ ∈Ω, p, p˜ ∈ α(0.5+Z), n ∈N+, l ∈ Z, such that q ′+ 6= q+ and
q ′′− 6= q− , the inﬁnitesimal generator matrix Q of the process X (t ) is of the following form (with
2K functions fi ,gi :Ω×N+→R+ and 2 functions u,d :Ω→R+) :
Q(q,p),(q+nei ,p) = fi (q,n)
Q(q,p),(q−nei ,p) = gi (q,n)
Q(q,p),([q+,l ],p+α) = (1−θreini t )u(q)piK (l )+θreini tu(q)piinc ([q+, l ])
Q(q,p),(q ′,p+α) = θreini tu(q)piinc (q ′)
Q(q,p),([l ,q−],p−α) = (1−θreini t )d(q)pi−K (l )+θreini td(q)pidec ([l ,q−])
Q(q,p),(q ′′,p−α) = θreini td(q)pidec (q ′′)
Q(q,p),(q,p) = −
∑
(q˜ ,p˜)∈Ω×α(0.5+Z),(q˜ ,p˜) 6=(q,p)
Q(q,p),(q˜ ,p˜)
Q(q,p),(q˜ ,p˜) = 0,otherwise.
Note that up to minor modiﬁcations, most classical order book models such as the zero-
intelligence model of Smith et al. (2003) and that of Cont et al. (2010), and the queue-reactive
model, can be included in this framework.
1.2.2 V-Uniform ergodicity
Constant reference price
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We now discuss ergodicity conditions for the Markovian process X (t ). V-uniform ergodicity
implies the existence of a unique invariant distribution for the state vector q(t ), which is very
useful in explaining the empirical order book distribution, as we have already seen in the
queue-reactive model. We write
f ∗i (q) :=
∑
n
fi (q,n),
g∗i (q) :=
∑
n
gi (q,n),
and consider two probability measures on N+
li (q,n) := fi (q,n)
f ∗i (q)
,
ki (q,n) := gi (q,n)
g∗i (q)
,
and their related moment-generating functions G f ,i ,q (z) and Gg ,i ,q (z). We make the following
assumptions:
Assumption 4. For any order book state q and any i ≥ ibestask , gi (q,n)= 0 for any n > qi and for
any order book state q and any i ≤ ibestbid , fi (q,n)= 0 for any n >−qi .
Assumption 5. There exists z∗ > 1 such that for any q and i , G f ,i ,q (z∗)<∞ and Gg ,i ,q (z∗)<∞.
Furthermore, there exists L > 0 such that for any i ,
lim
z→1+
sup
q
[ f ∗i (q)G
f ,i ,q (z)1i>ibestbid + g∗i (q)Gg ,i ,q (z)1i<ibestask ]< L.
Assumption 6. There exist r > 0 and U > 1 such that
lim
z→1+
sup
(q,i ):qi>U ,i≥ibestask
[ f ∗i (q)− g∗i (q)
1−Gg ,i ,q (z−1)
G f ,i ,q (z)−1 ] < −r
lim
z→1+
sup
(q,i ):qi<−U ,i≤ibestbid
[g∗i (q)− f ∗i (q)
1−G f ,i ,q (z−1)
Gg ,i ,q (z)−1 ] < −r.
Assumption 7. For any z > 1,
B f (z) := inf
(q,i ):qi>U ,i≥ibestask
(G f ,i ,q (z)−1)> 0
Bg (z) := inf
(q,i ):qi<−U ,i≤ibestbid
(Gg ,i ,q (z)−1)> 0.
Under these assumptions, we have the following result:
Theorem 2. When u = d ≡ 0, under Assumption 4, 5, 6 and 7, the continuous-time Markov jump
process q(t ) is non-explosive, V-uniformly ergodic and positive Harris recurrent.
13
Introduction
For the embedded Markov chain q(n), deﬁned as q(n) = q(Jn), with Jn the time of the n-th
jump, and q(Jn) the state of the LOB after this event, a diﬀerent assumption is needed for its
ergodicity. We write
a∗i (q)=
f ∗i (q)∑
i [ f
∗
i (q)+ g∗i (q)]
, b∗i (q)=
g∗i (q)∑
i [ f
∗
i (q)+ g∗i (q)]
,
for the proportions of queue size increases and decreases, and replace Assumption 6 by the
following one.
Assumption 8. There exist r > 0 and U > 1 such that
lim
z→1+
sup
(q,i ):qi>U ,i≥ibestask
[a∗i (q)−b∗i (q)
1−Gg ,i ,q (z−1)
G f ,i ,q (z)−1 ] < −r
lim
z→1+
sup
(q,i ):qi<−U ,i≤ibestbid
[b∗i (q)−a∗i (q)
1−G f ,i ,q (z−1)
Gg ,i ,q (z)−1 ] < −r.
Then we can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3. When u = d ≡ 0, under Assumptions 4, 5, 7 and 8, the embedded discrete-time Markov
chain q(n) is V-uniformly ergodic and positive Harris recurrent.
The main idea to prove the ergodicity of q is to design an appropriate Lyapunov function V , on
which the following negative drift condition is satisﬁed for some γ> 0 and B > 0:
QV (q) := ∑
q ′ 6=q
Qqq ′ [V (q
′)−V (q)]
≤ −γV (q)+B.
Then the above theorems can be derived using Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 6.1 in Meyn and
Tweedie (1993). Note that the same kind of method is used in Abergel and Jedidi (2011) in order
to show ergodicity properties of zero-intelligence order book models.
General case
For some z,U > 1, let
V z([q,c])=
K∑
i=−K ,i 6=0
z |qi |−U .
When pre f is no longer constant, we make the two following additional assumptions:
Assumption 9. There exist z > 1 and Lpi > 0 such that for Q inc , Qdec , QK , Q−K four random
variables such that Q inc ∼piinc , Qdec ∼pidec , QK ∼piK and Q−K ∼pi−K :
E[V z([Q inc ,c])]+E[V z([Qdec ,c])]+E[z |QK |−U ]+E[z |Q−K |−U ]≤ Lpi.
Assumption 10. There exists a ﬁnite set W ⊂ Ω such that the upper bound of the proportion of
reference price jumps in any order book state q is smaller than one on Ω/W :
sup
q∈Ω/W
u(q)+d(q)∑
i [ f
∗
i (q)+ g∗i (q)]+u(q)+d(q)
< 1.
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Recall that q(n) represents the state of the order book after the n-th event and pre f (n) is the
reference price after the n-th event, we consider here the process of reference price increments
c(n), deﬁned as the reference price change at the n-th event:
c(n)= pre f (n)−pre f (n−1).
We have the following theorem on the ergodicity of the Markov chain Y (n)= (q(n),c(n)):
Theorem 4. Under Assumptions 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10, the embedded discrete-time Markov chain
Y (n)= (q(n),c(n)) is V-uniformly ergodic and positive Harris recurrent.
1.2.3 Scaling limit
Another important element in order book modeling is the scaling limit of the price process. Let
N (t )= inf{n, Jn ≤ t }
be the number of events until time t , with the convention inf{;}= 0. Let Z (n) be the cumulative
price change until the n-th event, that is Z (0)= 0 and for n ≥ 1:
Z (n)=
n∑
i=1
c(i ).
We have
Z (N (t ))= pre f (t )−pre f (0).
Thus it represents the reference price at time t recentered its starting value. The following
theorem shows that the rescaled price process Sˆ(n)(t ) := Z (bntc)p
n
in event time converges to a
Brownian motion under the preceding assumptions:
Theorem 5. Under Assumptions 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10, if Epi∗ [c(0)]= 0, then the series
σ2 = Epi∗ [c20]+2
∞∑
n=1
Epi∗ [c0cn],
converges absolutely, with pi∗ the invariant distribution of (q(n),c(n)). Furthermore, if Y (0) ∼ pi∗,
we have the following convergence in law in D[0,∞):
Sˆ(n)(t )
n→∞→ σB(t ),
where B(t ) is a standard Brownian motion.
Consider now the following additional assumption:
Assumption 11. There exists some m > 0, such that
inf
q∈Ω
{∑
i
( f ∗i (q)+ g∗i (q))+u(q)+d(q)
}>m.
Then we have the following result on the convergence of the rescaled reference price process in
calendar time:
S˜(n)(t )= Z
(
N (nt )
)
p
n
.
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Theorem 6. Let τn be the inter-arrival time between the n-th and the (n−1)-th jumps of the Markov
process X . Under Assumptions, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, the process (q(n),c(n),τ(n)) is positive Harris
recurrent. Furthermore, if Epi∗ [c(0)]= 0 and Y (0)∼pi∗, then
S˜(n)(t )
n→∞→ σp
Epi∗∗ [τ(1)]
B(t ),
with pi∗∗ the invariant distribution of (q(n),c(n),τ(n)).
The above two theorems discuss the scaling limit of the underlying reference price process. For
the more usual process such as pbestbid (t ), pbestask (t ) and pmid (t ), the same result still apply
since they are all bounded by 2K with respect to pre f (t ).
2 Part II: Tick Value Eﬀects
The tick value is the minimum price change imposed by the market designer on a traded
asset. It is one of the most important structural parameters that aﬀect the microstructure of the
underlying asset and thus its macroscopic properties. In this part, we present our theoretical
and empirical results in studying the role of tick size in high frequency trading.
2.1 The Eﬀects of Tick Value Changes on Market Microstructure: Analysis of
the 2014 Japanese Experiment
In Chapter III, we study the eﬀects of tick value reduction for large tick assets. We aim at
demonstrating that the approach introduced in Dayri and Rosenbaum (2012) allows for an ex
ante assessment of the consequences of a tick value change on the microstructure of a large
tick asset. The data of the Japanese tick value reduction pilot program are analyzed in light of
this methodology. For these assets, the notion of implicit spread is introduced using the high
frequency indicator η from the model with uncertainty zones of Robert and Rosenbaum (2011).
This enables us to forecast the future cost of market and limit orders after a tick value change.
Our results are shown to be very accurate. Furthermore, we are able to deﬁne an “optimal tick
value” for each asset that helps classify the assets according to the relevance of their tick value,
before and after its modiﬁcation.
2.1.1 Cost of trading and high frequency price dynamics
The high frequency indicator η
We propose to use a unique high frequency indicator, the parameter η (which can be easily
estimated), to summarize the high frequency features of the asset. This indicator, already used in
the queue-reactive model for calibration purpose, allows us to build an estimate for the relative
cost of market orders and limit orders, and is directly linked to the tick size. In the ﬁrst part
of this chapter, we show why this indicator is far more subtle and suitable for microstructure
analysis than any other measurement, like the ones based on the conventional bid-ask spread or
on the market depth.
The model with uncertainty zones assumes the existence of a latent eﬃcient price process X t ,
and that a transaction at a certain price level can happen only when the price level is close
enough to the eﬃcient price. This proximity is quantiﬁed by the parameter η: the distance
between the possible transaction price and the eﬃcient price must be smaller than α(1/2+η),
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with α the asset’s tick value. The zone with width 2ηα around the mid price is called uncertainty
zone. When the eﬃcient price is inside it, both buy and sell market orders can occur.
Perceived tick size and cost of market orders
The parameter η measures the mean-reversion level of the transaction price due to the existence
of the tick value. For large tick assets, η is also related to the perceived tick size of the asset by
market participants: a small η (< 0.5) means that the tick value appears too large while a large
η (> 0.5) means that it is considered too small, see Dayri and Rosenbaum (2012). Knowing η
also enables us to compute the cost of the orders. Take for example a market order at price Pt
leading to an upward price change at time t . The ex post expected cost of this order is given by:
Pt −E[X∞|X t ]=α/2−ηα.
Prediction of the cost of market and limit orders
Let us consider a large tick asset with current tick value α0 and associated high frequency
indicator η0. When the tick value is changed to α, the following prediction formula for the
new value of η (and thus the cost of market and limit orders) can be established based on the
invariance of the volatility with respect to the tick value:
η∼ (η0+0.1)(α0
α
)1/2−0.1. (1)
This formula, which is valid for large tick assets (η≤ 0.5), enables us:
• To tell whether the asset will remain a large tick asset after the tick value change: if the
predicted value of η is greater or equal than 0.5, the asset is predicted to become a small
tick asset after the tick value change.
• To predict the new value of η: if the predicted value of η is smaller than 0.5, the above
formula computes the estimated η after the tick value change.
The optimal tick value
Being able to predict the value of η after a tick value change not only helps the market designer
to forecast the consequences of their measures on the market microstructure, but also paves the
way for deﬁning a notion of “optimal tick value”. Although diﬀerent market participants can
have quite opposite views on what a good tick value is, there are in general two main objectives
in a tick value change program:
• The bid-ask spread should be close to one tick, ensuring the presence of liquidity in the
order book.
• Transaction costs should be close to zero for market orders. In that case, the market is
eﬃcient and market makers do not take advantage of the tick value to the detriment of
ﬁnal investors acting mainly as liquidity takers.
In our approach, an asset enjoys a relevant tick value if it is a large tick asset and its η parameter
is close to 1/2. Thus we have the following formula for the optimal tick value:
αopt = α0(η0+0.1)
2
0.36
.
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2.1.2 Analysis of the Tokyo stock exchange pilot program on tick values
The Tokyo stock exchange pilot program, in which 55 stocks are involved in a tick size reduction
plan, consists in three phases: Phase 0 (before the pilot program), from June 3, 2013 to January
13, 2014; Phase 1 (between the ﬁrst and the second implementation of the tick value reduction
program), from January 14, 2014 to July 21, 2014; Phase 2 (after the implementation of the second
tick value reduction program), from July 22, 2014 to December 30, 2014. We assess the quality
of the prediction formula on this experiment by predicting the outcomes of the ﬁrst and second
tick value reductions and comparing our forecasts to the empirical results.
Classiﬁcation of the stocks
The 55 stocks are classiﬁed according to their conventional spread S (in ticks) and to the level of
market order cost. We ﬁrst split the stocks into three groups:
• Small tick stocks: S > 1.6.
• Large tick stocks: S ≤ 1.5.
• Ambiguous cases: 1.5< S ≤ 1.6.
The cost of market order being α/2−ηα, we use the high frequency indicator η to distinguish
between balanced stocks (for which the cost of market order is close to 0) and market makers
favorable stocks (where market makers obtain signiﬁcant proﬁt from liquidity takers thanks to
the large tick value):
• Balanced stocks: η≥ 0.4.
• Market makers favorable stocks: η< 0.4.
A stock is considered to have a “suitable” tick value if it is both a large tick stock and a balanced
stock. Note that all small tick stocks are considered as balanced stocks, but they do not have
“suitable” tick value, their bid-ask spread (in ticks) being too large. Among the 55 stocks involved
in the pilot program, only 5 of them are considered having a suitable tick value before the start
of the program. This means that a tick value modiﬁcation can be beneﬁcial for the other 50
stocks.
Phase 0 - Phase 1
During Phase 1, 12 stocks being large tick assets in Phase 0 are involved in the tick value
reduction program. These stocks are selected to test the prediction quality of Formula 1 on the
new value of η in Phase 1 (ηp1 ). The predicted value η
p
1 tells directly whether the asset will remain
a large tick asset and whether it will be balanced after the tick value modiﬁcation. We use the
following criteria:
• If ηp1 ≥ 0.55, the asset is predicted to become a small tick asset after the tick value change.
• If ηp1 < 0.5, the asset is predicted to remain a large tick asset after the tick value change,
with the forecast value for the new η being meaningful and given by ηp1 .
• We qualify the situation 0.5≤ ηp1 < 0.55 as an “ambiguous” case between large tick and
small tick.
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We obtain an average relative prediction error for η of 18% along with very tight conﬁdence
intervals for these 12 stocks in Phase 1. Having such accurate predictions, it is no surprise that
we are also able to forecast the category an asset will belong to after the tick value modiﬁcation
with very high success rate (only 2 errors).
Phase 1 - Phase 2
More stocks (48) are aﬀected in Phase 2 by the tick value reduction program. For these stocks, we
conduct a similar analysis as the one for Phase 0 - Phase 1. An excellent accuracy is once again
obtained for the prediction of η and the category of these stocks after the tick value modiﬁcation:
the average relative prediction error is reported to be less than 17%, with a success rate of 85%
for the prediction of the stock’s category. These results conﬁrm the excellent prediction quality
of Formula 1 and the ability of our methodology to forecast ex ante the consequences of a tick
value change on the microscopic properties of the asset.
2.2 An Agent-based Model on Order Book Dynamics
In Chapter IV, we introduce a simple agent-based model on order book dynamics, which gives
insights on the relationships between traded volume V , price volatility σ, tick size α, bid-ask
spread φ and the order book equilibrium form L(x) (L(x) denotes the quantities of buying/selling
orders between P (t ) and P (t )+ x, where P (t ) denotes the market underlying eﬃcient price,
whose role is equivalent to the role of pre f in Part I).
2.2.1 Model with inﬁnitesimal tick size
We assume that P (t ) = P0+Y (t ), with Y (t ) a compound Poisson process with jump rate λi
and size (denoted by B ) distribution ψ (deﬁned on R). We impose E[B ] = 0 so that P (t ) is
a martingale. In such case, we have σ := V[P (t )]t = λiE[B2], where the term σ represents the
macroscopic volatility.
Agents
We assume that there exist three types of traders in the market:
• One informed trader: the informed trader receives the value of the price jump size B right
before it happens. He then sends his trades based on this information to gain proﬁt. We
assume that he can only send market orders.
• One noise trader: the noise trader sends random market orders to the market. We assume
that these trades follows a compound Poisson process, with arrival rate λu and volume
distribution κu in R (positive volume represents a buying order, while negative volume
represents a selling order).
• Market makers: the market makers receive the value of the price jump size B right after it
happens. They place limit orders and try to make proﬁt. We assume that they are risk
neutral.
The following greedy assumption on the informed trader’s behavior enables us to link the
informed trader’s trade size Q i , the noise trader’s trade size Qu , the price jump size B and the
order book’s cumulative shape L(x). We denote the repartition functions of B , Qu , Q i and Q
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(the unconditional trade size) respectively by Fψ(x), Fκu (x), Fκi (x) and Fκ(x), and deﬁne the
inverse cumulative order book shape function L−1(q) := argmax
x
{x|L(x)= q}.
Assumption 12. Based on the received value of B and the cumulative order book shape function
L(x) provided by market makers, the informed trader sends his trade in a greedy way such that he
wipes out all the available liquidity in the limit order book till the level P (t )+B . Thus, his trade
size Q i satisﬁes:
Q i = L(B).
From the above assumption, we can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 7. The repartition functions Fκu (x), Fκi (x) and Fκ(x) satisfy, with r = λiλi+λu :
Fκi (q) = Fψi (L−1(q))
Fκ(q) = rFκi (q)+ (1− r )Fκu (q).
The equilibrium limit order book shape
We now study the behavior of market makers under the greedy assumption. Consider the proﬁt
of passive selling orders placed between P (t )+x and P (t )+x+δp for some x,δp > 0, given the
fact that a buying transaction of size Q happens with Q ≥ L(x+δp), that is all these orders are
executed. If the transaction comes from the informed trader, market makers who place these
limit orders lose money due to the greedy assumption, and they gain proﬁt if the transaction
comes from the noise trader as the diﬀerence between the average executed price and the
eﬃcient price P (t ). We denote the conditional expected ex post gain of these orders by G(x,δp),
and deﬁne the average proﬁt per unit at x, denoted by G(x), as the limit of the average ex post
proﬁt of the passive orders placed between P (t )+x and P (t )+x+δp :
G(x) = lim
δp→0+
G(x,δp)
L(x+δp)−L(x) .
A positive G(x) means that new limit orders at x are still proﬁtable. As market makers are
assumed to be risk neutral, it is natural to make the following zero proﬁt assumption (with
l (x) := L′(x)):
Assumption 13. For every x ∈ R+, if L(x) > 0 and l (x) > 0, then the conditional expected average
gain per unity of passive orders placed at x, given the fact that they are totally executed, is equal to
0, that is, when L(x)> 0 and l (x)> 0:
G(x) = 0.
Equivalently, we have:
x = r E[B1B>x ]
1−Fκ(L(x))
.
Unlike the traditional zero-proﬁt assumption (such as that used in Glosten and Milgrom (1985))
which assumes that market makers make no proﬁt at all, under the above assumption, “fast”
market makers can still make proﬁt from their limit orders placed before the equilibrium is
attained due to the competition among them. This point will be made clearer when the tick
value constraint is added.
The following theorem shows that the bid-ask spread emerges naturally from the above assump-
tions as well as an equilibrium cumulative order book shape:
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Theorem 8. The cumulative limit order book shape function is uniquely determined. We have,
L(x)= 0, for x ∈ [−η,η], where η is the unique solution of the following equation:
1+ r
2r
= E[max(B
η
,1)].
Furthermore, for x > η:
L(x) = F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− r E[max(
B
x
,1)]),
and for x <−η:
L(x) = −F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− r E[max(
B
−x ,1)]).
In particular, the intrinsic bid-ask spread satisﬁes φ= 2η.
Actually, the existence of the informed trader prevents market makers from posting their limit
orders too close to the eﬃcient price: the expected proﬁt of these orders is negative as they are
very vulnerable to large price jumps. In our model, market makers can only make proﬁt from the
noise trades. The minimum distance η to which their limit orders start to make proﬁt depends
naturally on the proportion of noise trades as well as on the distribution of the price jump.
2.2.2 Tick size
Constrained bid-ask spread
When we constrain price changes by the tick size, the cumulative order book L(x) becomes a
piece-wise constant function. We denote by Gd (i ) the expected average gain of passive orders
placed at the i-th limit given the fact that a transaction happens and they are completely
executed. We make a similar zero proﬁt assumption in such case. We write d := P¯ (t )−P (t ), with
P¯ (t ) the smallest possible price level that is greater or equal to the eﬃcient price P (t ), and ld (i )
the number of limit orders placed at the i-th limit:
Assumption 14. For every i ∈ N+, if ld (i ) > 0, then the conditional expected average gain of the
passive orders placed at d + (i −1)α, given the fact that they are totally executed, is equal to 0, that
is, when ld (i )> 0:
Gd (i )= 0.
Equivalently, we have:
d + (i −1)α= rE[B1B≥d+(i−1)α]
1−Fκ(Ld (d + (i −1)α))
.
When one limit is empty, its potential expected gain can be deﬁned as the average gain/loss of an
inﬁnitesimal passive order placed at this limit, under the condition that it is executed completely.
When the potential expected gain is positive, market makers naturally place new passive orders
as these orders are proﬁtable in expectation. This idea gives the following assumption:
Assumption 15. For every i ∈N+, if ld (i )= 0, then the potential conditional expected average gain
of the passive orders placed at d + (i −1)α, given the fact that they are totally executed, is less than
or equal to 0, that is, when ld (i )= 0:
Gd (i )≤ 0.
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Equivalently, we have:
d + (i −1)α≤ rE[B1B≥d+(i−1)α]
1− rFψ(d + (i −1)α)− (1− r )Fκu (max(0,Ld (d + (i −2)α)))
.
One interesting theorem can be obtained from these assumptions. It suggests that the average
bid-ask spread, which is now constrained by the tick size, is a linearly increasing function of the
tick size α:
Theorem 9. The average bid-ask spread φα satisﬁes the following equation:
φα =α+φ,
where φ is the intrinsic bid-ask spread of the asset when the tick value is equal to 0.
The cumulative limit order book shape is shown to satisfy the following theorem:
Theorem 10. The cumulative limit order book shape function is uniquely determined. We have,
ld (i )= 0 for all −kdl < i < kdr , where kdl and kdr are two positive integers determined by the following
equations:
kdr = 1+d
η−d
α
e,
kdl = d
η+d
α
e,
where η is the unique solution of the following equation:
1+ r
2r
= E[max(B
η
,1)].
For h ≥ kdr :
Ld (d + (h−1)α) = F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− r E[max(
B
d + (h−1)α ,1)]),
for h ≤−kdl :
Ld (d +hα) = −F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− r E[max(
B
−d −hα ,1)]).
Priority value
The priority value, already discussed in the queue-reactive model to explain the concave
cancellation rate, can be formulated in this model as the diﬀerence between the expected proﬁt
of the order placed on top and that placed at the bottom of the queue:
Theorem 11. The priority value at the i−th limit can be written as:
For i = kdr ,
G˜d (i ) = E[B1B≥d+(kdr −1)α]{
1
E[max( B
d+(kdr −1)α ,1)]−Fψ(d + (k
d
r −1)α)
− 1
1+r
2r −Fψ(d + (kdr −1)α)
},
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for i > kdr ,
Gdp (i ) = E[B1B≥d+(i−1)α]{
1
E[max( Bd+(i−1)α ,1)]−Fψ(d + (i −1)α)
− 1
E[max( Bd+(i−2)α ,1)]−Fψ(d + (i −1)α)
}.
The above formulas can be easily generalized to compute the priority value of an order placed
at any position in the queue.
2.2.3 Information propagation
We then discuss the case when the market makers no longer hold exact information on the price
P (t ), and add a minimum reaction time between the moment when the informed trader receives
the updated information and the moment when he sends orders to take the liquidity. We assume
here that α= 0 in order to simplify our analysis.
The main question faced by market makers when they no longer know the value of P (t ) is
whether they should reﬁll the gaps in the order book once the liquidity has been taken by a
market order. If the market order is sent by the noise trader, then market makers should send
limit orders to reﬁll the limit order book. But if the market order comes from the informed
trader, reﬁlling the order book leads to further losses to market makers as the newly inserted
orders will probably again be consumed by the informed trader.
For a given market order of volume q (until the price level p ′) at the moment t , write P (t−) the
eﬃcient price before this trade, which we assume is known to market makers. Immediately after
this trade, the gain of a limit order placed between P (t−)+x and P (t−)+x+δp can be written
as (νi is a random variable with νi = 1 if the last trade comes from the informed trader, νi = 0 if
the last trade comes from the noise trader):
g p
′
(x,δp) = νi g˜ p ′(x,δp)+ (1−νi )g (x,δp),
with g˜ p
′
(x,δp) representing the gain in the case of an informed transaction, and g (x,δp) that in
the case of a noise transaction. Denote by L−(p ′) the cumulative order book quantity right before
the trade at the price level P (t−)+p ′, r p ′ = r (1−Fψ(p
′))
1−rFψ(p ′)−(1−r )Fκu (L−(p ′)) and the best ask price a
p ′
(we consider a buy market order) right after the trade, we have the following theorem concerning
the equilibrium order book state immediately after this trade:
Theorem 12. Assume the reaction rate λa is much larger than the information arrival rate λi and
noise trade arrival rate λu , that is:
r i = λ
i
λi +λu +λa ≈ 0
r u = λ
u
λi +λu +λa ≈ 0.
(2)
The best ask price ap
′
lies in the interval (r p
′
,p ′) and satisﬁes the following approximate equa-
tion:
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1+ r
2r
≈ (1− r p ′)E[B1B>ap′ ]
ap ′ − r p ′p ′ +Fψ(a
p ′).
Moreover, the equilibrium order book state L(x) immediately after a transaction satisﬁes:
for x < p ′:
L(x) ≈ F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r (1− r p ′)E[max(B ,x)]− r r p ′(p ′−x)Fψ(x)
(1− r )(x− r p ′p ′) ),
and for x ≥ p ′ :
Gp
′
(x) = x− r p ′p ′− r (1− r
p ′)E[B1B>x ]
1− rFψ(x)− (1− r )Fκu (L(x))
− r
p ′rE[B1B>x−p ′ ]
1− rFψ(x−p ′)− (1− r )Fκu (L(x))
.
In particular, at the trade price p ′, we have:
L(p ′) ≈ F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− r E[max(
B
p ′
,1)])= L−(p ′).
The above theorem gives lower and upper bounds on the new best bid/ask limit after a new
transaction, as well as a description of the order book state around the transaction price p ′.
In our setting, the cumulative number of orders stays almost the same at p ′ immediately after
the transaction. The new best bid/ask position depends on the volume of the last trade, but is
strictly smaller than the transaction price (in the buying case).
Limit order book recovery speed
If the last trade is indeed an informed transaction, orders that are placed before p ′ are exposed
to the risk of being overrun once more by the informed trader. However, as the time advances, if
no further trades arrive to take away these newly inserted orders, market makers may adjust their
expected potential gain. Then the limit order book state will recover gradually to its original
equilibrium state. These intuitions are formalized in the following theorem.
Let Gp
′
(x,δt ) denotes the conditional expected gain per unity at the price P−(t )+ x at the
moment t +δt , given the fact that no trade has arrived in the market between t and t +δt .
We write Gp
′
(x) for the conditional expected gain per unity given the fact that the last trade is
issued by an informed trader, and G(x) represents the standard conditional expected average
gain per unity. We have the following result:
Theorem 13. Given the fact that no trade arrives between (t , t +δt ]. We have, for x < p ′,
Gp
′
(x,δt )= r p ′
δt G˜
p ′(x)+ (1− r p ′
δt )G(x),
with
r p
′
δt =
1
1+ 1−r p′
r p′
eλaδt
.
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When δt→∞, r p ′
δt → 0, and Gp
′
(x,δt )→G(x), that is, if the trade is intiated by the noise trader, the
limit order book shape gradually recovers after this trade to its stationary state, with approximative
speed ∼ e−λa t .
25

Part I
Limit Order Book Modelling
27

CHAPTER I
The queue-reactive model
Abstract
Through the analysis of a dataset of ultra high frequency order book updates, we introduce
a model which accommodates the empirical properties of the full order book together with
the stylized facts of lower frequency ﬁnancial data. To do so, we split the time interval of
interest into periods in which a well chosen reference price, typically the midprice, remains
constant. Within these periods, we view the limit order book as a Markov queuing system.
Indeed, we assume that the intensities of the order ﬂows only depend on the current state of
the order book. We establish the limiting behavior of this model and estimate its parameters
from market data. Then, in order to design a relevant model for the whole period of interest,
we use a stochastic mechanism that allows to switch from one period of constant reference
price to another. Beyond enabling to reproduce accurately the behavior of market data, we
show that our framework can be very useful for practitioners, notably as a market simulator
or as a tool for the transaction cost analysis of complex trading algorithms.
Keywords: Limit order book, market microstructure, high frequency data, queuing model,
jump Markov process, ergodic properties, volatility, mechanical volatility, market simulator,
execution probability, transaction costs analysis, market impact.
1 Introduction
Electronic limit order books (LOB for short), where market participants send their buy and
sell orders via a continuous-time double auction system, are nowadays the dominant mode of
exchange on ﬁnancial markets. Consequently, understanding the LOB dynamics has become a
fundamental issue. Indeed, a deep knowledge of the LOB’s behavior enables policy makers to
design relevant regulations, market makers to provide liquidity at cheaper prices, and investors
to save transaction costs while mounting and unwinding their positions, thus reducing the cost
of capital of listed companies. Furthermore, it can also provide insights on the macroscopic
features of the price which emerges from the LOB.
In the seminal work on zero intelligence LOB models of Smith, Farmer, Gillemot, and
Krishnamurthy (2003), a mean-ﬁeld approach is suggested in order to study the properties of
the LOB. In such models, the underlying assumption is that the order ﬂows follow independent
Poisson processes. Although this hypothesis is not really compatible with empirical observations,
the authors show that its simplicity allows for the derivation of many interesting formulas, some
of them being testable on market data. This work has been followed by numerous developments.
For example, in Cont, Stoikov, and Talreja (2010), the probabilities of various order book related
events are computed in this framework, whereas stability conditions of the system are studied
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in Abergel and Jedidi (2011). We wish to extend this approach in two directions. On the
one hand, we want our model to be more consistent with market data, so that we can give
new insights on the dynamics of the LOB. On the other hand, we aim at providing a useful
and relevant tool for market practitioners, notably in the perspective of transaction costs analysis.
Under the ﬁrst in ﬁrst out rule (which we assume in the sequel), a LOB can be considered as
a high-dimensional queuing system, where orders arrive and depart randomly. We consider the
three following types of orders:
• Limit orders: insertion of a new order in the LOB (a buy order at a lower price than the
best ask price, or a sell order at a higher price than the best bid price).
• Cancellation orders: cancellation of an already existing order in the LOB.
• Market orders: consumption of available liquidity (a buy or sell order at the best available
price).
In practice, market participants (or their algorithms) analyze many quantities before sending
a given order at a given level. One of the most important variables in this decision process is
probably the distance between their target price and their “reference market price”, typically the
midprice. This reference price is linked with the order ﬂows since it is usually determined by the
LOB state. This interconnection makes the design of LOB models quite intricate. To overcome
this diﬃculty, we split the time interval of interest into periods of constant reference price, and
consider two parts in our modeling. First, we study the LOB as a Markov queuing system during
the time periods when the reference price is constant. Then, we investigate the dynamics of
the reference price. Such a framework is particularly suitable for large tick assets1, for which
constant reference price periods are quite long and allow for accurate parameter estimations.
Two kinds of public information are available to market participants at the high frequency
scale: the historical order ﬂows and the current state of the LOB. In this paper, we are mostly in-
terested in how the state of the LOB impacts market participants decisions. Surprisingly enough,
this question has been rarely considered in the literature. Let us mention as an exception the
interesting approach in Gareche, Disdier, Kockelkoren, and Bouchaud (2013), where the impact of
the LOB state on the queue dynamics is analyzed through PDE type arguments. Within periods
of constant reference price, we model the LOB as a continuous-time Markov jump process, and
estimate its inﬁnitesimal generator matrix under various assumptions on the information set used
by market participants. From these results, we are able to analyze how market participants react
towards diﬀerent conﬁgurations of the LOB. Furthermore, we provide the asymptotic distributions
of the LOB. The level of realism of our approaches is assessed by comparing expected features
from the models with empirical ones. Thus, all our developments are illustrated on two speciﬁc
examples of large tick stocks on Euronext Paris: France Telecom and Alcatel-Lucent (in appendix).
In the second part of the paper, we extend our framework by allowing reference price moves,
so that our model also accommodates macroscopic properties of the asset (roughly summarized
by the volatility). Modiﬁcations of the reference price2 will possibly occur provided one of the
best queues is totally depleted or a new order is inserted within the spread. This model is called
1A large tick asset is deﬁned as an asset whose bid-ask spread is almost always equal to one tick, see Dayri and
Rosenbaum (2012). In practice, our framework can be considered relevant for any asset whose average spread is
smaller than 2.5 ticks.
2Note that the reference price will not be exactly the midprice, see Section 2.2.
30
2. Dynamics of the LOB in a period of constant reference price
“queue-reactive model". In particular, it enables us to bring to light a quantity, the “maximal
mechanical volatility", which represents the amount of price volatility generated by the generic
randomness of the order ﬂows. In practice, this parameter is typically smaller than the empirical
volatility estimated from market data. The reason for this is simple: the market does not evolve
like a closed physical system, where the only source of randomness would be the endogenous
interactions between participants. It is also subject to external informations, such as the news,
which increase the volatility of the price. Hence, it will be necessary to introduce an exogenous
component within the queue-reactive model.
Throughout the paper, we illustrate the fact that many useful short term predictions can
be computed in our framework: execution probabilities of passive orders, probability of price
increase. . . More importantly, we show that the queue-reactive model turns out to be a very
relevant market simulator, notably in view of the analysis of complex trading tactics, using for
example a mixture of market and limit orders.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider periods when the reference
price is constant. We ﬁrst present a very general framework for the LOB dynamics and then
introduce three speciﬁc models. The ﬁrst one is a birth and death process in which the queues
are assumed to be independent. In this setting, we are able to fully characterize the asymptotic
behavior of the LOB. The second approach is a queuing system in which the bid and ask sides
are independent, but the ﬁrst two lines on each side can exhibit correlations. We show that
this model can be seen as a quasi birth and death process (QBD for short) and thus admits a
matrix geometric solution as its invariant distribution. In the last approach, we allow for cross
dependences between bid and ask queues. An application of these models to the computation of
execution probabilities is presented at the end of the same section. In Section 3, we investigate
the dynamics of the reference price. In particular, we build the queue-reactive model which is a
relevant LOB model for the whole time period of interest. We end this section by showing how
our framework can be used for transaction costs and market impact analysis of high frequency
trading strategies. A conclusion and some perspectives are given in Section 4. Some proofs and
further empirical results are gathered in an appendix.
2 Dynamics of the LOB in a period of constant reference price
Within time periods when the reference price is constant, we consider three diﬀerent models for
the LOB. These models can be jointly introduced through the general framework we present
now.
2.1 General Framework
In the general framework, the LOB is seen as a 2K -dimensional vector, where K denotes the num-
ber of available limits on each side3, see Figure I.1. The reference price pre f deﬁnes the center
of the 2K -dimensional vector, and divides the LOB into two parts: the bid side [Q−i : i = 1, ...,K ]
and the ask side [Qi : i = 1, ...,K ], where Q±i 4 represents the limit at the distance i −0.5 ticks
to the right (+i ) or to the left (−i ) of pre f . The number of orders at Qi is denoted by qi . We
assume that on the bid (resp. ask) side, market participants send buy (resp. sell) limit orders,
cancel existing buy (resp. sell) orders and send sell (resp. buy) market orders. We consider a
constant order size at each limit. However, the order sizes at the diﬀerent limits are allowed to
3Note that an empty limit can be part of the LOB in our setting.
4To simplify our notations, we write ∗i /∗−i as ∗±i , and ∗−i /∗i as ∗∓i .
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Figure I.1: Limit order book
be diﬀerent. In practice, these sizes can be chosen as the average event sizes observed at each
limit Qi (AESi for short)5.
The 2K -dimensional process X (t )= (q−K (t ), ...,q−1(t ),q1(t ), ...,qK (t )) is then modeled as a
continuous-time Markov jump process in the countable state space Ω = N2K , with jump size
equal to one. For q = (q−K , ...,q−1,q1, ...,qK ) ∈Ω, and ei = (a−K , ...,ai , ...,aK ), where a j = 0 for
j 6= i and ai = 1, the components Qq,p of the inﬁnitesimal generator matrix Q of the process
X (t ) are assumed to be of the following form:
Qq,q+ei = fi (q)
Qq,q−ei = gi (q)
Qq,q = −
∑
p∈Ω,p 6=q
Qq,p
Qq,p = 0,otherwise.
We now give a theoretical result on the ergodicity of the system under two very general
assumptions. Let us denote by Pq,p (t ) the transition probability from state q to state p in a time
t . Recall that a Markov process in a countable state space is said to be ergodic if there exists a
probability measure pi that satisﬁes piP =pi (pi is called invariant measure) and for every q and p :
lim
t→∞Pq,p (t )=pip .
We consider the two following assumptions.
Assumption 16. (Negative individual drift) There exist a positive integer Cbound and δ > 0, such
that for all i and all q ∈Ω, if qi >Cbound ,
fi (q)− gi (q)<−δ.
5In our framework, AESi is a more suitable choice than ATS (Average Trade Size) that computes only the average
size of market orders, see Section 5.6 in appendix for more details.
32
2. Dynamics of the LOB in a period of constant reference price
Assumption 17. (Bound on the incoming ﬂow) There exists a positive number H such that for any
q ∈Ω, ∑
i∈[−K ,...,−1,1,...,K ]
fi (q)≤H .
Assumption 16 can be interpreted as follows: the queue size of a limit tends to decrease
when it becomes too large. Assumption 17 ensures no explosion in the system: the order arrival
speed stays bounded for any given state of the LOB. Under these two assumptions, we have
the following ergodicity result for the 2K -dimensional queuing system. The proof is given in
appendix.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 16 and 17, the 2K -dimensional Markov jump process X (t ) is ergodic.
This theorem is the basis for the asymptotic study of the LOB dynamics in the following
sections.
2.2 Data description and estimation of the reference price
2.2.1 The database
The data used in our empirical studies are collected from Cheuvreux’s6 LOB database, from
January 2010 to March 2012, on Euronext Paris. It records the LOB data (prices, volume and
number of orders) up to the ﬁfth best limit on both sides, whenever the LOB state changes. Note
that we remove market data corresponding to the ﬁrst and last hour of trading, as these periods
have usually speciﬁc features because of the opening/closing auction phases. Two large tick
European stocks, France Telecom and Alcatel-Lucent, are studied and they exhibit very similar
behaviors. Some characteristics of these two stocks are given in Table 1. We have chosen the
stock France Telecom as illustration example for all the developments in the sequel. The results
for Alcatel-Lucent can be found in appendix. Although only stocks are considered in this paper,
our method applies also to other ﬁnancial assets, such as interest rates or index futures (among
which large tick assets are quite numerous, see Dayri and Rosenbaum (2012)).
stock average number of average number of average spread size
orders per day trades per day (in number of ticks)
France Telecom 159250 7282 1.43
Alcatel Lucent 129400 8626 1.99
Table I.1: Data description
2.2.2 Estimation of the reference price
As mentioned in the introduction, the estimation of a relevant reference price pre f is the basis
for deﬁning the limits in the order book. Indeed, pre f provides the center point of the LOB and
thus the positions of the 2K limits. In our framework, if we write pi for the price level of the
limit Qi , i =−K , ...,1,1, ...,K , we must have
pre f =
p1+p−1
2
.
6Cheuvreux is a brokerage ﬁrm based in Paris, formerly a subsidiary of Crédit Agricole Corporate Investment
Bank, and now merged with Kepler Capital Market.
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When the observed bid-ask spread is equal to one tick, pre f is obviously taken as the midprice
(denoted by pmid ) and both Q1 and Q−1 are non empty. When it is larger than one tick, several
choices are possible for pre f . We build pre f from the data the following way: when the spread is
odd (in tick unit), it is still natural to use pmid as the LOB center:
pre f = pmid =
(pbestbid +pbestask )
2
.
When it is even, pmid is no longer appropriate since it is now itself a possible position for order
arrivals. In such case, we use either
pmid +
tick size
2
or pmid −
tick size
2
,
choosing the one which is the closest to the previous value of pre f . Note that more complex
methods could be used for the estimation of pre f , see for example Delattre, Robert, and
Rosenbaum (2013).
2.3 Model I: Collection of independent queues
We now give a ﬁrst simple LOB model around a ﬁxed reference price.
2.3.1 Description of the model
In this model, we assume independence between the ﬂows arriving at diﬀerent limits in the
LOB. Three types of orders are considered: limit orders, cancellations and market orders. We
suppose that the intensities of these point processes at diﬀerent limits are only functions of the
target queue size (that is the available volume at the considered limit Qi ). Furthermore, at a
given limit, conditional on the LOB state, the arrival processes of the three types of orders are
taken independent. The values of these intensities are denoted by λLi (n) (limit orders), λ
C
i (n)
(cancellations) and λMi (n) (market orders) when qi = n. Moreover, the intensity functions at Qi
and Q−i are chosen identical, considering the symmetry property of the LOB. We then have
λLi (n)=λL−i (n),λCi (n)=λC−i (n),λMi (n)=λM−i (n), and
fi (q) = λLi (qi )
gi (q) = λCi (qi )+λMi (qi ).
In this model, market orders sent to Qi consume directly the volume available at Qi .
Therefore, we can have a market order at the second limit while the ﬁrst limit is not empty.
However, for large tick assets, this assumption is reasonable as their market order ﬂow is almost
fully concentrated on ﬁrst limits (Q±1) and the estimated intensities of this ﬂow at (Q±i ), i 6= 1 are
very small. Under these assumptions, the LOB becomes a collection of 2K independent queues,
each of them being a birth and death process.
2.3.2 Empirical study: Collection of independent queues
In Model I, the intensities of the diﬀerent queues can be estimated separately. The value of K is
set to 3, as our numerical experiments show that for the considered stocks, both the dynamics
and empirical distributions at Q±i , i = 4,5 are quite similar to that at Q±3. This value of K will
also apply to other experiments in the paper.
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Figure I.2: Intensities at Q±i , i = 1, 2, 3, France Telecom
The estimation method goes as follows. We deﬁne an “event” ω as any modiﬁcation of the
queue size. For queue Qi , we record the waiting time ∆ti (ω) (in number of seconds) between
the event ω and the preceding event at Qi , the type of the event Ti (ω) and the queue size qi (ω)
before the event. The queue size is then approximated by the smallest integer that is larger than
or equal to the volume available at the queue, divided by the stock’s average event size AESi at
the corresponding queue. We set the “type” of the event ω the following way:
• Ti (ω) ∈ E+ for limit order insertion at Qi ,
• Ti (ω) ∈ E− for limit order cancellation at Qi ,
• Ti (ω) ∈ E t for market order at Qi .
When the reference price changes, we restart the recording process. Once we have collected
(∆ti (ω),Ti (ω),qi (ω)) from historical data, it is easy to estimate λLi (n), λ
C
i (n) and λ
M
i (n) by the
maximum likelihood method:
Λˆi (n) =
(
mean(∆ti (ω)|qi (ω)= n)
)−1
λˆLi (n) = Λˆi (n)
#{Ti (ω) ∈ E+,qi (ω)= n}
#{qi (ω)= n}
λˆCi (n) = Λˆi (n)
#{Ti (ω) ∈ E−,qi (ω)= n}
#{qi (ω)= n}
λˆMi (n) = Λˆi (n)
#{Ti (ω) ∈ E t ,qi (ω)= n}
#{qi (ω)= n}
,
where “mean” denotes the empirical mean and #A the cardinality of the set A.
In Figure I.2, we present the estimated intensities. Data at Qi and Q−i are aggregated
together (simply by combining the two collected samples) and conﬁdence intervals (dotted lines)
are computed using central limit approximations detailed in appendix. We now comment the
obtained graphs.
35
I. The queue-reactive model
Behaviors under the independence assumption
• Limit order insertion:
Q±1: The intensity of the limit order insertion process is approximately a constant function
of the queue size, with a signiﬁcantly smaller value at 0. Note that inserting a limit
order in an empty queue creates a new best limit and the market participant placing
this order is the only one standing at this price level. Such action is often risky.
Indeed, when the spread is diﬀerent from one tick, one is quite uncertain about the
position of the so-called “eﬃcient" or “fair" price, see for example Delattre, Robert,
and Rosenbaum (2013) for discussions on this notion. This smaller value can also be
due to temporary realizations of the structural relation between the bid-ask spread
and the volatility: if the spread is large because the inventory risk of market makers
is high, the probability that anyone inserts a limit order in the spread is likely to be
low, see among others Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997), Avellaneda and
Stoikov (2008), Wyart, Bouchaud, Kockelkoren, Potters, and Vettorazzo (2008) and
Dayri and Rosenbaum (2012) for more details about market making and the relation
between spread, volatility and inventory risk.
Q±2: The intensity is now approximately a decreasing function of the queue size. This
interesting result probably reveals a quite common strategy used in practice: posting
orders at the second limit when the corresponding queue size is small to seize priority.
More details on this strategy are given in Section 2.4.2.
Q±3: The intensity function shows similar properties to that at the second limit.
• Limit order cancellation:
Q±1: The rate of order cancellation is an increasing concave function for q±1 between
0 and 25, and becomes ﬂat/slightly decreasing for larger values. This result is in
contrast to the classical way to model this ﬂow, where one often considers a linearly
increasing cancellation rate, see for example Cont, Stoikov, and Talreja (2010). On
this ﬁrst in ﬁrst out market, the priority value, that is the advantage of a limit order
compared with another limit order standing at the rear of the same queue, can be
one of the reasons for this behavior. Indeed, the priority value is an increasing
function of the queue size and orders having a high priority value are less likely to
be canceled.
Q±2: The rate of order cancellation attains more rapidly its asymptotic value, which is
lower than for Q±1. Compared to the ﬁrst limit case, market participants at the
second limit have even stronger intention not to cancel their orders when the queue
size increases. This is probably due to the fact that these orders are less exposed to
short term market trends than those posted at Q±1 (since they are covered by the
volume standing at Q±1 and their price level is farther away from the reference price).
Q±3: The priority value is smaller at the third limit since it takes longer time for Q±3 to
become the best quote if it does. The rate of order cancellation increases almost
linearly for queue sizes larger than 3 AES3. We also ﬁnd a quite large cancellation
rate when the queue size is equal to one, which shows that market participants cancel
their orders more quickly when they ﬁnd themselves alone in the queue.
• Market orders:
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Q±1: The rate decreases exponentially with the available volume at Q±1. This phenomena
is easily explained by market participants “rushing for liquidity” when liquidity is
rare, and “waiting for better price” when liquidity is abundant.
Q±2: In practice, market orders can arrive at Q±2 only if Q±1 = 0 (that is when Q±2 is the
best oﬀer queue). The shape of the intensity is very similar to the one obtained in
the case of Q±1. The values are of course much smaller.
Q±3: In some rare cases, one can still ﬁnd some market orders arriving at Q±3 (mar-
ket orders occurring when the spread is large). The intensity function remains
exponentially decreasing.
2.3.3 Asymptotic behavior under Model I
The invariant distribution of the LOB can be computed explicitly in Model I. We denote by pii
the stationary distribution of the limit Qi , and deﬁne the arrival/departure ratio vector ρi by
ρi (n)=
λLi (n)
(λCi (n+1)+λMi (n+1))
.
Then the following result for the invariant distribution is easily obtained, see for example Gross
and Harris (1998):
pii (n) = pii (0)
n∏
j=1
ρi ( j −1)
pii (0) =
(
1+
∞∑
n=1
n∏
j=1
ρi ( j −1)
)−1.
Hence the long term behavior of the LOB is completely determined by ρ. This implies
that two assets can have very diﬀerent ﬂow dynamics, but still the same invariant distribution
provided that their arrival/departure ratios are the same.
We now compare the asymptotic results of the model with the empirical distributions ob-
served at Q±1, Q±2 and Q±3. To compute these empirical laws, we use a sampling frequency of
30 seconds (every 30 seconds, we look at the LOB and record its state)7. The results are gathered
in Figure I.3, as well as the invariant distributions from a Poisson model (constant limit/market
order arrival rate, linear cancellation rate, parameters estimated from the same dataset).
One can see that the invariant distributions approximate very well the empirical distributions
of the LOB. This shows that in order to explain the shape of the LOB, such mean-ﬁeld type
approach, where the LOB proﬁle arises from interactions between the average behaviors of
market participants, can be very relevant.
2.4 Model II: Dependent case
We now present some extensions of Model I. We assume here that buy/sell market orders
consume volume at the best quote limits, deﬁned as the ﬁrst non empty ask/bid queue. Thus, we
consider a buy market order process with intensity λMbuy and a sell market order process with
7Other sampling frequencies have also been tested and the estimated distributions are found to be very similar.
These sampled data will also be used to estimate the joint distributions of the LOB limits in Model IIa and IIb .
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Figure I.3: Model I, invariant distributions of q±1,q±2,q±3, France Telecom
intensity λMsel l . The limit order, cancellation, and market order arrival processes are assumed to
be independent conditional on the LOB state. So we can write fi (q) and gi (q) in the following
form:
fi (q) = λLi (q)
gi (q) = λCi (q)+λMbuy (q)1bestask(q)=i , if i > 0
gi (q) = λCi (q)+λMsel l (q)1bestbid(q)=i , if i < 0.
As for Model I, we consider some bid-ask symmetry, that is, for q = [q−3,q−2,q−1,q1,q2,q3],
q ′ = [q3,q2,q1,q−1,q−2,q−3] and i = 1,2,3, λLi (q) = λL−i (q ′), λMi (q) = λM−i (q ′) and λMbuy (q) =
λMsel l (q
′) .
2.4.1 Model IIa : Two sets of dependent queues
Institutional traders and brokers tend to place most of their limit orders at best limits, while many
market makers, arbitragers and other high frequency traders stand also in queues beyond these
best limits. This suggests for example that the dynamics at Q±2 may not only depend on q±2, but
also on whether or not Q±1 is empty. We thus propose to use the following intensity functions
for the queue Q±2: in this model, λL±2 and λ
C
±2 are functions of q±2 and 1q±1>0. Intensities at
Qi , i 6= ±2 remain functions of qi only. For large tick assets, the probability that Q±i , i ≥ 3 is the
best limit is negligible. It is thus reasonable to also assume that market orders are only sent to
Q±1 and Q±2. This enables us to keep the independence property between Q±3 and (Q±1,Q±2).
When q±1 > 0, the market order intensity λMbuy/sel l is assumed to be a function of q±1; when
q±1 = 0, it is a function of q±2 only.
2.4.2 Model IIa : Empirical study
In this empirical study, our goal is to understand how market participants make trading decisions
at Q±2 in two diﬀerent situations: q±1 = 0 and q±1 > 0. Since we are now studying a two-
dimensional problem, the data recording process is slightly diﬀerent. In particular, for (Q1,Q2),
it goes as follows: we record the waiting times ∆ti (ω) between events that happen at Q1 or Q2,
the type of event T (ω) and the two queue sizes (q1(ω),q2(ω)) before the event. The maximum
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Figure I.4: Intensities at Q2 as functions of 1q1>0 and q2, France Telecom
likelihood method is again used to estimate the intensity functions λLi , λ
C
i , λ
M
i for i = 1,2. For
i = 1 and i = 3, as the dynamics at Q±i only depend on the queue size at Q±i , the estimated
values of λL1 ,λ
C
1 and λ
M
1 are very close to those obtained in Model I and are not shown here.
The estimated intensity functions at Q±2 are given in Figure I.4. Some comments are in order:
• Limit order insertion: Both curves are decreasing functions of the queue size. In the ﬁrst
case (q±1 = 0), the limit order insertion intensity reaches very rapidly its asymptotic value.
The relatively high value observed for q±2 = 0 is probably due to the fact that for large
tick assets, market makers rarely allow for spreads larger than 3 ticks. In the second
case (q±1 > 0), the intensity continues to go down to a much lower value. This is likely to
be related to the arbitrage strategy introduced in Section 2.3.2: post passive orders at a
non-best limit when its size is small, wait for this limit to eventually become the best limit
and then gain the proﬁt from having the priority value. For example, when the considered
limit becomes the best one, one can decide to stay in the queue if its size is large enough
to cover the risk of short term market trend, or to cancel the orders if the queue size is too
small.
• Limit order cancellation: The cancellation rate is higher when q±1 = 0. This can be related
to the concentration of the trading activity at best limits. When q±1 > 0, the cancellation
rate is quite large when q±2 = 1, as it is the case at Q±3 (see Section 2.3.2).
• Market orders: No market order can arrive at Q±2 when there are still limit orders at Q±1
(cross limits large market orders that consume several limits are treated as several market
orders that arrive sequentially at those limits within a very short time period). The market
order arrival rate when Q±2 is the best limit is not very diﬀerent from that at Q±1, but
shows a rather unexpected increasing trend when the queue size becomes larger than 5
AES2.
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Figure I.5: Model IIa : joint distribution of q1,q2, France Telecom
2.4.3 Model IIa : Asymptotic behavior
Model IIa belongs to a special class of Markov processes, called quasi birth and death processes
(QBD). Their asymptotic behavior can be studied by the matrix geometric method. Deﬁnitions of
QBD processes and explanations about the matrix geometric method can be found in appendix.
In Figure I.5, we show the theoretical joint distribution of (q1,q2) for the stock France Telecom
and compare it with the joint distribution estimated from empirical data. Here also, we see that
the theoretical results provide a very satisfying approximation.
2.4.4 Model IIb : Modeling bid-ask dependences
We now study the interactions between the bid queues and the ask queues. Let Q0, Q−, Q¯, Q+
be four marks which represent in the following ranges of values for the queue sizes. Let m and l
be two integers. We deﬁne the function Sm,l (x):
Sm,l (x) = Q0 if x = 0
Sm,l (x) = Q− if 0< x ≤m
Sm,l (x) = Q¯ if m < x ≤ l
Sm,l (x) = Q+ if x > l .
This function associates to a queue size x four possible ranges: empty: x = 0, small: x ∈ (0,m],
usual: x ∈ (m, l ] and large: x ∈ (l ,+∞). We set m as the 33% lower quantile and l as the 33%
upper quantile of q±1 (conditional on positive values). In this model, market participants at
Q±1 adjust their behavior not only according to the target queue size, but also to the size of the
opposite queue. The rates λL±1 and λ
C
±1 are therefore modeled as functions of q±1 and Sm,l (q∓1).
As in Model IIa , we suppose that market orders consume volume at the best limits and are
only sent to Q±1 and Q±2. When q±1 > 0, the market order intensity λMbuy/sel l is assumed to
be a function of q±1 and Sm,l (q∓1). Regime switching at Q±2 is kept in this model: λL±2, λ
C
±2
are assumed to be functions of 1q±1>0 and q±2, and when q±1 = 0, the market order intensity
λMbuy/sel l is modeled as a function of q±2.
Under these assumptions, the 2K -dimensional problem is reduced to the study of the 4-
dimensional continuous-time Markov jump process (Q−2,Q−1,Q1,Q2). One important feature
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Figure I.6: Intensities at Q1 as functions of Sm,l (q−1) and q1, France Telecom
of this model is that the queues Q±2 have no inﬂuence on the dynamics at Q±1. Therefore, we
only need to study the 3-dimensional process (Q−1,Q1,Q2) (or even the 2-dimensional process
(Q−1,Q1) if one is only interested in the dynamics at Q±1. Remark also that other choices for
the speciﬁcation of the intensity functions at Q±1 are possible. For example, one can consider
them as functions of the ﬁrst level bid/ask imbalance, deﬁned as q1−q−1q1+q−1 , or simply as functions
of the spread size.
2.4.5 Model IIb : Empirical study
We focus here on the estimation of the intensity functions at Q±1. We consider the departure
ﬂow intensities λC±1(q±1,Sm,l (q∓1)) and λ
M
buy/sel l (q±1,Sm,l (q∓1)), and the arrival ﬂow intensities
λL±1(q±1,Sm,l (q∓1)). Using again the symmetry property of the LOB, we take λ
L
1 (x, y)=λL−1(x, y),
λC1 (x, y) = λC−1(x, y) and λMsel l (x, y) = λMbuy (x, y). We record the waiting times ∆t (ω) between
events that happen at Q1 or Q−1, the types of event T (ω) and the two queue sizes (q1(ω),q−1(ω))
before the event. Then we estimate these intensity functions using the maximum likelihood
method. The results are shown in Figure I.6 (m = 4 AES1, l = 9 AES1)8. Some remarks are in
order:
• Limit order insertion: The limit order insertion rate is a decreasing function of the opposite
queue size. In particular, we see that when the opposite queue is empty (pink curve), it is
signiﬁcantly larger. Indeed, in that case, the “eﬃcient" price is likely to be closer to the
opposite side. Therefore limit orders at the non empty ﬁrst limit are likely to be proﬁtable.
• Limit order cancellation: The cancellation rates for diﬀerent ranges of Q−1 are similar in
their forms but have diﬀerent asymptotic values. This rate is not surprisingly a decreasing
function of the liquidity level on the opposite side. Indeed, when this level becomes low,
many market participants cancel their limit orders and send market orders since the
market is likely to move in an unfavorable direction.
• Market orders: We see that when the liquidity available on the opposite side is abundant,
more market orders are sent. Indeed, in that case, transactions at the target queue are
8Note that the computation of the conﬁdence intervals becomes more intricate for this model and the results
presented are slightly approximate ones, see details in appendix.
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Figure I.7: Model IIb : joint distribution of q−1,q1, France Telecom
relatively cheap as its price level is temporarily closer to the eﬃcient price. In the special
situation q−1 = 0, the price level at Q1 can seem relatively attractive since it is much closer
to the reference price than the opposite best price, which is in that case 2 ticks away from
it. This explains why the market order intensity is larger when the opposite queue is empty
than when its size is small.
2.4.6 Model IIb : Asymptotic behavior
Monte-Carlo simulations are used to obtain the theoretical invariant distribution of the LOB in
Model IIb . The theoretical and empirical joint distributions of Q−1 and Q1 are shown in Figure
I.7. The diﬀerence between the two graphs comes from the relatively high probabilities of states
of the form (x, y) with x and y both small in empirical data, which are somehow replaced by
states of the form (x,0) or (0, y) in the model. Indeed, in practice, a situation where one of the
ﬁrst queue is empty is not likely to remain long since it often leads to a reference price change.
This eﬀect is not taken into account in Model IIb where the reference price is constant, but will
be investigated in Model III in Section 3.1. We anticipate here by giving in Figure I.8 the joint
distribution obtained when suitable moves of the reference price are added within the framework
of Model IIb (following the approach of Model III in Section 3.1). We now ﬁnd that the simulated
density becomes very close to the empirical one.
2.5 Example of application: Probability of execution
The preceding models can be used to compute short term predictions about several important
LOB related quantities. One relevant example is the probability of executing an order before
the midprice moves. Suppose that at time t = 0, both Q1 and Q−1 are not empty. Then a trader
(called A) submits a buy limit order at Q−1 of size n0 and waits in the queue until either the
order is executed or the opposite queue Q1 is totally depleted. The probability of execution can
be computed in all of the three preceding models, using Monte-Carlo simulations.
There are two types of orders at Q−1: orders placed before t = 0, thus having higher priority
compared with the order of trader A, and orders placed after t = 0, having lower priority. When
a market order arrives at Q−1, the limit order with the highest priority is executed. Hence
trader A’s order starts being executed only when all orders placed at Q−1 before t = 0 have been
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Figure I.8: Model III: joint distribution of q−1,q1, France Telecom
either canceled or executed. When a cancellation event happens at Q−1, the precise order being
canceled is not clearly deﬁned in our models. So, we need to make two additional assumptions
for the cancellation process.
Assumption 18. When a cancellation event occurs at Q−1, orders at Q−1 have the same probability
of being canceled (except for the limit order submitted by trader A, which is never canceled).
Assumption 19. The cancellation intensity at Q−1 is supposed to be equal to λC1 (q−1)
q−1−n0
q−1
instead
of λC1 (q−1), since the order placed by trader A is never canceled.
Orders with lower priority are actually more likely to be canceled, see Gareche, Disdier,
Kockelkoren, and Bouchaud (2013). However, in order to investigate precisely this feature, we
would need more detailed market data keeping records of the identiﬁers of the submitted and
canceled orders. As a result, execution probabilities might be slightly overestimated using
Assumptions 18 and 19. Simulation results (for n0 = 1) are shown in Figure I.9, together with the
predictions associated to a Poisson model that assumes a linearly increasing cancellation rate.
We see that our three models give fairly similar execution probabilities, while the Poisson model
clearly overestimates them.
3 The queue-reactive model: a time consistent model with
stochastic LOB and dynamic reference price
We now wish to obtain a model which is relevant on the whole period of interest and provides
useful applications.
3.1 Model III: The queue-reactive model
3.1.1 Building the model
Let δ denote the tick value. We assume here that pre f changes with some probability θ when
some event modiﬁes the midprice pmid . More precisely, when pmid increases/decreases9, pre f
9Note that in this model, pre f does not necessarily match its estimated value using the method introduced in
Section 2.2. However, for large tick assets, the diﬀerence is negligible.
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Figure I.9: Execution probability of a buying order placed at Q−1 at t = 0, France Telecom
increases/decreases by δ with probability θ, provided q±1 = 0 at that moment. Hence changes of
pre f are possibly triggered by one of the three following events:
• The insertion of a buy limit order within the bid-ask spread while Q1 is empty at the
moment of this insertion, or the insertion of a sell limit order within the bid-ask spread
while Q−1 is empty at the moment of this insertion.
• A cancellation of the last limit order at one of the best oﬀer queues.
• A market order that consumes the last limit order at one of the best oﬀer queues.
When pre f changes, the value of qi switches immediately to the value of one of its neigh-
bors (right if pre f increases, left if it decreases). Thus, q±1 becomes zero when pre f de-
creases/increases. Recall that we keep records of the LOB up to the third limit. Consequently,
the value for q±3 when pre f increases/decreases is drawn from its invariant measure. Note that
the queue switching process must be handled very carefully: the average event sizes are not the
same for diﬀerent queues. So, when qi becomes q j , its new value should be re-normalized by
the ratio between the two average event sizes at Qi and Q j .
To possibly incorporate external information, we moreover assume that with probability
θreini t , the LOB state is redrawn from its invariant distribution around the new reference
price when pre f changes. The parameter θreini t can be understood as the percentage of price
changes due to exogenous information. In this case, we consider that market participants
readjust very quickly their order ﬂows around the new reference price, as if a new state of the
LOB was drawn from its invariant distribution. A similar approach has been used in Cont
and De Larrard (2013) in a model for best bid and best ask queues, in which θreini t is set to
1. Under these assumptions, the market dynamics is now modeled by a (2K +1)-dimensional
Markov process: X˜ (t ) := (X (t ),pre f (t )), in the countable state space Ω˜ = N2K ×δN, where
X (t )= (q−K (t ), ...,q−1(t ),q1(t ), ...,qK (t )) represents the available volumes at diﬀerent limits.
In the sequel, Model I is used to describe the LOB dynamics during periods when pre f is
constant (very similar results are obtained in simulations using Model IIa or IIb ). The pre f
change probability θ and the LOB reinitialization probability θreini t are calibrated using the 10
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Figure I.10: 10 min volatility and mean reversion ratio, France Telecom
minutes standard deviation of the returns of pmid (the volatility) and the mean reversion ratio η
introduced in Robert and Rosenbaum (2011), deﬁned by
η= Nc
2Na
,
where Nc is the number of continuations of the estimated pre f on the interval of interest (that is
the number of consecutive moves in the same direction) and Na is the number of alternations
(that is the number of consecutive moves in opposite directions)10. Indeed, the microstructure
of large tick assets is well summarized by the parameter η, see Robert and Rosenbaum (2011)
and Dayri and Rosenbaum (2012) and the volatility is of course one of the most important
low frequency statistics. In Figure I.10, we show the surfaces of the 10 min volatility and η for
diﬀerent values of θ and θreini t .
3.1.2 About the maximal mechanical volatility
Let us comment now the particular case where we take θreini t = 0. In such situation, Model
III becomes a “purely order book driven model" since the price ﬂuctuations are completely
generated by the LOB dynamics. Our simulations show that under this setting, the maximal
attainable volatility level (when θ = 1), which we call maximal mechanical volatility, is much
lower than the empirical volatility (5 bps compared with 14 bps for the stock France Telecom).
This suggests that endogenous LOB dynamics alone may not be enough for reproducing the
market volatility. A closer look at these results shows that the model approximates actually
quite well the average frequency of price changes, and that the small value of the mechanical
volatility is mainly due to the strong mean reverting behavior of the price in this purely order
book driven model. This is because of the often reversed bid-ask imbalance immediately after a
change of pre f . In Figure I.10, we can see that the mean reversion ratio η is equal to 0.08 when
θ = 1,θreini t = 0, which is much smaller than the empirical ratio 0.39.
10Note that here we compute the mean reversion ratio of pre f while the transaction price is usually considered.
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3.2 Example of application: Order placement analysis
We now show how the queue-reactive model can be used in the context of optimal trading. In the
general framework of optimal execution, the trading horizon is split into small slices (typically
5-10 minutes) and an algorithm of execution determines the volume to be executed in each
slice. This problem, often called “order scheduling problem”, has been widely studied in the
literature, see Bertsimas, Lo, and Hummel (1999); Almgren and Chriss (2000); Bouchard, Dang,
and Lehalle (2011) for representative examples on this topic. In practice, another optimization
issue, the “order placement problem”, arises naturally once the order scheduling problem has
been solved: how should the algorithm place orders to execute the target volume?
This second optimization problem can be seen as the microstructural version of the ﬁrst
one. However, it is much more diﬃcult to solve. Indeed, the price dynamics can no longer be
approximated by a Brownian motion at these (ultra) high frequency scales. Moreover, the queue
priority plays an important role as well as other microstructural features of the asset such as the
tick size, the state of the LOB and the trading speed. This in particular implies that execution
strategies based on limit or market orders can lead to very diﬀerent outcomes. Some papers
investigate the consequences of using diﬀerent types of order, see Harris and Hasbrouck (1996),
while others aim at ﬁnding the best position to place limit orders, see Laruelle, Lehalle, and
Pagès (2013). However, in practice, order placement tactics are usually more complex than the
ones considered in the academic literature. For example, traders can hide their trading intentions
by splitting furthermore the target volume within each slice. Also, they may start passively,
sending limit orders, and then switch to market orders when some market conditions change
or a stopping time criteria is met. Very few quantitative tools are available for the analysis of
sophisticated tactics and one often needs to rely on so-called market replayers, in which the
number of simulations is limited by that of the available trading days in the historical data.
Moreover, the market impact, that is the average price drift due to our own trading between the
beginning of the execution and a later time, is often neglected. In contrast, our framework is
unlimited in number of simulations and is both relevant and easy to use in order to study market
impact proﬁles and execution costs of complex placement tactics.
We write ntotal for the total quantity to execute and M for the number of slices. An order
scheduling strategy gives the target quantity to be executed in each slice, denoted by ni (ni ≥ 0
and
∑M
i=1ni = ntotal ). An order placement tactic can be seen as a predeﬁned procedure of order
management, ensuring the execution of the target quantity within the slice. Here, as illustration
examples, we present two simple tactics, denoted by T1 and T2. In the i -th slice, both tactics
post a limit order of size ni at the best oﬀer queue at the beginning of the period, and send a
market order with all the remaining quantity to complete the execution of the target volume at
the end time of the slice. In between:
• T1 (Fire and forget): When pmid changes, cancel the limit order and send a market order
at the opposite side with all the remaining volume if any.
• T2 (Pegging to the best): When the best oﬀer price changes or our order is the only
remaining order at the best oﬀer limit, cancel the order and repost all the remaining
volume at the newly revealed best oﬀer queue.
Since an order placement tactic is often speciﬁcally designed for a given order scheduling
strategy, comparisons between two tactics should take into account the associated scheduling
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strategy, together with the target benchmark11. Other parameters can also have inﬂuence when
comparing two tactics, such as the total quantity to execute ntotal and the number of slices M .
To simplify our analysis, we simulate a buy order of size ntotal = 60 AES1, with M = 20 and the
duration of each slice is ﬁxed to 10 minutes (a total trading period of 3h20). We focus on two
benchmarks: the VWAP on the total period (volume weighted average transaction price) and
the arrival price S0 (the midprice when the execution algorithm starts). Moreover, two types of
order scheduling strategies, denoted by S1 and S2, are considered to partly reﬂect the diversity
of optimal trading schemes:
• S1: A linear scheduling (ni = ntotal/M ), used for the VWAP benchmark.
• S2: An exponential scheduling ni = ntotal (e−(i−1)/4−e−i/4), used for the benchmark S0.
Finally, note that Assumptions 18 and 19 are in force for the order cancellation processes.
3.2.1 Tactic performance analysis
The performance of an execution algorithm is often measured by its slippage, deﬁned (for a buy
order) by
Slippage= Pbenchmark −Pexec
Pbenchmark
.
To understand the eﬀects of the order placement tactic on the execution’s slippage, we deﬁne the
theoretical scheduling slippage by:
P theoexec =
M∑
i=1
niVWAP
i
Slippagetheo = Pbenchmark −P
theo
exec
Pbenchmark
,
where VWAPi denotes the volume weighted average transaction price of the i−th slice.
Indeed, VWAPi is often considered as a simple proxy for the execution price in the slice when
one focuses on the scheduling algorithm. Hence, Slippagetheo essentially measures the quality
of the scheduling strategy and neglects the randomness in execution prices due to the order
placement tactic12. Note that here a market impact component is included in the computation of
the theoretical scheduling slippage. This is because the value of VWAPi in each slice is obviously
impacted by our execution.
We launched 2000 simulations for each couple of (S1/S2, T1/T2). The intensity functions
estimated for the stock France Telecom are used in these simulations, as well as the two pa-
rameters θ = 0.7 and θreini t = 0.85 calibrated in Section 3.1. Furthermore, we use a standard
kernel smoothing method when estimating the probability density functions of Slippagetheo and
Slippage. The results are shown in Figure I.11.
Figure I.11 suggests that the slippage distributions of the same scheduling strategy using two
diﬀerent tactics can be very diﬀerent: T2 (“Pegging to the best”) performs better than T1 (“Fire
11In execution services, the client often wants the execution algorithm to target some speciﬁc price (the arrival
price, the average market price during a predeﬁned period,...). The quality of the execution is then assessed on the
basis of the diﬀerence between the realized execution price and this target benchmark price.
12See Section 5.4 in Appendix for a detailed discussion on placement tactic analysis
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Figure I.11: Simulation results for the tactics
and forget”) when being coupled with a linear scheduling strategy with VWAP benchmark, while
T1 slightly outperforms T2 when an exponential scheduling strategy with arrival price benchmark
is considered. In our setting, the limit orders change the queue sizes and therefore modify the
behaviors of the order ﬂows. Consequently they generate market impact. By constantly following
the best oﬀer queue until the total volume is ﬁlled, T2 achieves on average a higher passive
execution rate (deﬁned as the volume passively executed13 divided by the total executed volume).
Thus, in each slice, it often obtains a better price than that of a more market orders based tactic.
However, at the same time, it creates a larger impact than T1 since the order stays longer in the
queues. This explains why the theoretical scheduling slippage of T2 is worse than that of T1 for
an execution with arrival price benchmark using an exponential scheduling strategy.
3.2.2 Market impact proﬁles
We now study the market impact proﬁles of these two tactics. Recall that an order placement
tactic has two parameters: the slice duration T and the quantity to execute n. In the follow-
ing experiments, T is set to 10 minutes, and the value of n varies from 1 to 60 AES1. We
denote by MIi (t ,n) the market impact at time t of Tactic i with target quantity n, deﬁned by:
MIi (t ,n) = E[St−S0S0 ], with St the midprice at time t . We launched 2000 simulations for each
value of n, t in the ranges 1-60 AES1 and 1-600 seconds. Impact proﬁles are given in Figure I.12.
In agreement with the celebrated “square-root law”, see Gatheral (2010); Toth, Lemperiere,
Deremble, De Lataillade, Kockelkoren, and Bouchaud (2011a); Farmer, Gerig, Lillo, and Wael-
broeck (2013), the market impact curves are concave both in time and volume. One can also see
that the impact of T1 is quite instantaneous and depends essentially on the target quantity n,
while the impact of T2 is a progressive process, depending both on the target quantity n and the
time t . Remark that T2 seems suitable when dealing with small orders since its market impact is
small and it has a higher passive execution rate than T1. If one needs to trade larger orders, T1
becomes probably more relevant since the cost of market impact is likely to outweigh the beneﬁt
from passive execution of T2. Finally, note that in our Markovian framework, no signiﬁcant
price relaxation (that is the fact that on average, after the completion of the execution of a buy
13A buy execution is said to be passive if it occurs at the bid side of the LOB, aggressive if it occurs at the ask
side of the LOB.
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Figure I.12: Market impact proﬁles
order, the price may drop to a lower level than the one reached at the end of the execution) can
be observed.
4 Conclusion and perspectives
In this work, we have modeled market participants intelligence through their average behaviors
towards various states of the LOB. This enabled us to analyze the diﬀerent order ﬂows and
to design a suitable market simulator for practitioners, allowing notably to investigate the
transaction costs of complex trading strategies. To our knowledge, our model is the ﬁrst one
where such pre-trade cost analysis is possible in a simple and eﬃcient way.
Another important public information, the historical order ﬂow, is not considered in this
approach. Market order ﬂows have been shown to be autocorrelated in several empirical studies,
see for example Toth, Palit, Lillo, and Farmer (2011b). Thus, adding such feature in our framework
would probably be relevant. Another possible direction for future research would be to explain
the shape of the estimated intensity functions in a more sophisticated way. For example, it would
be interesting to design some agent based model where these repetitive patterns of the LOB
dynamics would be reproduced, providing an even better understanding of the nature of these
intensity curves.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. For some z > 1, set
V (q)=
K∑
j=−K , j 6=0
z |q j−Cbound |+ .
For any q ∈Ω, we have:
QV (q) = ∑
p 6=q
Qq,p [V (p)−V (q)]
=
K∑
i=−K ,i 6=0
[ fi (q)(z
|qi+1−Cbound |+ − z |qi−Cbound |+)+ gi (q)(z |qi−1−Cbound |+ − z |qi−Cbound |+)]
=
K∑
i=−K ,i 6=0
[ fi (q)1qi≥Cbound z
|qi−Cbound |+(z−1)+ gi (q)1qi≥Cbound+1z |qi−Cbound |+(
1
z
−1)]
= (z−1)
K∑
i=−K ,i 6=0
[ fi (q)1qi≥Cbound −
gi (q)1qi≥Cbound+1
z
]z |qi−Cbound |+
= (z−1) ∑
i :qi=Cbound
fi (q)+ (z−1)
∑
i :qi>Cbound
[ fi (q)− gi (q)
z
]zqi−Cbound . (I.1)
Under Assumption 16 and 17, we can ﬁnd a z suﬃciently close to 1 such that, if qi >Cbound ,
fi (q)− gi (q)
z
< z−1(−r +H(z−1))=−r ′ < 0.
So, from Equation (I.1), we have
QV (q) ≤ (z−1)H − (z−1) ∑
i :qi>Cbound
r ′zqi−Cbound
≤ −(z−1)r ′∑
i
z |qi−Cbound |+ + (z−1)H +2(z−1)r ′K
≤ −(z−1)r ′V (q)+ (z−1)[H +2r ′K z].
Thus X (t ) is V-uniformly ergodic. Then using Theorem 4.2 in Meyn and Tweedie (1993), X (t )
is Harris positive recurrent and has a ﬁnite invariant measure. Furthermore, by Theorem 3.6.2
in Norris (1998), the process X (t ) converges to its equilibrium and is therefore ergodic.
5.2 Computation of conﬁdence intervals
When the queues are independent, by the central limit theorem, we have, with asymptotic
probability 95% (we note pˆi L(n)= #{T (ω)∈E
+,qi (ω)=n}
#{qi (ω)=n} ):
Λi (n) ∈ [Λˆi (n)− 1.96Λˆi (n)√
#{qi (ω)= n}
,Λˆi (n)+ 1.96Λˆi (n)√
#{qi (ω)= n}
]
λLi (n)
Λi (n)
∈ [pˆi L(n)−
1.96
√
pˆi
L(n)(1− pˆi L(n))√
#{qi (ω)= n}
, pˆi
L(n)+
1.96
√
pˆi
L(n)(1− pˆi L(n))√
#{qi (ω)= n}
].
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So, at least with probability 90%:
λLi (n) ∈ [(Λˆi (n)−
1.96Λˆi (n)√
#{qi (ω)= n}
)(pˆi
L(n)−
1.96
√
pˆi
L(n)(1− pˆi L(n))√
#{qi (ω)= n}
)
(Λˆi (n)+ 1.96Λˆi (n)√
#{qi (ω)= n}
)(pˆi
L(n)+
1.96
√
pˆi
L(n)(1− pˆi L(n))√
#{qi (ω)= n}
)].
Similar results can be computed for λCi and λ
M
i . The method used to compute conﬁdence
intervals of Model IIa is quite similar. Conﬁdence intervals are more diﬃcult to compute in
Model IIb , and we use approximations by neglecting the possible intersections between the two
sets: {q1(ω)= n,Sm,l (q−1(ω)) ∈ s)} and {q−1(ω)= n,Sm,l (q1(ω)) ∈ s)}.
5.3 Quasi birth and death process
Deﬁnition 1. (Quasi birth and death process, from Latouche and Ramaswami (1999)): A quasi birth
and death (QBD) process is a bivariate Markov process with countable state space S = {(i , j ) : i ≥
0, j = 0,1, ...,m} where the ﬁrst element i is called the level of the process, and the second element
j is called the phase of the process. The parameter m can be either ﬁnite or inﬁnite. The process is
restricted in level jumps only to its nearest neighbors, meaning that the probability of jumping from
level i directly to level l , l ≥ i +2 or l ≤ i −2 is equal to zero.
We can easily see that the Markov process (q1,q2) in Model IIa is indeed a QBD process
with countable phases. Its inﬁnitesimal generator matrix is of the following form:
Q =

A(0)1 A
(0)
0 0 0 ...
A(1)2 A
(1)
1 A
(1)
0 0 ...
0 A(2)2 A
(2)
1 A
(2)
0 ...
... ... ... ... ...
 ,
where the matrix A(`)0 encodes transitions from level q1 = ` to level q1 = `+ 1, matrix A(`)2
encodes transitions from level q1 = ` to level q1 = `−1, and matrix A(`)1 encodes transitions
within level q1 = `. More speciﬁcally, the element (i , j ) of A(`)0 is the transition rate from state
(q1 = `,q2 = i ) to state (q1 = `+1,q2 = j ), the element (i , j ) of A(`)2 is the transition rate from
state (q1 = `,q2 = i ) to state (q1 = `−1,q2 = j ), and the element (i , j ) of A(`)1 is the transition
rate from state (q1 = `,q2 = i ) to state (q1 = `,q2 = j ).
We write the intensity functions at Q2 when q1 = 0 with a .˜ For matrix A(`)i , i = 0,1,2, we have:
A(k)0 = λL1 (k)I ,
A(k)2 = (λC1 (k)+λMbuy (k))I ,
A(0)1 =

−λL1 (0)− λ˜L2 (0) λ˜L2 (0) 0 ...
λ˜C2 (1)+ λ˜Mbuy (1) −λL1 (0)− λ˜L2 (1)− λ˜C2 (1)− λ˜Mbuy (1) λ˜L2 (1) ...
0 λ˜C2 (2)+ λ˜Mbuy (2) −λL1 (0)− λ˜L2 (2)− λ˜C2 (2)− λ˜Mbuy (2) ...
... ... ... ...
 ,
and for k ≥ 1:
A(k)1 =
 −λ
C
1 (k)−λMbuy (k)−λL1 (k)−λL2 (0) λL2 (0) 0 ...
λC2 (1) −λC1 (k)−λMbuy (k)−λL1 (k)−λL2 (1)−λC2 (1) λL2 (1) ...
... ... ... ...
 .
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We deﬁne pii , j =P[q1 = i ,q2 = j ] the stationary distribution of this QBD process, and:
pin = [pin,0,pin,1, ...]
pi = [pi0,pi1, ...].
We shall have:
piQ = 0
pi1 = 1.
The dynamics of the two queues system (q1,q2) is level dependent, meaning that its
transition kernel depends on the value of q1. This makes the computation or approximation
of its asymptotic behavior quite diﬃcult. Thus we consider an additional assumption in order
to turn (q1,q2) into a so-called level independent QBD process. This is particularly interesting
since it enables us to easily express the invariant measure in a matrix geometric form and to
compute it numerically. The level independence property is deﬁned by the fact that for i ≥ 1,
A(i )0 , A
(i )
1 and A
(i )
2 do not depend on i and A
(0)
0 = A(i )0 , see Latouche and Ramaswami (1999).
Under the following assumption, this property is satisﬁed by (q1,q2) in Model IIa .
Assumption 20. (Independent Poisson ﬂows at ﬁrst limits) There are two positive constants λ1 and
µ1, with λ1 <µ1, such that for k ≥ 1:
λC1 (k)+λMbuy (k) = µ1
λL1 (k) = λ1
λL1 (0) = λ1.
In practice, λ1 and µ1 are taken as the average values of the estimated intensity functions
at ﬁrst limits. Under this assumption, a quite simple numerical computation of the invariant
distribution is possible. Generally speaking, QBD processes with ﬁnite phase (meaning that the
value set of the second dimension, in our case q2, is ﬁnite) can be easily treated, see for example
Latouche and Ramaswami (1999). In the inﬁnite case, truncation methods must be applied to
obtain approximate results. Thanks to the special structure of the generator in our model, one
simple truncation method, called “ﬁrst column augmentation by block”, can be applied. Details
of this truncation method can be found in Bean and Latouche (2010). The mathlab toolbox
SMCSolver, see Bini, Meini, Steﬀé, and Van Houdt (2006), is used to compute the invariant
measure.
5.4 Order Placement Tactic Analysis
In this section we gather our ideas on order placement tactic analysis related to Section 3.2. We
use the following notations:
M Number of slices.
ntotal Total target execution quantity.
V Total market volume in the i−th slice.
ni Target volume in the i−th slice.
vi Market volume in the i−th slice.
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n∗i Executed volume in the i−th slice.
∆ni := n∗i −ni .
Ni :=
∑i
j=1ni Cumulative target volume till the i−th slice.
N∗i :=
∑i
j=1n
∗
i Cumulative executed volume till the i−th slice.
∆Ni := N∗i −Ni .
pi Market VWAP (volumed weighted average price) in the i−th slice.
p∗i Algorithm’s VWAP in the i−th slice.
∆pi := p∗i −pi .
σi Price volatility in the i−th slice.
In practice, an execution algorithm gives answers to the two following question:
1. Order Scheduling: how to distribute the target volume across the trading horizon?
2. Order Placement: how to place individual orders to the LOB?
While most existing approaches for post-trade performance analysis focus on evaluating
the overall performance, it is actually more reasonable to separate the order scheduling part
from the order placement part: performance of order placement tactics depends mainly on
ultra-high frequency factors such as the latency, the queue priority, bid-ask imbalance, which
have generally little inﬂuences over the choice of the “optimal trading curve” determined by
the order scheduling strategy. Moreover, the same order scheduling strategy can be coupled
with diﬀerent order placement tactics to build diﬀerent execution algorithms. In such cases, it is
important to be able to understand the pros and cons of each tactic so that an informed choice
can be made to determine the best tactic under diﬀerent market conditions.
5.4.1 Slippage Decomposition
To separate eﬀects of order scheduling and order placement, we propose the following decompo-
sition method (taking a VWAP benchmark (Pbenchmark =
∑M
i=1
vi
V pi ) as an example, decomposition
methods for other benchmark are similar):
Slippage =
∑M
i=1(
n∗i
ntotal
p∗i − viV pi )
Pbenchmark
=
∑M
i=1(
ni
ntotal
− viV )pi
Pbenchmark
+
(
∑M
i=1
δni
ntotal
pi +∑Mi=1 nintotal δpi +∑Mi=1 δnintotal δpi )
Pbenchmark
= SlippageV +SlippageO
SlippageV =
∑M
i=1(
ni
ntotal
− viV )pi
Pbenchmark
SlippageO =
∑M
i=1
δni
ntotal
pi
Pbenchmark
+
∑M
i=1
ni
ntotal
δpi
Pbenchmark
+
∑M
i=1
δni
ntotal
δpi
Pbenchmark
= Tracking Error+Price Improvement+Residual. (I.2)
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Volume Scheduling
SlippageV 14 represents the quality of the volume scheduling strategy, its randomness comes
from the randomness of the price process p i and the market volume curve mi . While traditional
performance analysis uses often the deviation between the optimal trading curve and the realized
market volume curve to quantify the VWAP execution’s performance, we see clearly that here
the quality of order scheduling depends not only on the diﬀerence between the vectors viV and
mi
M , but also on the price process pi .
Order Placement
An order placement tactic can be seen as a (dynamic or statical) strategy of placing orders
to markets with some target quantity and a limited trading horizon. Mathematically, it can be
represented by three random processes: [ f (t ),p(t ), i (t )], where f (t ) denotes the ﬁll rate (the
executed quantity) of the tactic till time t , p(t ) denotes the tactic’s relative performance with
respect to the market till time t , and i (t ) denotes the market impact caused by the tactic. When
other execution conditions, such as the target quantity and the duration, are equal, then we can
further reduce the representation form of a placement tactic to three random variables [ f ,p, i ].
The decomposition formula I.2 enables us to diﬀerentiate the contributions of three main aspects
in an order placement tactics: tracking error, price improvement and the residual:
• Tracking Error: Tracking error measures the performance due to the deviation of the
realized execution trading curve from the scheduled one. In the order placement analysis
in Section 3.2, this term is equal to zero, as both tactics execute the exact amount assigned
by the scheduling strategy in each trading slice. In practice, a good algorithm does
not necessarily follows strictly the “optimal trading curve”, since this often obliges the
algorithm to send a lots of market orders, which is of course not the best way to obtain
the liquidity. By allowing some deviations around the optimal curve, an algorithm can
have a better performance (less aggressive orders + ability to auto-adjust its trading curve
under diﬀerent market conditions). Tracking error is closely linked with the ﬁll rate ( f ) of
the placement tactic.
• Price Improvement: Price improvement measures the placement tactic’s ability of capturing
cheap liquidities in the microscopic level. In general, placement tactics with higher
aggressive ratio (deﬁned as the percentage of quantities executed as market orders) have
worse average price. Price improvement is closely linked with the relative performance p
of the placement tactic.
• Residual: Residual measures the cross eﬀects due to the dependencies between the ﬁll rate
f and the relative performance p .
5.5 Alcatel-Lucent
Results for the stock Alcatel-Lucent are presented in the following ﬁgures (Figure I.13 to Figure
I.18).
5.6 AES
AESi is deﬁned as the average size of all events (including limit order insertion, cancellation and
trades) at Qi , while ATS computes only the average size of all trade events. In Table I.2 we show
14One may notice that Slippagetheo is exactly SlippageV in the above decomposition.
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Figure I.13: Intensities at Q±1,2,3, Alcatel Lucent
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Figure I.14: Intensities at Q2 as functions of 1q1>0 and q2, Alcatel Lucent
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Figure I.15: Intensities at Q1 as functions of Sm,l (q−1) and q1, Alcatel Lucent
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Figure I.16: Queue distribution, Alcatel Lucent
Figure I.17: Model IIa : joint distribution of q1,q2, Alcatel Lucent
Figure I.18: Model IIb : joint distribution of q−1,q1, Alcatel Lucent
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the estimated values of AES at diﬀerent distances to pre f and the estimated value of ATS, for
the stocks France Telecom and Alcatel-Lucent.
stock ATS AES1 AES2 AES3
France Telecom 637 836 1068 1069
Alcatel Lucent 2340 3033 3451 3528
Table I.2: AES and ATS (in number of stocks)
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CHAPTER II
A General Framework for Markovian Order
Book Models
Abstract
We present a general Markovian framework for order book modeling. Through our approach,
we aim at providing a tool enabling to get a better understanding of the price formation
process and of the link between microscopic and macroscopic features of ﬁnancial assets.
To do so, we propose a new method of order book representation, and decompose the
problem of order book modeling into two sub-problems: dynamics of a continuous-time
double auction system with a ﬁxed reference price; interactions between the double auction
system and the reference price movements. State dependency is included in our framework
by allowing the order ﬂow intensities to depend on the order book state. Furthermore,
contrary to most existing models, the impact of the order book updates on the reference
price dynamics is not assumed to be instantaneous. We ﬁrst prove that under general
assumptions, our system is ergodic. Then we deduce the convergence towards a Brownian
motion of the rescaled price process.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, most ﬁnancial exchanges use a limit order book (LOB) mechanism. In these order-
driven markets, market participants send their buy and sell orders to a continuous-time double
auction system, where orders are matched according to their price and time priority. Understand-
ing the LOB dynamics is one of the fundamental issues in the ﬁeld of market microstructure
and leads to many interesting applications in optimal execution, design of electronic trading
algorithms, minimization of market impact costs, short-term predictions and regulation. In the
recent years, many works have been devoted to the description of order book dynamics. Order
book models can be essentially divided into two types: economic models, where one focuses on
the behaviors of individual agents and their optimal decisions, see for example Parlour (1998),
Foucault (1999) and Ros¸u (2009); statistical models, where the order ﬂows are seen as random
processes, see Smith, Farmer, Gillemot, and Krishnamurthy (2003), Cont, Stoikov, and Talreja
(2010), Abergel and Jedidi (2011), Cont and De Larrard (2013), Lakner, Reed, and Stoikov (2013),
Lachapelle, Lasry, Lehalle, and Lions (2013), Bayer, Horst, and Qiu (2014) and Abergel and Jedidi
(2015). With the notable exception of Abergel and Jedidi (2015), where the authors consider the
case of Hawkes-type dynamics, these models usually assume Poisson ﬂows for the order arrival
processes. Such assumption is mainly made for technical reasons, since it is well-known that it is
not consistent with market data. In Huang, Lehalle, and Rosenbaum (2013), the authors propose
to replace the Poisson assumption by a state-dependent approach where the intensities of the
ﬂows depend on the state of the LOB. This model, called “Queue-reactive” model, provides
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new insights for the order book dynamics, such as market participants behaviors conditional on
diﬀerent states of the order book, the LOB’s asymptotic form and the bid-ask spread distribution.
It is also a very relevant tool for practitioners in the perspective of transaction cost analysis of
complex trading algorithms. In this paper, we aim at extending the Queue-reactive model to a
more general framework, in which most of the existing statistical models can be included (up to
minor modiﬁcations). Our goal is to give some theoretical results on the system’s ergodicity as
well as the asymptotic scaling limit of the price process.
In the LOB, price levels are discretized by a minimum price change unity called the tick
value (denoted by α). Market participants can place their buy/sell orders at any level which is a
multiple of the tick value and these orders will either stay in the LOB (a buy order with price
lower than the current best ask price, or a sell order with price higher than the current best
bid price, this type of orders being called “limit order”), or be matched with the existing orders
in the LOB (this type of orders being called “market order”). The LOB, as its name suggests,
is composed of all unmatched limit orders and can be seen as a (rough) approximation of the
current microstructural supply and demand on the diﬀerent price levels.
Current statistical models diﬀer in their way of representing the LOB. In Cont, Stoikov,
and Talreja (2010), the price grid is supposed to be ﬁnite (nminα, ...,nmaxα), and the LOB is
represented by a nmax −nmin +1 dimensional vector that records the buying/selling quanti-
ties at each of these price levels. In such representation, the diﬀerent limits are indexed by
their absolute price level. In practice, to cover the intra-day price range [pmin ,pmax ], the
dimension of the state space have to be at least pmax−pminα +11, which is typically a very large
number. Another way of representing the order book state is to use the relative indexing
method. Following ideas from the Zero-intelligence model of Smith, Farmer, Gillemot, and
Krishnamurthy (2003), Abergel and Jedidi (2011) propose to use the best bid and the best
ask prices as two reference prices to index the limits. In that case, the LOB is made of the
following elements: the two reference prices pbestbid and pbestask , and the limits around them
which are two K dimensional vectors a (for the ask side) and b (for the bid side). The vector
a = [a1, ...,aK ] records the limit sizes at the price levels [pbestbid +α, ...,pbestbid +Kα], while the
vector b = [b1, ...,bK ] records the limit sizes at the price levels [pbestask −α, ...,pbestask −Kα]2.
In practice, observing a market depth of ﬁve ticks is usually considered enough for most trading
purposes. Consequently, for a typical stock with spread size of order ﬁve ticks, the value of
K should be generally of order 10 so that essential information from the LOB is captured.
Thus, the use of these two reference prices reduces signiﬁcantly the dimensionality of the state
space. Note that in this representation, the index of a limit at a given price level is no longer
constant. Therefore, appropriate boundary conditions must be deﬁned to deal with price changes.
In this paper, we propose an original representation of the order book, using only one
reference price which is not necessarily directly observable from the order book state. We view
this reference price as sort of market consensus about the underlying “eﬃcient" price used by
market participants when making their trading decisions. We keep K limits on each side of
the reference price and the LOB is fully described by a 2K +1 dimensional vector, which is
then modeled by a continuous-time Markov jump process. The use of this unique reference
price gives us a lot of ﬂexibility when modeling the order book. Since the reference price is no
1Of course if we choose nmin = 1 and nmax =∞, we have a complete description of all the available buying/selling
oﬀers in the whole price grid αN.
2Note that in this representation, there can be overlaps between the vector a and b when the bid-ask spread is
larger than one tick.
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longer directly determined by the order book state, we can diﬀerentiate two types of jumps in the
Markov process: pure order book state jumps (jumps for which the reference price stays constant)
and common jumps (jumps for which a reference price change is involved). For large tick assets3,
such decomposition is proved to be very relevant when studying the conditional dependences
between the dynamics of the LOB and its state, see Huang, Lehalle, and Rosenbaum (2013).
Moreover, in this framework, we are able to easily incorporate exogenous price movements into
the order book dynamics. This can be simply done adding a reference price jump component
which is independent of the order book state.
At the high frequency scale, the LOB state is one of the two public information that are
accessible to traders and their automates (the other being the history of the order ﬂows). Thus it
plays a very important role in their trading decisions. In our framework , the LOB is assumed to
be a continuous-time Markov jump process, and the inﬂuence of the LOB state on the incoming
ﬂows is modeled through a state-dependent inﬁnitesimal generator matrix for the jump process.
Indeed, in practice, traders essentially rely on information deduced from the current LOB state
when deciding to send an order at a speciﬁc price level. Various simplifying assumptions on the
information set used by traders can be considered in our framework in order to facilitate the em-
pirical studies. The index of a limit, for example, is probably one of the most important elements
in their decision process, as it gives the distance between the target price and the reference price.
Inﬂuence of other variables, such as the target limit’s size, its relative distance to the current
best oﬀer queues and the size of its opposite queue is studied in Huang, Lehalle, and Rosen-
baum (2013), and are shown to also have non-negligible eﬀects on the dynamics of the order ﬂows.
Under appropriate assumptions, the Queue-reactive model can be easily estimated using
empirical data. It provides many interesting new insights on the origin of some micro-structural
properties, such as the stylized empirical distribution of the LOB state. It has been shown in
Bouchaud, Mézard, Potters, et al. (2002) that there exist some regularities in the order book’s
empirical form, that is the average value of the LOB state (a 2K dimensional vector in our model).
From a theoretical point of view, these regularities are closely linked with the notion of ergodicity
of the LOB system (the exact deﬁnition of ergodicity will be given in Section 3): Ergodicity
ensures the convergence of the LOB state distribution towards an invariant probability measure.
Thus the stylized form observed on market data might be explained by a law of large number
type phenomenon for this invariant distribution. This hypothesis is supported by empirical
studies in Huang, Lehalle, and Rosenbaum (2013), in which the authors compare the theoretical
asymptotic distributions in our model with empirical estimations, and show that they are very
close. In Huang, Lehalle, and Rosenbaum (2013), some assumptions are made to ensure the LOB
system’s ergodicity. In this paper, we want to generalize them in an extended framework where
the volume of the orders is no longer constant and the inﬂuence of the order book state on the
dynamics of the reference price may not be instantaneous.
Another important element in order book modeling is the asymptotic behavior of the price.
Such analysis is very relevant as it provides useful insights on the price formation process, and
links the dynamics at the microscopic level with macroscopic features of the asset, such as its
volatility. We prove that in our framework, the rescaled reference price process converges to
a Brownian motion. An expression for the macroscopic volatility in terms of the ﬂow rates is
derived using a functional central limit theorem together with the strong mixing property of the
price increments, in the spirit of Abergel and Jedidi (2011).
3A large tick asset is deﬁned as an asset whose bid-ask spread is almost always equal to one tick.
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Figure II.1: Limit order book
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the general Markovian framework.
Section 3 discusses the ergodicity properties of the model. The diﬀusive limit of the rescaled
price process is stated in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we give some speciﬁc models which can
be seen as particular cases of our framework. The technical proofs are gathered in an appendix.
2 A general Markovian framework
2.1 Representation of the order book
In our framework, the order book is made of two elements: the center position: a certain
reference price (note that here the center position is not necessarily the mid price) and the shape
of the book (the queue sizes around the reference price), see Figure II.1 for an example. The
center position, denoted by pre f ∈ {nα+0.5α,n ∈ Z}4, can be seen as the current consensus
price level and is used to index the limits. We write Q±i for the queue at the price level
pre f ± (i −0.5)α and denote its size by q±i and its price by pi . Then the total order book’s
shape at time t is an inﬁnite vector q(t )= [...,q−k (t ), ...q−1(t ),q1(t ), ...,qk (t ), ...], with qi ∈Z, and
|qi | is the number of orders at the limit Qi (qi < 0 if these orders are bid orders and qi > 0
if they are ask orders. Note that in such a representation, one can have qi ≥ 0 or qi < 0 for
all i ). The LOB information at time t is therefore fully represented by X (t ) := (q(t ),pre f (t )),
t ≥ 0. To restrict the value of X (t ), we consider only K limits on each side, and thus have now
q(t )= [q−K (t ), ...q−1(t ),q1(t ), ...,qK (t )] and X (t ) ∈Z2K ×α(0.5+Z).
The state space of q(t ) is actually smaller than Z2K . More speciﬁcally, let us deﬁne
ibestbid (q) = max(−K −1,sup{i |qi < 0})
ibestask (q) = min(K +1, inf{i |qi > 0}).
4For the generality of the framework, we allow for negative prices, however, in practice, the model should of
course be used over a reasonably small time interval so that prices remain positive.
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The state space Ω of q(t ) is deﬁned as the set of all q ∈Z2K , such that: for all i ∈ {−K , ...,K },
qi ≤ 0 if i ≤ ibestbid (q) and qi ≥ 0 if i ≥ ibestask (q).
2.2 Dynamics of the order book
In our general framework, we model the LOB vector X (t ) as a continuous-time Markov jump
process, whose inﬁnitesimal generator matrix Q will be given in Equation (II.4). We diﬀerentiate
two types of jumps in the order book dynamics: pure order book state jumps (for which pre f
stays constant) and common jumps (for which a change in the value of pre f is involved).
Pure order book state jump
There are three5 types of orders that interact directly with the order book and trigger pure order
book state jumps:
• Limit orders: insertion of a new order in the order book (a buy order at a lower price than
the best ask price, or a sell order at a higher price than the best bid price).
• Cancellation orders: cancellation of an already existing order in the order book.
• Market orders: consumption of available liquidity (a buy or sell order at the best available
price).
In the seminal work of Smith, Farmer, Gillemot, and Krishnamurthy (2003), the arrival times
of the above three types of orders at diﬀerent price levels are assumed to be mutually independent
and exponentially distributed. Furthermore, each order has unit size. In our approach, the size
of the jumps, which represents the amount of volume inserted to/removed from the LOB for a
given event, is random. Moreover, the arrival rate of a given jump is assumed to be function of
the index of the target price, the current LOB state vector q(t ), the direction of the jump and
its size. That is, for any q,q ′ ∈Ω (q 6= q ′), p ∈α(0.5+Z), n ∈N+ and any ei = (a−K , ...,ai , ...,aK )
(a j = 0 for j 6= i and ai = 1), we have in cases where q +nei ∈Ω and q −nei ∈Ω:
Q(q,p),(q+nei ,p) = fi (q,n)
Q(q,p),(q−nei ,p) = gi (q,n)
Q˜(q,p),(q ′,p) = 0, otherwise, (II.1)
where the fi and gi are 2K functions: Ω×N+→R+.
Note that in (II.1), fi (q,n) and gi (q,n) have diﬀerent meanings for diﬀerent i and q . For example,
when i ≥ ibestask , fi (q,n) represents the arrival rate of sell limit orders of size n, and gi (q,n)
the sum of the rate of cancellations of size n and the arrival rate of market buy orders of size n.
When i ≤ ibestbid , the role of fi (q,n) and gi (q,n) are switched. Note also that q ±nei is not
always in the state space Ω even when q ∈Ω. Thus some values of the functions fi and gi are
not needed in Equation (II.1) and assumed to be equal to zero. Furthermore, so that there is no
absorbing state, we assume ∑
i
∑
n
(
fi (q,n)+ gi (q,n)
)> 0.
5Four if we also consider the modiﬁcation orders. We view modiﬁcation orders as a combination of a cancellation
and an insertion order that arrive in a very short time interval.
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Common jumps
The reference price pre f can be viewed as a consensus value on the “eﬃcient" price and takes
discretized values in α(0.5+Z). In practice, this reference price is built based on two sets of
information: the current state of the LOB and the historical order ﬂows. We have in mind that
pre f moves in a Markovian manner, so its dynamics depends on the present information only,
that is the current state of the LOB. In our framework, we restrict the price jump size to one tick
at each time. We use two functions u,d :Ω→R+ to describe respectively the rate of positive and
negative jumps:
∑
q ′∈Ω
Q(q,p),(q ′,p+α) = u(q)∑
q ′∈Ω
Q(q,p),(q ′,p−α) = d(q)∑
q ′∈Ω
Q(q,p),(q ′,p±nα) = 0, for n ≥ 2. (II.2)
To understand Equation (II.2), let us ﬁrst consider the following simple example where the
LOB state information is summarized by the diﬀerence between the current value of pre f and
the mid price pmid :
Example 1.
imid = (ibestbid + ibestask )/2,
u(q) = θ0+θ1max(0,α(imid −0.5))
d(q) = θ0+θ1max(0,−α(imid +0.5)),
with θ0 ≥ 0 and θ1 a positive constant representing the intensity of the adjustment of pre f towards
pmid .
In the above example, we assume that the reference price jump rate depends on the deviation
of the current value of pre f from pmid . Indeed, pmid is often considered an approximation of
the LOB center implied by its current state. We may also include other LOB information such as
the available quantities at Qibestbid and Qibestask when deﬁning u(q) and d(q). Such additional
variables increase the complexity of our model but make it more realistic.
Remark 1. In the already mentioned Queue-reactive model, changes of pre f are triggered by the
order book events that modify pmid , while in Equation (II.2), they are driven by the order book
state. Although the Queue-reactive model cannot exactly be seen as a particular case of the framework
presented in this paper (see Section 5), most of the theoretical results shown in Sections 3 and 4 still
hold (with some minor modiﬁcations in some assumptions). In particular, one can prove the diﬀusive
limit of the reference price in the Queue-reactive model applying almost the same method as that used
here.
As soon as pre f changes, the value of qi switches immediately to the value of one of its
neighbors (right if pre f increases, left if it decreases). As we keep only K limits on each side,
two boundary distributions pi−K and piK are introduced for generating the new queue sizes at
Q−K (when pre f decreases) and QK (when pre f increases). To possibly incorporate external
information, we moreover assume that with probability θreini t , the LOB state vector q(t ) is
redrawn from some distribution (piinc if pre f increases, pidec if pre f decreases) when pre f
changes. As shown in Huang, Lehalle, and Rosenbaum (2013), models where price dynamics are
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purely endogenous, driven by order ﬂows only, are usually not able to reproduce some of the
important macroscopic features of prices, such as the volatility. Thus the parameter θreini t can
be understood as the percentage of price changes due to exogenous information, in which case
market participants readjust very quickly their order ﬂows around the new reference price, as
if a new state of the LOB was drawn from its (invariant) distribution (ergodicity conditions are
discussed in the next section).
For q ∈Ω, we write q+ = [q−K+1, ...,q−1,q1, ...,qK ], q− = [q−K , ...,q−1,q1, ...,qK−1], [q+, l ] =
[q−K+1, ...,q−1,q1, ...,qK , l ] and [l ,q−] = [l ,q−K , ...,q−1,q1, ...,qK−1]. Under the above assump-
tions, we have for l ∈Z and q,q ′,q ′′ ∈Ω such that q ′+ 6= q+ and q ′′− 6= q−:
Q(q,p),([q+,l ],p+α) = (1−θreini t )u(q)piK (l )+θreini tu(q)piinc ([q+, l ])
Q(q,p),(q ′,p+α) = θreini tu(q)piinc (q ′)
Q(q,p),([l ,q−],p−α) = (1−θreini t )d(q)pi−K (l )+θreini td(q)pidec ([l ,q−])
Q(q,p),(q ′′,p−α) = θreini td(q)pidec (q ′′). (II.3)
The inﬁnitesimal generator matrix of X (t )
Equations (II.1), (II.2) and (II.3) give a complete description of the inﬁnitesimal generator matrix
Q of the process X (t ), which is summarized in the following assumption.
Assumption 21. Let q,q ′,q ′′, q˜ ∈Ω, p, p˜ ∈ α(0.5+Z), n ∈ N+, l ∈ Z be such that q ′+ 6= q+ and
q ′′− 6= q−. The process X (t ) is an irreducible Markov jump process with aperiodic embedded chain
whose inﬁnitesimal generator matrix Q is of the following form (with 2K functions fi ,gi :Ω×N+→
R+ and two functions u,d :Ω→R+) :
Q(q,p),(q+nei ,p) = fi (q,n)
Q(q,p),(q−nei ,p) = gi (q,n)
Q(q,p),([q+,l ],p+α) = (1−θreini t )u(q)piK (l )+θreini tu(q)piinc ([q+, l ])
Q(q,p),(q ′,p+α) = θreini tu(q)piinc (q ′)
Q(q,p),([l ,q−],p−α) = (1−θreini t )d(q)pi−K (l )+θreini td(q)pidec ([l ,q−])
Q(q,p),(q ′′,p−α) = θreini td(q)pidec (q ′′)
Q(q,p),(q,p) = −
∑
(q˜ ,p˜)∈Ω×α(0.5+Z),(q˜ ,p˜)6=(q,p)
Q(q,p),(q˜ ,p˜),
Q(q,p),(q˜ ,p˜) = 0, otherwise. (II.4)
Note that under Assumption (21), the dynamics of the process X (t ) is invariant under
translations of the LOB center position: its inﬁnitesimal matrix generator Q satisﬁes:
Q(q1,p1),(q2,p1+β) =Q(q1,p2),(q2,p2+β),
for any q1,q2 ∈Ω, p1,p2 ∈α(0.5+Z) and β ∈αZ. One can also remark that in our framework,
the order book state process q(t ) alone is also a continuous-time Markov jump process, whose
ergodicity is discussed in the next section.
65
II. Markovian Order Book Models
2.3 Comparison with existing models
The ﬁrst major diﬀerence between our approach and the existing Markovian models in the
literature is the introduction of state dependency in the order book dynamics. Most of the
current order book models follow the “Zero-intelligence” framework, using Poisson ﬂows for
the processes of order arrivals. The Poisson assumption is clearly unrealistic, see for example
the empirical results in Huang, Lehalle, and Rosenbaum (2013). In our framework, we propose
to incorporate the strategic behaviors of market participants via a mean-ﬁeld game approach,
assuming their decisions depend on an underlying “eﬃcient" price pre f and on the LOB state
vector q(t ). Note also that Equation (II.1) allows us to have jumps of random size in the order
book’s shape, while a constant jump size is often assumed in the other existing models.
We also introduce a new method of LOB representation using one unique reference price
pre f . Most models use the best bid and best ask prices as two reference prices for indexing
the buy and sell limits. In such models, these reference prices are directly determined by the
order book state. In particular, changes in the order book state are immediately carried on
the values of these prices. In our framework, pre f is not necessarily deduced from the order
book state. Therefore, we can assume that changes in the order book state aﬀect the value of
pre f with some delay rate (the functions u and d introduced in Equation (II.2)). Thanks to this
original representation, we can naturally decompose the order book dynamics into two parts: a
continuous-time multidimensional queuing system (Equation (I.1)) and the dynamics of its center,
that is the reference price (Equations (II.2) and (II.3)). Compared with the Queue-reactive model
introduced in Huang, Lehalle, and Rosenbaum (2013), pre f is no longer constrained within
the bid-ask spread. This desirable feature gives us the possibility of separating the exogenous
and endogenous parts in the price dynamics by choosing appropriate price jump rate functions
u and d . For example, with the functions u and d of Example 1, one can interpret θ0 as the
exogenous part in the dynamics of pre f and θ1 as the intensity of the endogenous eﬀects driving
pre f towards the current mid price level.
3 Ergodicity
In this section, we discuss ergodicity properties in our framework. To do so, we make some
additional assumptions on the functions fi , gi , u and d .
Let
Pt (x,A) :=P[Y (t ) ∈ A|Y (0)= x]
be the transition probability at time t of a continuous or discrete-time Markov process Y with
state space Y . In this work, we say that the process Y is V-uniformly ergodic if there exists a
coercive6 function V > 1, an invariant distribution pi, r ∈ (0,1) and R >∞ such that for any
x ∈Y and t ∈R+ (or N+ in discrete-time),
||Pt (x, .)−pi(.)||V ≤Rr tV (x), (II.5)
where we write ||.||V for the V -norm of a signed measure, see Meyn and Tweedie (1993, 2009).
In continuous time, the main idea to prove such property is to design an appropriate Lyapunov
function V : Y → (1,∞), on which the following negative drift condition is satisﬁed for some
6|V (x)|→+∞ as ||x||→∞.
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γ> 0 and B > 0:
QV (y) := ∑
y ′ 6=y
Qy y ′ [V (y
′)−V (y)]
≤ −γV (y)+B.
Then by Theorem 6.1 in Meyn and Tweedie (1993), the Markov process Y is non-explosive
and V-uniformly ergodic. Furthermore, by Theorem 4.2 in Meyn and Tweedie (1993) it is positive
Harris recurrent. Note that the same kind of method is used in Abergel and Jedidi (2011) in order
to show ergodicity properties of Zero-intelligence models.
As mentioned in the introduction, the LOB’s ergodicity implies here the existence of a unique
invariant distribution for the state vector q . This is relevant for explaining the stylized empirical
distribution of the LOB state. Mostly, as we will see in Section 4, the ergodicity analysis is the
basis for proving the diﬀusive limit of the reference price process.
3.1 When pre f stays constant
We ﬁrst discuss the V-uniform ergodicity of the process q(t ) when assuming u(q) = d(q) = 0
in Equation (II.4). Recall that the unused values of fi (q,n) and gi (q,n) in the deﬁnition of the
queue dynamics, that is when q±nei ∉Ω, are set to zero. With the convention 0/0= 0, we deﬁne
f ∗i (q) :=
∑
n
fi (q,n)
g∗i (q) :=
∑
n
gi (q,n)
li (q,n) := fi (q,n)
f ∗i (q)
ki (q,n) := gi (q,n)
g∗i (q)
G f ,i ,q (z) :=
∞∑
n=1
znli (q,n)
Gg ,i ,q (z) :=
∞∑
n=1
znki (q,n).
Thus, when f ∗i (q) > 0 (resp. g∗i (q) > 0), li (q, .) (resp. ki (q, .)) is a probability measure on
N+ with moment-generating function G f ,i ,q (z) (resp. Gg ,i ,q (z)). We make the four following
assumptions.
Assumption 22. For any order book state q and any i ≥ ibestask , gi (q,n)= 0 for any n > qi and
for any order book state q and any i ≤ ibestbid , fi (q,n)= 0 for any n >−qi .
Assumption 23. There exists z∗ > 1 such that for any q and i , G f ,i ,q (z∗)<∞ and Gg ,i ,q (z∗)<∞.
Furthermore, there exists L > 0 such that for any i ,
lim
z→1+
sup
q
[ f ∗i (q)G
f ,i ,q (z)1i>ibestbid + g∗i (q)Gg ,i ,q (z)1i<ibestask ]< L.
Assumption 24. There exist r > 0 and U > 1 such that
lim
z→1+
sup
(q,i ):qi>U ,i≥ibestask
[ f ∗i (q)− g∗i (q)
1−Gg ,i ,q (z−1)
G f ,i ,q (z)−1 ] < −r
lim
z→1+
sup
(q,i ):qi<−U ,i≤ibestbid
[g∗i (q)− f ∗i (q)
1−G f ,i ,q (z−1)
Gg ,i ,q (z)−1 ] < −r. (II.6)
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Assumption 25. For any z > 1,
B f (z) := inf
(q,i ):qi>U ,i≥ibestask
(G f ,i ,q (z)−1)> 0
Bg (z) := inf
(q,i ):qi<−U ,i≤ibestbid
(Gg ,i ,q (z)−1)> 0.
To understand the practical meaning of these assumptions, let us consider the following
example where the pure order book state jumps are assumed to have constant size equal to one.
In such situation, the four assumptions above can be rewritten as follows and are much easier to
interpret.
Example 2. LOB model with constant order size.
• For n ≥ 2, fi (q,n)= gi (q,n)= 0 for any q ∈Ω.
• There exists L > 0 such that for any i ∈ {−K , ...,K } and q ∈Ω,
fi (q,1)1i>ibestbid + gi (q,1)1i<ibestask < L.
• There exist r > 0 and U > 1 such that
sup
(q,i ):qi>U ,i≥ibestask
[ fi (q,1)− gi (q,1)] < −r
sup
(q,i ):qi<−U ,i≤ibestbid
[gi (q,1)− fi (q,1)] < −r.
Basically, Assumption 22 says that a bid/ask limit cannot become an ask/bid limit in a single
queue update event, that is the queue size cannot revert its sign in a single jump7. From Example
2, we see that Assumption 23 essentially states that the total intensity of the order insertion
processes in the bid and ask side remains uniformly bounded with respect to the state of the LOB.
Assumption 24, which is the most important for the system’s ergodicity, forces the individual
queue sizes |qi | to decrease when they become larger than a certain threshold. From these
assumptions, we obtain the following theorem proved in appendix for the Markov process q(t ).
Theorem 1. When u = d = 0, under Assumptions 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, the continuous-time Markov
jump process q(t ) is non-explosive, V-uniformly ergodic and positive Harris recurrent.
Consider now the embedded Markov chain q(n) deﬁned by q(n)= q(Jn), where Jn is the
time of the n-th jump, and q(Jn) the state of the LOB after this event. The study of the embedded
Markov chain is an important step in order to obtain the diﬀusivity of the price process in our
setting. We write
a∗i (q)=
f ∗i (q)∑
i [ f
∗
i (q)+ g∗i (q)]
, b∗i (q)=
g∗i (q)∑
i [ f
∗
i (q)+ g∗i (q)]
,
for the proportions of queue size increases and decreases, and replace Assumption 24 by the
following one.
7This assumption is not really mandatory but is realistic and technically quite convenient.
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Assumption 26. There exist r > 0 and U > 1 such that
lim
z→1+
sup
(q,i ):qi>U ,i≥ibestask
[a∗i (q)−b∗i (q)
1−Gg ,i ,q (z−1)
G f ,i ,q (z)−1 ] < −r
lim
z→1+
sup
(q,i ):qi<−U ,i≤ibestbid
[b∗i (q)−a∗i (q)
1−G f ,i ,q (z−1)
Gg ,i ,q (z)−1 ] < −r.
The following theorem is proved in appendix.
Theorem 2. When u = d = 0, under Assumptions 21, 22, 23, 25 and 26, the embedded discrete-time
Markov chain q(n) is V-uniformly ergodic and positive Harris recurrent.
3.2 General case
We are now interested in the case where u and d are no longer ﬁxed to 0. Recall that q(n)
represents the state of the LOB after the n-th event and pre f (n) is the reference price (the center
of the LOB) after the n-th event. We thus consider here the process of reference price increments
c(n) (since the reference price itself is of course not ergodic), deﬁned as the reference price
change at the n-th event:
c(n)= pre f (n)−pre f (n−1),
and the embedded chain Y (n)= (q(n),c(n)), n ∈N, with c(0) an artiﬁcial starting value. The
process Y (n) remains obviously Markovian. For some z > 1, let
V z([q,c])=
K∑
i=−K ,i 6=0
z |qi |−U .
We make two additional assumptions for the general case.
Assumption 27. There exist z > 1 and Lpi > 0 such that for Q inc , Qdec , QK , Q−K four random
variables such that Q inc ∼piinc , Qdec ∼pidec , QK ∼piK and Q−K ∼pi−K :
E[V z([Q inc ,c])]+E[V z([Qdec ,c])]+E[z |QK |−U ]+E[z |Q−K |−U ]≤ Lpi.
Assumption 28. There exists a ﬁnite set W ⊂ Ω such that the upper bound of the proportion of
reference price jumps in any order book state q is smaller than one on Ω/W :
sup
q∈Ω/W
u(q)+d(q)∑
i [ f
∗
i (q)+ g∗i (q)]+u(q)+d(q)
< 1.
Assumption 27 is technical and imposes some regularities on the four distributions piinc ,
pidec , piK and pi−K . Assumption 28 ensures that a reference price change is not the only possible
event except for a ﬁnite number of LOB states. Under these assumptions, we have the following
theorem proved in appendix on the ergodicity of the embedded chain Y (n).
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27 and 28, the embedded discrete-time Markov
chain Y (n)= (q(n),c(n)) is V-uniformly ergodic and positive Harris recurrent.
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4 Scaling limits
We are now interested in the scaling limit of the reference price process. Let Ji be the time of
the i -th jump of the process. Let
N (t )= inf{n, Jn ≤ t }
be the number of events until time t , with the convention inf{;}= 0. Let Z (n) be the cumulative
price change until the n-th event, that is Z (0)= 0 and for n ≥ 1:
Z (n)=
n∑
i=1
c(i ).
We have
Z (N (t ))= pre f (t )−pre f (0).
Thus it represents the reference price at time t recentered its starting value. We show in this
section the diﬀusive behavior of Z (N (t )) as n tends to inﬁnity.
Consider again the embedded chain Y (n)= (q(n),c(n)). From Theorem 3, Y (n) is V-uniformly
ergodic towards an invariant distribution pi∗. We have the following theorem for the rescaled
price process in event time Sˆ(n)(t ) := Z (bntc)p
n
(pi∗ is deﬁned as the invariant distribution of the
Markovian chain Y (n)).
Theorem 4. Under Assumptions 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27 and 28, if Epi∗ [c(0)]= 0, then the series
σ2 = Epi∗ [c20]+2
∞∑
n=1
Epi∗ [c0cn], (II.7)
converges absolutely, with pi∗ the invariant distribution of (q(n),c(n)). Furthermore, if Y (0) ∼ pi∗,
we have the following convergence in law in D[0,∞):
Sˆ(n)(t )
n→∞→ σB(t ),
where B(t ) is a standard Brownian motion.
Proof. This theorem is a direct application of Theorem 19.1 in Billingsley (2009). Indeed, the
sequence cn is clearly stationary and ergodic in the sense of Billingsley (2009) (for example
since it is stationary and mixing). Moreover, it has a ﬁnite second order moment and for all n,
Epi∗ [cn]= Epi∗ [c0]= 0.
Theorem 4 shows that in event time, the large scale limit of the reference price process is
a Brownian motion. However, the most relevant question is that of the large scale limit of the
reference price in calendar time. Thus we now consider the process
S˜(n)(t )= Z
(
N (nt )
)
p
n
.
To prove the diﬀusivity of S˜(n)(t ), we need a last assumption which is a bound of the expected
value on the waiting time between two events.
Assumption 29. There exists some m > 0, such that
inf
q∈Ω
{∑
i
( f ∗i (q)+ g∗i (q))+u(q)+d(q)
}>m.
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Let τn be the inter-arrival time between the n-th and the (n−1)-th jumps of the Markov
process X . We then have the following theorem proved in appendix for the long term behavior
of the reference price in calendar time.
Theorem 5. Under Assumptions 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29, the process (q(n),c(n),τ(n)) is
positive Harris recurrent. Furthermore, if Epi∗ [c(0)]= 0 and Y (0)∼pi∗, then
S˜(n)(t )
n→∞→ σp
Epi∗∗ [τ(1)]
B(t ),
with pi∗∗ is the invariant distribution of (q(n),c(n),τ(n)) and σ deﬁned in (II.7).
Theorem 5 discusses the scaling limit of the underlying reference price. However, the
diﬀerence between this price and the more usual pbestbid (t ), pbestask (t ) or pmid (t ) being
bounded by 2K , the same result applies replacing the reference price by any of those prices.
5 Some speciﬁc models
The Markovian setting proposed in this work allows us for a wide range of possibilities for
modeling order book dynamics. The goal of this section is to give some natural and tractable
examples of models, essentially already introduced in the literature, which can be seen as
particular cases of our general framework. Together with the dynamics of the models, we provide
suﬃcient conditions so that the assumptions made in the previous sections are satisﬁed in these
speciﬁc models. Thus the ergodicity and diﬀusive scaling properties apply in all these models.
5.1 Best bid/best ask Poisson model (Cont and De Larrard (2013))
The basic idea of this ﬁrst model, inspired by that introduced in Cont and De Larrard (2013), is
to use a constant spread size (ﬁxed to 1 tick) and to consider only two limits in the order book.
Example 3. Poisson model with K = 1.
• We take K = 1, θreini t = 1 and assume that the functions fi , gi , u and d have the following
forms, with 0<λ<µ<∞:
f1(q,n) = λ1n=1
g1(q,n) = µ1q1>01n=1
f−1(q,n) = µ1q−1<01n=1
g−1(q,n) = λ1n=1
u(q) = θ1q1=0
d(q) = θ1q−1=0.
• piinc and pidec satisfy Assumption 27 and
for any q−1 > 0, q1 ∈Z,
piinc (q−1,q1)=pidec (q−1,q1)= 0,
for any q1 < 0, q−1 ∈Z,
piinc (q−1,q1)=pidec (q−1,q1)= 0.
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Note that here, the boundary distributions piK and pi−K are no longer needed, since the
order book reinitialization probability θreini t is set to one.
In this model, the role of pre f is very close to that of pmid , which splits the order book into
two parts: the bid side (Q−1) and the ask side (Q1). The limit order insertion, cancellation and
market order insertion processes are assumed to be independent Poisson processes. The size of
these orders is assumed to be constant and pre f jumps with rate 0 when none of the queues Q±1
is empty, with rate θ to the right side when Q1 is empty, with rate θ to the left side when Q−1 is
empty. When the value of θ is very large, the price jump is almost instantaneous as soon as one
of the two queues becomes empty. In that case, this model becomes very close to that proposed
in Cont and De Larrard (2013), where an inﬁnite rate is used (note that the convergence of the
rescaled price process can still be proved with some minor modiﬁcations in such case of inﬁnite
jump rate).
5.2 Poisson model with K > 1
It is natural to try to extend the previous Poisson model in order to include more queues in the
order book and to allow for a spread size diﬀerent from one tick. In such model, the role of
pre f is slightly diﬀerent since it is not necessarily the mid price. Again, pre f can be understood
here as the underlying eﬃcient price that determines the order arrival intensities at diﬀerent
price levels. Now buy/sell limit orders can be inserted both on the right side and on the left side
of pre f .
Example 4. Poisson model with K > 1.
• The functions fi , gi , u and d have the following forms, for i =−K , ...,K :
fi (q,1) = λi1i>ibestbid (q)+γi1i=ibestbid (q)
+µi1i≤ibestbid (q)1qi<0
gi (q,1) = λ−i1i<ibestask (q)+γ−i1i=ibestask (q)
+µ−i1i≥ibestask (q)1qi>0
fi (q,n) = 0, for n> 1
gi (q,n) = 0, for n> 1
u(q) = θibestask (q)
d(q) = θ−ibestbid (q).
• piK , pi−K , piinc and pidec satisfy Assumption 27.
• For any i , j ∈ {−K , ...,K }, i < j , we have
µ−i >λi > 0
0≤ θi ≤ θ j .
Limit orders, cancellations and market orders (which consume the quantities at the best
oﬀer limits) are modeled by independent Poisson processes with diﬀerent intensities λbuy/sel li ,
µ
buy/sel l
i and γ
buy/sel l
i , depending on the distance from their target price to pre f . We assume
bid-ask symmetry in this model, that is λbuyi =λsel l−i , µ
buy
i =µsel l−i and γ
buy
i = γsel li , thus we omit
the index buy/sell in the above equations. Remark that the intensity of the buy/sell market order
ﬂow at the best limit γi is a function of i , that is the position of the best limit with respect to
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the reference price. This allows us to model the fact that market participants have diﬀerent
behaviors towards the best limit, depending on their evaluation of the reference price.
The reference price jump dynamics is modeled by a sequence of increasing rates θi , i ∈ {−K , ...,K }.
This means that the larger the index of the best ask queue, the larger the probability of pre f
to increase and the smaller the index of the best bid queue, the larger the probability of
pre f to decrease. Note that in this model, we no longer assume any speciﬁc value for the
reinitialization probability θreini t and use Assumption 27 to impose some properties on the
boundary distributions piK and pi−K and the initialization distributions piinc and pidec .
5.3 Zero-intelligence model
We now present a diﬀerent way of extending the Poisson model with K = 1 in order to include
more queues in the order book. This modeling approach where two reference prices are used is
called Zero-intelligence model and is introduced in Smith, Farmer, Gillemot, and Krishnamurthy
(2003). It is also considered in Abergel and Jedidi (2011) and is the basis of Cont, Stoikov, and
Talreja (2010). We deﬁne φ(i , j ) as the absolute distance (in number of ticks) between the queue
Qi and Q j and make the three following assumptions.
Example 5. Zero-intelligence model.
• The functions fi , gi , u and d have the following forms, for i =−K , ...,K :
fi (q,1) = λφ(i ,ibestbid (q))1i>ibestbid (q)+γ1i=ibestbid (q)+|qi |µφ(i ,ibestask (q))1i≤ibestbid (q)
gi (q,1) = λφ(i ,ibestask (q))1i<ibestask (q)+γ1i=ibestask (q)+|qi |µφ(i ,ibestbid (q))1i≥ibestask (q)
fi (q,n) = 0, for n> 1
gi (q,n) = 0, for n> 1
u(q) = θibestask (q)
d(q) = θ−ibestbid (q).
• piK , pi−K , piinc and pidec satisfy Assumption 27.
• For any i , j ∈ {−K , ...,K }, λφ(i , j ) > 0 and µφ(i , j ) > 0.
• For any i , j ∈ {−K , ...,K }, i < j , we have
0≤ θi ≤ θ j .
In this model, pre f is no longer an underlying eﬃcient price determining the order arrival
intensities. These intensities now depend on the positions of two diﬀerent prices: pbestbid
and pbestask . Limit orders, cancellations and market orders are still described by independent
Poisson processes. Buy/sell limit orders are inserted in the queues to the left/right side of the
best ask/best bid price, with intensities depending on the distance between their price level
and the best ask/best bid price (λφ(i ,ibestask/bestbid )); cancellations of buy/sell orders are sent to the
queues on the left/right side of the best ask/best bid price, with intensities being linear functions
of the queue sizes (|qi |µφ(i ,ibestask/bestbid )); market buy/sell orders are sent to the best ask/best bid
queue, with intensity γ. The reference price pre f now provides the center of the 2K dimensional
moving frame representing the LOB’s state and the same modeling approach as in Section 5.2 is
used for its dynamics.
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5.4 Queue-reactive model (Huang, Lehalle, and Rosenbaum (2013))
In Huang, Lehalle, and Rosenbaum (2013), the Queue-reactive model for order books is
introduced. This model takes into account the inﬂuence of the order book’s state in determining
the order arrival intensities (in a much more general way than considering only the position of
the best bid and best ask queues). The Queue-reactive model assumes that no buy/sell limit
order can be inserted on the right/left side of pre f and uses the following assumption instead of
Equation (II.2) for the dynamics of the jumps of pre f .
Assumption 30. Whenever pmid increases (resp. decreases), pre f increases (resp. decreases) by α
with probability θ, provided that q1 = 0 (resp. q−1 = 0) at that moment. Therefore, changes in the
value of pre f are possibly triggered by one of the three following events:
• The insertion of a buy (resp. sell) limit order within the bid-ask spread while Q1 (resp. Q−1 is
empty).
• The cancellation of the last limit order at one of the best oﬀer queues.
• A market order which consumes the last limit order at one of the best oﬀer queues.
With some minor modiﬁcations in the proof of Theorem 5, one can prove that the scaling limit
of pre f in the Queue-reactive model is a Brownian motion. As explained above, in this model,
changes of pre f are triggered by events that modify the mid price. Here we propose a slightly
modiﬁed version of the Queue-reactive model8 by considering the following four assumptions
(note that the state space Ω is reduced in that case to Ω∗ := {q ∈Ω,qi1i<0 ≤ 0,qi1i>0 ≥ 0}).
Example 6. Queue-reactive type model.
• The functions fi , gi , u and d have the following forms, for i =−K , ...,K :
fi (q,1) = λ|i |(qi )1i>0+µ|i |(−qi )1i<0
gi (q,1) = λ|i |(−qi )1i<0+µ|i |(qi )1i>0
fi (q,n) = 0, for n> 1
gi (q,n) = 0, for n> 1
u(q) = θ1q1=0
d(q) = θ1q−1=0,
with λ|i | and µ|i | non-negative functions deﬁned on N, with µ|i |(0)= 0.
• We have
sup
i∈{1,...,K },qi∈N
(λi (qi ))< L <∞.
• There exist r > 0 and U > 1 such that for any qi >U and any i ∈ {1, ...,K }:
λi (qi )−µi (qi ) < −r.
• There exists m′ > 0 such that for any i ∈ {1, ...,N }:
inf
qi∈N
[λi (qi )+µi (qi )] > m′.
8Model I in Huang, Lehalle, and Rosenbaum (2013) is used to describe the queue dynamics during constant
reference price periods.
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Compared with Assumption 30, changes in pre f are now driven by the relative position of
the mid price in the current order book state. Nevertheless, we can see that the two approaches
are quite similar. In this model, pre f always stays between pbestask and pbestbid (since µ|i |(0)= 0
implies that the queue sizes on the left/right side of pre f never become positive/negative). Such
model gives us a much larger choice on the intensity functions λ|i | and µ|i | than when assuming
Poisson ﬂows. Furthermore, with enough data points, these functions can be estimated in a non-
parametric way, as done in Huang, Lehalle, and Rosenbaum (2013). Finally the state-dependent
approach provides us very interesting insights about the way the order book state inﬂuences
market participants decisions and the mechanism making the empirical distribution of the order
book arise from these decisions, see Huang, Lehalle, and Rosenbaum (2013).
6 Conclusion
In this work, we extend the order book modeling approach proposed in Huang, Lehalle, and
Rosenbaum (2013) to a more general Markovian framework, allowing to take into account most
relevant features of LOB dynamics such as:
• Dependencies between the order arrival processes and the LOB state.
• Endogenous movements of the underlying eﬃcient price and inﬂuence of the LOB state
on its dynamics.
• Exogenous movements of the underlying eﬃcient price.
• Randomness in the size of the orders.
The ergodicity of the LOB system and the diﬀusive limit of the rescaled price process are
established under general assumptions. Finally, to illustrate the usefulness and the relevance of
our approach, several examples of classical models which can be seen as particular cases of our
general framework are presented.
To get a fully satisfying model, a last step would probably be to allow for a non-Markovian
component in the market order ﬂow (since the Markov assumption is probably quite reasonable
for the limit order and cancellation ﬂows). This can for example be done using self-exciting
processes, as in Abergel and Jedidi (2015). However, except for very speciﬁc cases (exponential
Hawkes processes for example), adding such non-Markovian component would certainly require
revising completely the mathematical approach to the model.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Let us denote by Q˜ the inﬁnitesimal generator matrix of q(t ) when u = d = 0. The inﬁnite
matrix Q˜ has the following form:
Q˜q,q+nei = fi (q,n)
Q˜q,q−nei = gi (q,n)
Q˜q,q = −
∑
q∈Ω,q ′ 6=q
Q˜q,q ′
Q˜q,q ′ = 0,otherwise.
For some 1< z ≤ z∗ (recall that z∗ is deﬁned in Assumption 23), let us consider the function
V (q)=
K∑
i=−K ,i 6=0
z |qi |−U .
Since qi ≥ 0 for i ≥ ibestask , qi ≤ 0 for i ≤ ibestbid and qi = 0 for i ∈ (ibestbid , ibestask ), we have
Q˜V (q) := ∑
q ′ 6=q
Q˜qq ′ [V (q
′)−V (q)]
= ∑
i≤ibestbid
∞∑
n=1
[(z−qi+n−U − z−qi−U )gi (q,n)+ (z |qi+n|−U − z−qi−U ) fi (q,n)]
+ ∑
i≥ibestask
∞∑
n=1
[(zqi+n−U − zqi−U ) fi (q,n)+ (z |qi−n|−U − zqi−U )gi (q,n)]
+ ∑
i∈(ibestbid ,ibestask )
∞∑
n=1
[(zn−U − z−U ) fi (q,n)+ (zn−U − z−U )gi (q,n)].
Then by Assumption 22,
Q˜V (q) = ∑
i≤ibestbid
∞∑
n=1
[(z−qi+n−U − z−qi−U )gi (q,n)+ (z−qi−n−U − z−qi−U ) fi (q,n)]
+ ∑
i≥ibestask
∞∑
n=1
[(zqi+n−U − zqi−U ) fi (q,n)+ (zqi−n−U − zqi−U )gi (q,n)]
+ ∑
i∈(ibestbid ,ibestask )
∞∑
n=1
[(zn−U − z−U ) fi (q,n)+ (zn−U − z−U )gi (q,n)]
= ∑
i≤ibestbid
z−qi−U
∞∑
n=1
(zn −1)[gi (q,n)− fi (q,n)
zn
]
+ ∑
i≥ibestask
zqi−U
∞∑
n=1
(zn −1)[ fi (q,n)− gi (q,n)
zn
]
+ ∑
i∈(ibestbid ,ibestask )
z−U
∞∑
n=1
(zn −1)[ fi (q,n)+ gi (q,n)].
Using the deﬁnition of G f ,i ,q (z), Gg ,i ,q (z), f ∗i (q) and g
∗
i (q), we get
Q˜V (q) = ∑
i≤ibestbid
z−qi−U [g∗i (q)(G
g ,i ,q (z)−1)− f ∗i (q)(1−G f ,i ,q (z−1))]
+ ∑
i≥ibestask
zqi−U [ f ∗i (q)(G
f ,i ,q (z)−1)− g∗i (q)(1−Gg ,i ,q (z−1))]
+ ∑
i∈(ibestbid ,ibestask )
z−U [ f ∗i (q)(G
f ,i ,q (z)−1)+ g∗i (q)(Gg ,i ,q (z)−1)].
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Moreover, since for z > 1 we have G f /g ,i ,q (z−1)< 1 and G f /g ,i ,q (z)> 1, we obtain
Q˜V (q) ≤ ∑
i :i≤ibestbid ,qi<−U
z−qi−U (Gg ,i ,q (z)−1)(g∗i (q)− f ∗i (q)1−G f ,i ,q (z−1)Gg ,i ,q (z)−1 )
+ ∑
i :i≥ibestask ,qi>U
zqi−U (G f ,i ,q (z)−1)( f ∗i (q)− g∗i (q)1−Gg ,i ,q (z−1)G f ,i ,q (z)−1 )
+ ∑
i :i≤ibestbid ,qi≥−U
g∗i (q)G
g ,i ,q (z)+ ∑
i :i≥ibestask ,qi≤U
f ∗i (q)G
f ,i ,q (z)
+ ∑
i∈(ibestbid ,ibestask )
[ f ∗i (q)G
f ,i ,q (z)+ g∗i (q)Gg ,i ,q (z)]
≤ ∑
i :i≤ibestbid ,qi<−U
z−qi−U (Gg ,i ,q (z)−1)(g∗i (q)− f ∗i (q)1−G f ,i ,q (z−1)Gg ,i ,q (z)−1 )
+ ∑
i :i≥ibestask ,qi>U
zqi−U (G f ,i ,q (z)−1)( f ∗i (q)− g∗i (q)1−Gg ,i ,q (z−1)G f ,i ,q (z)−1 )
+∑
i
[ f ∗i (q)G
f ,i ,q (z)1i>ibestbid + g∗i (q)Gg ,i ,q (z)1i<ibestask ].
Now note that
sup
q
[ f ∗i (q)G
f ,i ,q (z)1i>ibestbid + g∗i (q)Gg ,i ,q (z)1i<ibestask ]
is an increasing function of z. Thus by Assumption 23, we can ﬁnd z ′ > 1 such that for any
z ≤ z ′, q ∈Ω and i ∈ [−K , ...,K ]:(
f ∗i (q)G
f ,i ,q (z)1i>ibestbid + g∗i (q)Gg ,i ,q (z)1i<ibestask
)< L.
From Assumption 24, we see that we can ﬁnd some z˜ with 1 < z˜ ≤ z ′ such that for any
(q, i ),qi <−U , i ≤ ibestbid , for any 1< z ≤ z˜:
g∗i (q)− f ∗i (q)
1−G f ,i ,q (z−1)
Gg ,i ,q (z)−1 <−r, (II.8)
and for any (q, i ),qi >U , i ≥ ibestask , for any 1< z ≤ z˜:
f ∗i (q)− g∗i (q)
1−Gg ,i ,q (z−1)
G f ,i ,q (z)−1 <−r. (II.9)
Thus taking z in the deﬁnition of the function V satisfying 2K z−U > 1 (so that the function V is
coercive) and 1< z ≤ z˜, we obtain
Q˜V (q) ≤ −r ∑
i :i≤ibestbid ,qi<−U
z−qi−U (Gg ,i ,q (z)−1)
−r ∑
i :i≥ibestask ,qi>U
zqi−U (G f ,i ,q (z)−1)+2KL.
≤ −rBg (z)
∑
i :i≤ibestbid ,qi<−U
z−qi−U
−rB f (z)
∑
i :i≥ibestask ,qi>U
zqi−U +2KL.
By Assumption 25, B :=min(Bg (z),B f (z))> 0. Therefore we get
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Q˜V (q) ≤ −rB ∑
i :|qi |>U
z |qi |−U +2KL
≤ −rB∑
i
z |qi |−U +2K (L+ rB)
= −rBV (q)+2K (L+ rB).
Finally, remark that in our setting, any compact set included in Ω is ﬁnite. A singleton being a
petite set and a ﬁnite union of singletons remaining a petite set, see Proposition 5.5.5 in Meyn
and Tweedie (2009), we get that all the compact sets are petite. Therefore by Theorem 6.1
in Meyn and Tweedie (1993), q(t ) is non-explosive and V-uniformly ergodic. Furthermore, by
Theorem 4.2 in Meyn and Tweedie (1993) it is positive Harris recurrent.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 2
For some 1< z ≤ z∗, set again
V (q)=
K∑
i=−K ,i 6=0
z |qi |−U .
We write P˜q,q ′ the transition probability from q to q ′. In the same way as in the preceding
proof, we have
∆V (q) := ∑
q ′∈Ω
P˜q,q ′(V (q
′)−V (q))
= ∑
i≤ibestbid
z−qi−U [b∗i (q)(G
g ,i ,q (z)−1)−a∗i (q)(1−G f ,i ,q (z−1))]
+ ∑
i≥ibestask
zqi−U [a∗i (q)(G
f ,i ,q (z)−1)−b∗i (q)(1−Gg ,i ,q (z−1))]
+ ∑
i∈(ibestbid ,ibestask )
z−U [a∗i (q)(G
f ,i ,q (z)−1)+b∗i (q)(Gg ,i ,q (z)−1)].
Following the same method as in the proof of Theorem 1, we can easily ﬁnd 1< z ′ ≤ z∗ and
B > 0 such that taking z = z ′ in the deﬁnition of V , it is coercive and we get
∆V (q) ≤ −rV (q)+B.
Now deﬁne the set C := {q, rV (q)≤ 2B}, C is obviously a ﬁnite set and is therefore petite.
Furthermore, we have
∆V (q)≤−r
2
V (q)+B1q∈C .
Thus by Theorem 16.1.2 in Meyn and Tweedie (2009), q(n) is V-uniformly ergodic.
Eventually, the fact that the chain is positive Harris recurrent is deduced from Theorem 9.1.8
together with Theorem 15.0.1 in Meyn and Tweedie (2009).
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7.3 Proof of Theorem 3
For ease of notation, we write V instead of V z . Let Q inc , Qdec , QK , Q−K be four random
variables such that Q inc ∼piinc , Qdec ∼pidec , QK ∼piK and Q−K ∼pi−K . We deﬁne
u∗(q) = u(q)∑
i [ f
∗
i (q)+ g∗i (q)]+u(q)+d(q)
d∗(q) = d(q)∑
i [ f
∗
i (q)+ g∗i (q)]+u(q)+d(q)
n∗(q) =
∑
i [ f
∗
i (q)+ g∗i (q)]∑
i [ f
∗
i (q)+ g∗i (q)]+u(q)+d(q)
EK = E[zQK−U ]
E−K = E[zQ−K−U ]
Epiinc = E[V ([Q inc ,c])]
Epidec = E[V ([Qdec ,c])].
Remarking that V ([q,c]) does not depend on c , we write from now on V (q) instead of V ([q,c]).
Moreover, we set P [q,c],[q ′,c ′] as the transition probability from state [q,c] to state [q ′,c ′] and
P˜q,q ′ as the transition matrix of the embedded chain q(n) when u = d = 0. Using the form of
the inﬁnitesimal generator Q, we deduce
∆V ([q,c]) := ∑
(q ′,c ′)∈Ω×{−α,α}
P [q,c],[q ′,c ′](V (q
′)−V (q))
= n∗(q) ∑
q ′∈Ω
P˜q,q ′(V (q
′)−V (q))
+u∗(q)[(1−θreini t )(EK − z |q−K |−U )+θreini t (Epiinc −V (q))]
+d∗(q)[(1−θreini t )(E−K − z |qK |−U )+θreini t (Epidec −V (q))].
By Assumption 27, we have
∆V ([q,c]) ≤ n∗(q) ∑
q ′∈Ω
P˜q,q ′(V (q
′)−V (q))+2LK +2Lpi.
Then as in the proof of Theorem 2, we can ﬁnd 1< z ′ ≤ z∗ and B > 0 such that taking z = z ′ in
the deﬁnition of V , it is coercive and we get
∆V (q) ≤ −n∗(q)rV (q)+Bn∗(q)+2LK +2Lpi.
Moreover, Assumption 28 ensures that for any q except those belonging to the ﬁnite set W ,
n∗(q)>M with M ∈ (0,1]. Consequently,
∆V (q) ≤ −MrV (q)+B +2LK +2Lpi+ν1[q,c]∈W×{−α,α},
with ν> 0. Now deﬁne the set C := {[q,c], MrV (q)≤ 2B +4LK +4Lpi}. Being ﬁnite, C ∪W is a
petite set and we have
∆V ([q,c])≤−Mr
2
V ([q,c])+ (B +2LK +2Lpi+ν)1[q,c]∈C∪W .
Hence from Theorem 16.1.2 in Meyn and Tweedie (2009), Y (n) is V-uniformly ergodic.
Eventually, the fact that the chain is positive Harris recurrent is deduced from Theorem 9.1.8
together with Theorem 15.0.1 in Meyn and Tweedie (2009).
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7.4 Proof of Theorem 5
7.4.1 Preliminary lemma
We start with the following preliminary lemma.
Lemma 1. For the Markov chain (q(n),c(n),τ(n)), the Cartesian product of any ﬁnite set included
in Ω× {−α,α} and R+ is petite.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that for any q ∈ Ω and c ∈ {−α,α}, the set q × c ×R+ is petite (actually
small). We deﬁne the measure νq,c,τ which is so that for any B ∈B(Ω× {−α,α}×R+), νq,c,τ(B)
is the transition probability from [q,c,τ] to B in a single step:
νq,c,τ(B)=P [q,c,τ],B .
Recall that in our framework, the transition probabilities from (q(n),c(n),τ(n)) depend only
on the value of q(n). So we can write νq,c,τ(B) as νq (B). In the sense of Equation (5.43) in
Meyn and Tweedie (2009), the transition probability P [q,r,τ],B can be seen as a sampling kernel
for the Markov chain (q(n),c(n),τ(n)), using the Dirac measure at point 1 on Z+ as sampling
measure. Moreover, for any τ ∈R+ and any B ∈B(Ω× {−α,α}×R+), we have
P [q,c,τ],B ≥ νq (B).
Therefore the set q × c ×R+ is petite. Then, as the union of two petite sets remains petite,
see Proposition 5.5.5 in Meyn and Tweedie (2009), we have the result.
7.4.2 A law of large numbers
In the next proposition, we give a law of large numbers for the inter-arrival times, which is the
key element to establish the diﬀusive behavior of the price in calendar time. Within the proof of
this proposition, we show that (q(n),c(n),τ(n)) is positive Harris recurrent.
Proposition 1. Let τi be the inter-arrival time between the i -th and the i−1-th jumps of the Markov
process X . Under Assumptions 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29, almost surely, we have
1
n
n∑
i=1
τi →
n→∞ Epi∗∗ [τ(1)],
with pi∗∗ the invariant distribution of (q(n),c(n),τ(n)).
Proof. First we show that the Markov chain (q(n),c(n),τ(n)) is positive Harris recurrent. For
the Markov chain (q(n),c(n)), we have already proved that a coercive function V can be found,
such that the following drift condition is satisﬁed for some a > 0 and L <∞:
∆V ([q,c])≤−aV ([q,c])+L.
Now, for the Markov chain (q(n),c(n),τ(n)), take
V ∗([q,c, t ])=V ([q,c])+ t .
With obvious notation, we have
∆V ∗([q,c, t ]) = ∆V ([q,c])+E[q,c,t ][τ]− t
≤ −aV ([q,c])+L+Ex [τ]− t .
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Taking a′ =min(a,1) and L′ = L+1/m, using Assumption 29, we get
∆V ∗([q,c, t ]) ≤ −aV ([q,c])+L+1/m− t
≤ −a′[V ([q,c])+ t ]+L+1/m
≤ −a′V ∗([q,c, t ])+L′.
Now let C = {([q,c, t ]), a′V ∗([q,c, t ])≤ 2L′}. We have
∆V ∗([q,c, t ]) ≤ −a
′
2
V ∗([q,c, t ])+L′1[q,c,t ]∈C .
According to Lemma 1, the set C is petite. Thus we can apply Theorem 15.0.1 in Meyn and
Tweedie (2009) to deduce that the Markov chain (q(n),r (n),τ(n)) is positive recurrent and thus
admits an invariant measure.
Now remark that the function V ∗ is unbounded oﬀ petite sets (using Lemma 1 together with
the fact that any subset of a petite set is itself petite). Consequently, Theorem 9.1.8 in Meyn and
Tweedie (2009) enables us to obtain that the Markov chain (q(n),c(n),τ(n)) is Harris recurrent.
Therefore it is positive Harris recurrent.
We end the proof thanks to Theorem 17.0.1 from Meyn and Tweedie (2009).
7.4.3 End of the proof of Theorem 5
We have
S˜(n)(t )= Z (btn/Epi∗∗ [τ(1)]c)p
n
+ (Z (N (nt ))p
n
− Z (btn/Epi∗∗ [τ(1)]c)p
n
)
.
According to Proposition 1, the sequence of processes N (nt )/n converges to t/Epi∗∗ [τ(1)]. More-
over, the limit of Z (btn/Epi∗∗ [τ(1)]c)/
p
n is continuous. Thus, using Skorohod representation
theorem together with continuity properties in Skorohod topology, see Proposition VI.2.1 in Jacod
and Shiryaev (2013), we get that the second term on the right hand side of the above equality
tends to zero. Finally, from Theorem 4, we get
Z (btn/Epi∗∗ [τ(1)]c)p
n
n→∞→ σp
Epi∗∗ [τ(1)]
Bt .
Combining these two results, we obtain the weak convergence of the rescaled price process to a
Brownian motion with variance σ2/Epi∗∗ [τ(1)], which concludes the proof.
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CHAPTER III
The Eﬀect of Tick Value Changes on Market
Microstructure: Analysis of the Japanese
Experiements 2014
Abstract
The tick value is a crucial component of market design and is often considered the most
suitable tool to mitigate the eﬀects of high frequency trading. The goal of this paper is to
demonstrate that the approach introduced in Dayri and Rosenbaum (2012) allows for an ex
ante assessment of the consequences of a tick value change on the microstructure of an asset.
To that purpose, we analyze the pilot program on tick value modiﬁcations started in 2014 by
the Tokyo Stock Exchange in light of this methodology. We focus on forecasting the future
cost of market and limit orders after a tick value change and show that our predictions are
very accurate. Furthermore, for each asset involved in the pilot program, we are able to
deﬁne (ex ante) an optimal tick value. This enables us to classify the stocks according to the
relevance of their tick value, before and after its modiﬁcation.
1 Introduction
On January 14, 2014, the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) launched the ﬁrst phase of its pilot
program on tick value1 modiﬁcations, reducing the tick value of the TOPIX 100 index stocks
priced above ¥3000 by approximately 90% (see Section 3.1 for more details on this pilot program).
The second phase was implemented on July 22, 2014, targeting a sub-Yen tick value reduction
for stocks of the TOPIX 100 index priced below ¥5000. The third phase of this program is
expected to start in September 2015, when a new tick value table should be announced after the
evaluation of the eﬀects of the tick value reductions in the ﬁrst two phases.
The tick value is probably the most relevant tool that can be used by exchanges and regu-
lators in order to improve the trading quality and the robustness of the market structure, see
Lehalle et al. (2014). Compared with other more controversial proposals, such as imposing a
minimum resting time for orders to remain valid or using frequent batch auctions, setting a
suitable tick value is in general considered to be a better way to control the growing activity
of high frequency traders, which accounts nowadays for more than 40% of the total volume on
equity markets. Indeed, a tick value change induces very little cost and is easily reversible if the
outcome does not meet the market designer’s expectations.
1The tick value is the minimum price variation allowed for an asset on a given market.
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The Tokyo Stock Exchange is not alone in its search for better tick values. In the United
States, on August 26, 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced a program
aiming at widening tick values for stocks with small capitalization. A targeted 12 months pilot
experiment will be implemented to assess the eﬀects of such changes. In Europe, in May 2014,
the European Securities and Markets Authority released a MiFID2/R discussion paper which
proposes two options for a new harmonized tick value regime to be introduced across all trading
venues. These two options are currently debated by European regulators.
Before the pilot program, most Japanese stocks were typical examples of large tick assets,
that is assets whose bid-ask spread is almost always equal to one tick. The tick value being the
lower bound for the bid-ask spread, when it is too large, the cost of market orders becomes very
signiﬁcant. This not only damages liquidity takers but also the “slow” liquidity providers who
suﬀer from the intensiﬁcation of the speed competition for gaining time priority in the order
book queues, see Moallemi and Yuan (2015). Although it is quite commonly accepted that it is
preferable to reduce the tick value for these large tick assets, ﬁnding the appropriate tick value
remains a very intricate problem. Indeed, most of the numerous works about the consequences of
a tick value change are empirical and focus on the outcomes of this market design modiﬁcation
in an ex post basis, see for example Lau and McInish (1995), Ahn, Cao, and Choe (1996), Bacidore
(1997), Bessembinder (2000), Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000), Chung and Van Ness (2001), Chung
and Chuwonganant (2002), Bourghelle and Declerck (2004) and Wu, Krehbiel, and Brorsen (2011).
These studies have clearly shown that a change in the tick value may lead to signiﬁcant
implications for the bid-ask spread, the available volume in the order book and many other
microstructural quantities. However, very few quantitative tools exist for predicting ex ante these
eﬀects. Consequently, exchanges and market regulators often rely on the trial and error approach
in order to set appropriate tick values. The Japanese pilot experiment, in which the tick value
reduction program is conducted in three phases, is one of such examples. Indeed, the eﬀects of
tick value changes in the ﬁrst two phases are evaluated ex post to help the design of a new tick
value table to be implemented in the last phase.
In Dayri and Rosenbaum (2012), the authors build a quantitative approach towards solving
the crucial problems of forecasting the consequences of a tick value change and determining
an optimal tick value. To that purpose, based on the model with uncertainty zones introduced
in Robert and Rosenbaum (2011), they use the key microstructural indicator η (half the ratio
between price continuations and alternations, see Section 2) which summarizes the high fre-
quency features of an asset. The paramount importance of the parameter η is due to the fact
that there is a one to one bijection between its value and the cost of market and limit orders. We
recall this connection in details in Section 2. Hence, measuring η allows us to classify stocks
according to whether they are proﬁtable for market makers or rather balanced. Furthermore,
being able to predict the consequences of a tick value change on η means one can anticipate
the new microstructural costs induced by this tick value modiﬁcation, which is precisely what
exchanges and regulation authorities need. Such predictions are possible using the approach
in Dayri and Rosenbaum (2012) where explicit forecasting formulas for the parameter η are
provided. Moreover, the way to set a tick value leading to an optimal η is also established (see
Section 2 for our deﬁnition of optimality).
In this work, our goal is to show that the theoretical forecasting formulas in Dayri and
Rosenbaum (2012) do enable us to predict ex ante the consequences of a tick value change on
the microstructure of an asset, notably on the trading costs. To demonstrate this, we use 18
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months of tick by tick market data from the TSE, including the whole year 2014 when the pilot
program is in place. Very accurate results are obtained for the prediction of the parameter η.
Thus, the approach in Dayri and Rosenbaum (2012) is proved to be indeed very helpful in both
predicting the consequences of a tick value change and choosing an optimal tick value for large
tick assets.
The paper is organized as follows. We recall in Section 2 the reading of the model with
uncertainty zones as a mean to quantify the average cost of market and limit orders using the
crucial microstructural indicator η. At the end of this section, we give the prediction formula for
η after a tick value modiﬁcation. Hence we provide a way to predict the change in the cost of
market and limit orders induced by such modiﬁcation. In Section 3, we consider the TSE pilot
experiment on tick values. First, before the start of the program, we classify Japanese assets in
two categories: stocks with costly market orders and stocks with balanced costs between market
and limit orders. Note that the situation of costly limit orders is very unlikely. Indeed, in that
case, market makers would increase their spread, what they can always do. Then we apply in
the same section the forecasting methodology presented in Section 2. In particular, we predict
whether a stock will change category after the tick value modiﬁcation. We conclude in Section 4.
2 Cost of trading and high frequency price dynamics
2.1 The model with uncertainty zones: When the tick prevents price discovery
The model with uncertainty zones, introduced in Robert and Rosenbaum (2011), is a high
frequency model for the transaction prices of a large tick asset. It reproduces most macroscopic
and microscopic stylized facts of price dynamics and is very suitable for the analysis of the role
of the tick value in determining the microstructural features of an asset. This model assumes the
existence of a latent eﬃcient price X t , typically a martingale, and states that a transaction can
occur at a given price level (on the tick grid) only provided this price level is close enough to
the eﬃcient price. This proximity is quantiﬁed by the parameter η: the distance between the
potential transaction price and the eﬃcient price has to be smaller than α/2+ηα, with α the tick
value of the asset. Thus, for a large tick asset, assuming the eﬃcient price lies within the one
tick bid-ask spread [b,b+α], we have η ∈ [0,1/2] and obtain three zones for the eﬃcient price:
• If it lies between b and b+α(1/2−η), transactions can only occur on the bid side (bid
zone).
• If it lies between b+α(1/2+η) and b+α, transactions can only occur on the ask side (ask
zone).
• If it lies between b+α(1/2−η) and b+α(1/2+η), transactions can occur both on the bid
and on the ask side (buy/sell or uncertainty zone).
These three zones are summarized in Figure III.1.
Estimation of η The parameter η can be very easily estimated as follows. We deﬁne an
alternation (resp. continuation) as a transaction price jump of one tick whose direction is
opposite to (resp. the same as) the one of the preceding transaction price jump. Let N (a) and
N (c) be respectively the number of alternations and continuations during the period [0, t ]. The
estimator of η over [0, t ] is simply given by
η̂= N
(c)
2N (a)
.
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Figure III.1: The three diﬀerent zones when the bid-ask is 100-101 and the tick value is equal to
one. The red dotted lines are the limits of the uncertainty zone. The uncertainty zone inside
the spread is the buy/sell zone. The upper dotted area is the ask zone and the lower dotted
area is the bid zone.
Theoretical properties for this estimator are established in Robert and Rosenbaum (2012). Note
that in Section 3, the estimated values of η over given time periods of several months will be
given by the averages of the daily estimations of η over all the days of the periods.
2.2 Perceived tick size and cost of market orders
The parameter η controls the width of the uncertainty zones (which is 2ηα ; when the eﬃcient
price is inside this zone, investors cannot clearly decide if it is more relevant to buy or sell) and
measures the bouncing intensity of the transaction price due to the existence of the tick value.
It can actually be seen as an indicator for the perceived tick size of a large tick asset: A very
small η (η¿ 0.5) means that for market participants, the tick value appears much too large (in
such case, it is necessary to be sharp in term of estimation of the eﬃcient price to know if it is
reasonable to buy or sell at a given time), while a η close to 1/2 is synonym of a suitable tick
value (in such situation, the uncertainty zones almost correspond to the tick grid). To understand
this, consider a market order of unit volume at price Pt at time t . Its cost with respect to the
eﬃcient price is Pt −X t . For a large tick asset, the average cost of such market order can be
computed and is equal to
α/2−ηα,
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Figure III.2: Daily values of η for all the assets of the TOPIX 100 index, for every day so that
the daily average spread is smaller than two ticks, from 2013, June 3 to 2013, December 30.
see Dayri and Rosenbaum (2012). The quantity α/2−ηα is non negative provided η≤ 0.5, a
condition which is almost systematically satisﬁed by estimated values of η on large tick assets,
see Figure III.2. Indeed, it would otherwise mean that on average, market makers lose money.
This is not really possible since in such situation, they would simply increase their spread, what
they can always do. Thus, when η< 0.5, market takers have to pay a ﬁxed positive cost in order
to get liquidity, while market makers gain proﬁt by placing limit orders2. This cost paid by
liquidity takers is given by α/2−ηα. Consequently, for large tick assets, the classical eﬃciency
rule that assumes zero cost for both market and limit orders becomes irrelevant.
2.3 Implicit bid-ask spread and cost of limit orders
Within bid-ask quotes of the form [b,b+α], the width of the uncertainty zone represents the
range of values for the eﬃcient price X t where transactions can occur both at the best bid and
the best ask side. The size of this range is 2ηα. Therefore, it is natural to view the quantity
2ηα as an implicit spread. This idea is fully supported by the regression analysis in Dayri and
Rosenbaum (2012), which shows empirically that for large tick assets, ηα is proportional to the
volatility per trade:
ηα∼ c σp
M
, (III.1)
where σ denotes the square root of the daily integrated variance of the price, M the number of
transactions per day and c a constant around one. Yet it is well-known that for small tick assets,
for which the (conventional) spread can evolve freely and is not artiﬁcially bounded from below
by the tick value, the average spread is proportional to the volatility per trade, see Madhavan,
Richardson, and Roomans (1997) and Wyart, Bouchaud, Kockelkoren, Potters, and Vettorazzo
2Of course this is true only considering the aggregated group of market makers. In practice, the gains of
individual market makers are often small since there are several of them and the queues at the best bid and ask levels
are quite long.
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(2008). This conﬁrms that 2ηα can be interpreted as an implicit spread for a large tick asset.
Actually the fact that for small tick assets, the average spread S is proportional to the
volatility per trade simply comes from the eﬃciency condition stating that market makers make
on average zero proﬁt due to competition. More precisely, to derive the spread-volatility per
trade relation, let us consider a dichotomy between market makers using limit orders and market
takers using market orders. In that case, the average proﬁt and loss per trade of a typical
market making strategy, which can be understood as that of a limit order, is essentially equal to
S/2− cσ/pM , see Wyart, Bouchaud, Kockelkoren, Potters, and Vettorazzo (2008). Therefore,
the eﬃciency assumption implies
S
2
∼ c σp
M
.
In the case of a large tick asset, for which S = α, as seen in the previous subsection, market
orders are costly, their cost being on average α/2−ηα. Therefore the proﬁt and loss of market
makers, which is still S/2− cσ/pM , is no longer zero. Indeed, it is precisely the cost paid by
market takers. Consequently, we get
S/2− c σp
M
=α/2− c σp
M
=α/2−ηα,
which leads to Equation (III.1). Importantly, this simple cost analysis and Equation (III.1) derived
from it enable us to design simple prediction formulas for η after a change in the tick value.
2.4 Prediction of the cost of market and limit orders
Based on the fact that Equation (III.1) should hold for a large tick asset for any tick value, the
authors in Dayri and Rosenbaum (2012) establish three prediction formulas for the new value of
η, and therefore for the new cost of market and limit orders, after a change in the tick value of
an asset. Each of the three formulas corresponds to diﬀerent assumptions. For simplicity, we
only present here a formula which does not require any prior regression analysis and assumes a
linear shape for the cumulative latent liquidity.
Let us consider a large tick asset for which the current tick value is α0 and associated is η0.
Then, if the tick value is changed to α, the formula for the new parameter η gives:
η∼ (η0+0.1)(α0
α
)1/2−0.1. (III.2)
We now comment this formula and its use to predict the new microstructural features of an
asset after a tick value change:
• Formula (III.2) actually holds only provided the asset remains a large tick asset after the
change in the tick value. However, due to the concurrence mechanism, market makers
maintain a spread equal to one tick as long as they make proﬁt from it, that is as long as
η< 1/2. The value of η in the formula being decreasing with α, we get that Formula (III.2)
holds provided α≥α∗ with
α∗ = (η0+0.1
0.6
)2
α0.
• Formula (III.2) enables us to tell whether the asset remains a large tick asset after the tick
value change: if the forecast value of η is greater than 1/2 (that is α< α∗), the asset is
predicted to become a small tick asset after the tick value modiﬁcation. However, note that
in that case, the forecast value of η cannot really be interpreted beyond this (becoming
small tick or not).
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• If the predicted value of η is smaller than 1/2, Formula (III.2) provides the estimated η
after the tick value change, and therefore the estimated cost of market and limit orders.
In particular, this allows us to tell ex ante whether a stock will become/remain favorable
for market makers or exhibit balanced trading costs. This is probably the most relevant
viewpoint in term of regulation.
2.5 What is a suitable tick value?
From a regulatory perspective, a tick value can probably be seen as suitable if:
• The bid-ask spread is close to one tick, ensuring the presence of liquidity in the order
book.
• Transaction costs are close to zero for market orders. In that case, the market is eﬃcient
and market makers do not take advantage of the tick value to the detriment of ﬁnal
investors acting mainly as liquidity takers.
Thus, in our approach, an asset enjoys a relevant tick value if it is a large tick asset and its η
parameter is close to 1/2. Indeed, recall that the cost of a market order for a large tick asset is
α/2−ηα.
Note that according to Formula (III.2), starting from a large tick asset, the optimal tick value
can be obtained setting α=α∗. With this optimality notion in mind, we conduct in the next
section an empirical analysis of the Japanese pilot program on tick values.
3 Analysis of the Tokyo Stock Exchange pilot program on tick
values
3.1 Data description
We use data from the 55 Japanese stocks of the TOPIX 100 index involved in the pilot program
in 2014. Our database, provided by Capital Fund Management, records the time and price of
every transaction, as well as the best bid and ask prices right before the transactions, from June
3, 2013 to December 30, 2014. We remove market data corresponding to the ﬁrst and last hour
of trading, as these periods have usually speciﬁc features due to the opening/closing auction.
Three diﬀerent phases are distinguished in this study:
• Phase 0 (before the pilot program): from June 3, 2013 to January 13, 2014.
• Phase 1 (from the ﬁrst implementation of the tick value reduction program to the second
one): from January 14, 2014 to July 21, 2014.
• Phase 2 (after the second implementation of the tick value reduction program): from July
22, 2014 to December 30, 2014.
The details of the pilot program are given in Table III.1.
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Quoted price below (¥) Phase 0 tick value (¥) Phase 1 tick value (¥) Phase 2 tick value (¥)
1,000 1 1 0.1
3,000 1 1 0.5
5,000 5 1 0.5
10,000 10 1 1
30,000 10 5 5
50,000 50 5 5
100,000 100 10 10
300,000 100 50 50
500,000 500 50 50
1,000,000 1000 100 100
3,000,000 1000 500 500
5,000,000 5000 500 500
10,000,000 10000 1000 1000
30,000,000 10000 5000 5000
50,000,000 50000 5000 5000
Higher prices 100000 10000 10000
Table III.1: Tick value reduction table.
3.2 Classiﬁcation of the stocks in Phase 0
In this work, we use the average spread in number of ticks, now denoted by S and estimated
as the average value of the bid-ask spread right before a transaction, to classify the stocks into
three groups:
• Small tick stocks: S > 1.6.
• Large tick stocks: S ≤ 1.5.
• Ambiguous case between large and small tick: 1.5< S ≤ 1.6.
For large tick stocks, we use the parameter η to distinguish between balanced stocks, for
which market orders are reasonably costly, and stocks where market makers (viewed again as an
aggregated class) obtain signiﬁcant proﬁt from liquidity takers thanks to the tick value. We use
the following criterion:
• Balanced stocks: η≥ 0.4.
• Market makers favorable stocks: η< 0.4.
Note that small tick stocks will be considered balanced stocks. However, they do not fulﬁll
the criteria for stocks having a suitable tick value, their spread being somehow too large.
For each of the 55 stocks, for Phase 0, we give in Table III.2 the average spread (S0), the
value of the η parameter (η0) and tell whether the stock is large tick or not (Yes or No for the
variable LTick0) and whether it is balanced or not (Yes or No for the variable Bal0).
We see that all the assets but one (Mitsubishi Estate Co Ltd) are large tick stocks in Phase
0. However, among the remaining 54 large tick stocks, only ﬁve of them are balanced: Chubu
Electric Power Co Inc, Inpex Corp, Kirin Holdings Co Ltd, Kubota Corp and Sumitomo Electric
Industries Ltd. According to our framework, no tick value modiﬁcation was necessary for these
ﬁve assets. However, a tick value reduction can be beneﬁcial for the 49 other stocks, which
somehow justiﬁes the will of the TSE to launch the pilot program.
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Company Name S0 η0 LTick0 Bal0
Large Tick Balanced
Aeon Co Ltd 1.07 0.18 Yes No
ANA Holdings Inc 1.23 0.09 Yes No
Asahi Class Co Ltd 1.03 0.15 Yes No
Asahi Kasei Corp 1.04 0.21 Yes No
Astellas Pharma Inc 1.05 0.14 Yes No
Bank of Yokohama Ltd 1.02 0.23 Yes No
Canon Inc 1.04 0.06 Yes No
Chubu Electric Power Co Inc 1.25 0.49 Yes Yes
Daiwa Securities Group Inc 1.04 0.20 Yes No
Dalichi Sankyo Co Ltd 1.15 0.32 Yes No
Dai-ichi Life Insurance Co Ltd 1.10 0.22 Yes No
Fujitsu Ltd 1.03 0.13 Yes No
Hitachi Ltd 1.04 0.10 Yes No
Honda Motor Co Ltd 1.04 0.10 Yes No
Inpex Corp 1.27 0.55 Yes Yes
ITOCHU Corp 1.05 0.18 Yes No
Japan Tobacco Inc 1.04 0.12 Yes No
JX Holdings Inc 1.01 0.08 Yes No
Kansai Electric Power Co Inc 1.24 0.33 Yes No
Kirin Holdings Co Ltd 1.43 0.53 Yes Yes
Kubota Corp 1.34 0.46 Yes Yes
Komatsu Ltd 1.30 0.29 Yes No
Marubeni Corp 1.02 0.12 Yes No
Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings Corp 1.01 0.16 Yes No
Mitsubishi Corp 1.22 0.36 Yes No
Mitsubishi Electric Corp 1.10 0.31 Yes No
Mitsubishi Estate Co Ltd 1.70 0.60 No Yes
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd 1.01 0.11 Yes No
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc 1.03 0.04 Yes No
Mitsui Co Ltd 1.12 0.23 Yes No
Mitsui Fudosan Co Ltd 1.07 0.23 Yes No
Mizuho Financial Group Inc 1.14 0.07 Yes No
Nissan Motor Co Ltd 1.06 0.14 Yes No
Nippon Steel Sumitomo Metal Corp 1.02 0.05 Yes No
Nippon Telegraph Telephone Corp 1.04 0.08 Yes No
Nomura Holdings Inc 1.05 0.06 Yes No
NTT DoCoMo Inc 1.28 0.24 Yes No
ORIX Corp 1.21 0.33 Yes No
Osaka Gas Co Ltd 1.04 0.16 Yes No
Panasonic Corp 1.14 0.16 Yes No
Resona Holdings Inc 1.00 0.07 Yes No
Ricoh Co Ltd 1.13 0.36 Yes No
Seven I Holdings Co Ltd 1.06 0.16 Yes No
Softbank Corp 1.05 0.06 Yes No
Sony Corp 1.17 0.24 Yes No
Sumitomo Corp 1.04 0.18 Yes No
Sumitomo Electric Industries Ltd 1.24 0.40 Yes Yes
Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings Inc 1.01 0.14 Yes No
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc 1.15 0.08 Yes No
Takeda Pharmaceutical Co Ltd 1.06 0.13 Yes No
Tokyo Gas Co Ltd 1.05 0.16 Yes No
Tokio Marine Holdings Inc 1.05 0.18 Yes No
Toray Industries Inc 1.03 0.13 Yes No
Toshiba Corp 1.03 0.06 Yes No
Toyota Motor Corp 1.03 0.04 Yes No
Table III.2: Average spread, value of η and categories (large tick or not; balanced or not) for
the 55 stocks in Phase 0.
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3.3 Phase 0 - Phase 1
We now test the prediction formula (III.2) between Phase 0 and Phase 1. We ﬁrst select 12 stocks
among the 55 stocks based on the following criteria:
• These stocks are large tick assets during Phase 0.
• These stocks are involved in the tick value reduction program during Phase 1.
• For every stock, days on which multiple tick values are used3 are removed from the
database. We then choose the tick value right before the end of Phase 0 and the tick value
right after the beginning of Phase 1 as two reference tick values. Stocks for which the
numbers of days when the tick value is equal to its reference value in Phase 0 and Phase 1
are both greater than 10 are ﬁnally selected.
Twelve assets are remaining after this selection. For each of these stocks, based on the
value of η in Phase 0 (η0), we predict the new value of η in Phase 1 (η
p
1 ) using Formula (III.2).
We provide conﬁdence intervals based on the 25% and 75% quantiles of the distribution of the
estimated daily η in Phase 04. We also forecast whether the asset will be large tick in Phase 1
(LTickp1 ) and balanced in Phase 1 (Bal
p
1 ). More precisely, considering a predicted η larger than
1/2 corresponds to an increase of the spread (recall that the situation η> 1/2 is not compatible
with a one tick spread):
• If ηp1 ≥ 0.55, the asset is predicted to become a small tick asset after the tick value change.
• If ηp1 < 0.5, the asset is predicted to remain a large tick asset after the tick value change,
with the forecast value for the new η being meaningful and given by ηp1 .
• We qualify the situation 0.5≤ ηp1 < 0.55 as an “ambiguous” case between large tick and
small tick.
We compare the predictions to the actual quantities in Phase 1: η1, LTick1 and Bal1. The
results are given in Table III.3.
The obtained average relative prediction error for η1, that is the average of the |ηp1 −η1|/η1
is less than 18%. This shows that thanks to Formula (III.2), we can forecast the new value of η,
and therefore the new trading costs, with a good accuracy. Our prediction for η being quite
sharp, it is no surprise that we are able to forecast whether or not a stock is going to remain
large tick and whether it is balanced in Phase 1. For nine of the stocks, our forecast was that it
would remain large tick, and seven of these predictions were correct (classifying the “ambiguous”
case as correct). We also predicted that two of the assets would become small tick and both
predictions were correct. Thus, the predictive power of our methodology is very high.
According to our optimality notion, three of the twelve stocks now enjoy a suitable tick value
(balanced large tick stocks): Seven I Holdings Co Ltd, Takeda Pharmaceutical Co Ltd and Tokio
Marine Holdings Inc. Such results could have been obtained ex ante using our approach. Indeed,
following our methodology, a regulator or an exchange can anticipate the suitable way to operate
a tick value change, especially when the goal is to decrease the tick value of an unbalanced stock.
3We recall that the tick value of a stock depends on its price, see Table III.1.
4The estimated η being the average of the daily estimations, in very few cases, the prediction can fall out of the
conﬁdence interval. Then we replace the prediction by the closest bound in the conﬁdence interval.
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Company name S0 η0 S1 η1 LTick1 Bal1 η
p
1 LTick
p
1 Bal
p
1
**Astellas Pharma Inc 1.05 0.14 1.72 0.43 No Yes 0.66 [0.50,0.71] No Yes
**Canon Inc 1.04 0.06 1.13 0.23 Yes No 0.26 [0.19,0.27] Yes No
**Honda Motor Co Ltd 1.04 0.10 1.23 0.32 Yes No 0.34 [0.26,0.37] Yes No
**Japan Tobacco Inc 1.04 0.12 1.23 0.32 Yes No 0.39 [0.26,0.41] Yes No
**Mitsui Fudosan Co Ltd 1.07 0.23 1.95 0.66 No Yes 0.63 [0.52,0.69] No Yes
*Nippon Telegraph Telephone Corp 1.04 0.08 2.00 0.62 No Yes 0.46 [0.35,0.51] Yes Yes
(*)*Seven I Holdings Co Ltd 1.06 0.16 1.55 0.51 Ambiguous Yes 0.49 [0.38,0.55] Yes Yes
*Softbank Corp 1.05 0.06 1.85 0.50 No Yes 0.40 [0.32,0.40] Yes Yes
*Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc 1.15 0.08 1.33 0.34 Yes No 0.47 [0.27,0.47] Yes Yes
**Takeda Pharmaceutical Co Ltd 1.06 0.13 1.46 0.43 Yes Yes 0.42 [0.28,0.45] Yes Yes
(*)*Tokio Marine Holdings Inc 1.05 0.18 1.39 0.46 Yes Yes 0.53 [0.41,0.57] Ambiguous Yes
**Toyota Motor Corp 1.03 0.04 1.36 0.32 Yes No 0.35 [0.27,0.33] Yes No
Table III.3: For the 12 selected stocks: Average spread and value of η in Phase 0 and Phase 1,
categories in Phase 1, and predictions for η and the categories. The number of stars * in front
of a company name represents the number of good predictions (one for being large tick or not,
one for being balanced or not). A star between brackets (*) corresponds to an “ambiguous”
case.
Figure III.3: Daily estimations of η for the last 3.5 months of Phase 0 and the ﬁrst 3.5 months
of Phase 1 for the stock Canon Inc.
To end this subsection, as an illustration, we give in Figure III.3 detailed results about η for
the stock Canon Inc. More precisely, we provide daily estimations of η for the last 3.5 months of
Phase 0 and the ﬁrst 3.5 months of Phase 1. We also add the average values of η during both
phases together with our forecast for the value of η in Phase 1. We see on this example that our
prediction is very close to the realized value.
3.4 Phase 1 - Phase 2
The tick value reduction program aﬀects much more stocks in Phase 2. Using the same selection
criteria as previously (replacing Phase 0 by Phase 1 and Phase 1 by Phase 2), we ﬁnd 48 stocks
that are large tick assets during Phase 1 and have their tick value eﬀectively reduced in Phase 2.
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We draw a similar analysis as the one for Phase 0-Phase 1. The results are given in Table III.4,
where the index 1 is used to denote quantities in Phase 1 and the index 2 quantities in Phase 2.
Once again, we obtain an excellent accuracy for predicting the value of η in Phase 2 based
on that in Phase 1. Indeed, the average relative error is here less than 17%. Among the 48
assets, 16 of them are predicted to become small tick stocks and all these predictions are correct.
Moreover, 28 stocks are predicted to remain large tick and 23 of these predictions are correct
(taking the ambiguous cases as correct). Regarding the fact of being balanced, more than 85%
of our predictions are realised. Hence the study of the evolution of the market between Phase
1 and Phase 2 conﬁrms what was found for Phase 0-Phase 1: our device based on η enables
us to forecast ex ante the consequences of a change in the tick value on the market microstructure.
Note that after this second phase, the stocks Canon Inc, Chubu Electric Power Co Inc,
Dalichi Sankyo Co Ltd, JX Holdings Inc, Komatsu Ltd and Mitsubishi Electric Corp seem to
have a suitable tick value (balanced large tick stocks).
4 Conclusion
Based on data from the TSE pilot program, we have studied the eﬀects of tick value changes on
the microstructure of large tick stocks. This has been done using the microstructural parameter
η which summarizes the high frequency features of a large tick asset, in particular the associated
trading costs. The prediction formula suggested in Dayri and Rosenbaum (2012) for the new
value of the parameter η after a tick value change has been tested using all the stocks of the
Japanese experiment. We have compared the prediction results in Phase 1 and Phase 2 with the
realized η, and shown that Formula (III.2) provides very accurate forecasts. In particular, we can
predict ex ante whether a large tick stock will become a small tick stock after a tick value change
and whether or not its associated trading costs will be balanced between market makers and
liquidity takers.
This work validates the quantitative tools developed in Dayri and Rosenbaum (2012) for
studying the consequences of a tick value modiﬁcation. It provides detailed practical guidelines
for market regulators and exchanges searching for optimal tick values. Indeed, it can help them
choose suitable tick values without applying any trial and error method, which may largely
reduce the duration and cost of pilot programs.
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Company Name S1 η1 S2 η2 LTick2 Bal2 η
p
2 LTick
p
2 Bal
p
2
**Aeon Co Ltd 1.03 0.12 1.16 0.16 Yes No 0.21 [0.18,0.26] Yes No
**Asahi Class Co Ltd 1.01 0.14 2.49 0.87 No Yes 0.67 [0.52,0.82] No Yes
**Asahi Kasei Corp 1.03 0.23 3.43 1.02 No Yes 0.93 [0.76,1.07] No Yes
**ANA Holdings Inc 1.00 0.02 1.37 0.30 Yes No 0.29 [0.26,0.31] Yes No
**Bank of Yokohama Ltd 1.02 0.22 3.28 0.98 No Yes 0.92 [0.77,1.05] No Yes
(*)Canon Inc 1.13 0.23 1.59 0.43 Ambiguous Yes 0.36 [0.30,0.43] Yes No
**Chubu Electric Power Co Inc 1.10 0.31 1.45 0.44 Yes Yes 0.48 [0.40,0.55] Yes Yes
**Daiwa Securities Group 1.02 0.19 3.42 1.09 No Yes 0.81 [0.70,0.90] No Yes
**Dai-ichi Life Insurance Co Ltd 1.08 0.25 1.35 0.35 Yes No 0.39 [0.33,0.47] Yes No
**Dalichi Sankyo Co Ltd 1.10 0.27 1.43 0.40 Yes Yes 0.43 [0.35,0.50] Yes Yes
**Fujitsu Ltd 1.01 0.16 2.80 0.97 No Yes 0.72 [0.60,0.80] No Yes
(*)*Hitachi Ltd 1.01 0.09 2.55 0.81 No Yes 0.50 [0.42,0.58] Ambiguous Yes
*Honda Motor Co Ltd 1.23 0.32 1.69 0.49 No Yes 0.49 [0.43,0.55] Yes Yes
*Inpex Corp 1.08 0.25 1.34 0.37 Yes No 0.40 [0.35,0.45] Yes Yes
**ITOCHU Corp 1.03 0.13 1.17 0.24 Yes No 0.23 [0.18,0.27] Yes No
(*)*Japan Tobacco Inc 1.23 0.32 1.86 0.55 No Yes 0.50 [0.40,0.57] Ambiguous Yes
(*)*JX Holdings Inc 1.01 0.07 1.52 0.41 Ambiguous Yes 0.44 [0.38,0.50] Yes Yes
**Kansai Electric Power Co Ltd 1.07 0.25 4.20 1.03 No Yes 1.01 [0.86,1.17] No Yes
*Kirin Holdings Co Ltd 1.10 0.29 1.31 0.34 Yes No 0.45 [0.31,0.57] Yes Yes
*Komatsu Ltd 1.10 0.24 1.50 0.46 Yes Yes 0.39 [0.33,0.43] Yes No
**Kubota Corp 1.15 0.37 1.69 0.59 No Yes 0.57 [0.49,0.64] No Yes
**Marubeni Corp 1.01 0.10 1.99 0.57 No Yes 0.54 [0.44,0.62] No Yes
*Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings 1.00 0.08 1.97 0.59 No Yes 0.46 [0.36,0.52] Yes Yes
**Mitsubishi Corp 1.05 0.18 1.40 0.36 Yes No 0.29 [0.24,0.34] Yes No
**Mitsubishi Electric Corp 1.08 0.29 1.50 0.49 Yes Yes 0.45 [0.39,0.52] Yes Yes
**Mitsubishi Estate Co Ltd 1.48 0.53 2.46 0.84 No Yes 0.79 [0.71,0.89] No Yes
**Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 1.01 0.11 2.42 0.80 No Yes 0.56 [0.45,0.66] No Yes
**Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc 1.00 0.03 1.44 0.32 Yes No 0.30 [0.28,0.32] Yes No
**Mitsui Co Ltd 1.04 0.14 1.18 0.21 Yes No 0.24 [0.20,0.28] Yes No
**Nippon Steel Sumitomo Metal Corp 1.00 0.03 1.29 0.31 Yes No 0.30 [0.27,0.34] Yes No
(*)*Nissan Motor Co Ltd 1.01 0.09 2.27 0.62 No Yes 0.50 [0.42,0.58] Ambiguous Yes
Nomura Holdings Inc 1.00 0.05 1.90 0.51 No Yes 0.36 [0.33,0.40] Yes No
**NTT DoCoMo Inc 1.03 0.17 1.28 0.34 Yes No 0.28 [0.24,0.32] Yes No
**ORIX Corp 1.06 0.23 1.23 0.33 Yes No 0.37 [0.32,0.42] Yes No
**Osaka Gas Co Ltd 1.00 0.12 2.21 0.81 No Yes 0.59 [0.47,0.70] No Yes
**Panasonic Corp 1.03 0.14 1.19 0.22 Yes No 0.24 [0.20,0.28] Yes No
*Resona Holdings Inc 1.00 0.06 1.84 0.56 No Yes 0.41 [0.36,0.45] Yes Yes
**Ricoh Co Ltd 1.05 0.25 1.23 0.29 Yes No 0.39 [0.33,0.46] Yes No
**Sony Corp 1.04 0.16 1.49 0.37 Yes No 0.26 [0.21,0.32] Yes No
**Sumitomo Corp 1.03 0.14 1.17 0.20 Yes No 0.24 [0.19,0.29] Yes No
*Sumitomo Electric Industries 1.07 0.29 1.32 0.37 Yes No 0.45 [0.36,0.53] Yes Yes
(*)*Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc 1.33 0.34 1.92 0.59 No Yes 0.52 [0.46,0.59] Ambiguous Yes
**Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings Inc 1.00 0.12 1.74 0.62 No Yes 0.59 [0.48,0.67] No Yes
**Takeda Pharmaceutical Co 1.46 0.43 2.19 0.67 No Yes 0.65 [0.56,0.73] No Yes
**Tokio Marine Holdings Inc 1.39 0.46 2.10 0.70 No Yes 0.70 [0.61,0.76] No Yes
**Tokyo Gas Co Ltd 1.01 0.14 2.54 0.91 No Yes 0.66 [0.55,0.76] No Yes
**Toray Industries Inc 1.02 0.14 3.24 0.98 No Yes 0.64 [0.51,0.77] No Yes
Toshiba Corp 1.00 0.05 1.74 0.52 No Yes 0.37 [0.31,0.42] Yes No
Table III.4: For the 48 selected stocks: Average spread and value of η in Phase 1 and Phase 2,
categories in Phase 2, and predictions for η and the categories. The meaning of the stars in
front of the company names is the same as for Table III.3.
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CHAPTER IV
Intelligence and Randomness of Market
Participants
1 Introduction
In Part I, we have seen the advantages of state-dependent approach in order book modeling,
as well as its application in explaining market participants’ intelligence. This new concept has
shown very promising results in explaining the links between the microscopic features (such as
the order arrival intensities) and the macroscopic features (such as the intraday price volatility).
The Markovian framework proposed in Chapter II models the intelligence and randomness of
market participants by a series of state-dependent functions ( fi ,gi in Equation II.1) and imposes
very little constraints on the speciﬁc forms of these functions. This choice, while enabling the
framework to include most Markovian LOB models, leaves one important practical question
unanswered: how to approximate these functions in real market?
In the queue-reactive model, this problem is tackled by taking a non-parametric (point-by-
point estimation) approach to approximate the order arrival intensities, in which the queue size
(the state) is dicretized and truncated to a limited range. Such method requires a huge number of
order book data and quickly becomes impossible when the dimension of state exceeds 3. Since
many repetitive patterns have been identiﬁed in the shape of these functions on various assets, it
is natural to consider the possibility of using parametric functions in describing the dynamics of
order arrivals. In Chapter I, these patterns have been explained qualitatively using arguments
such as the existence of priority value, the arbitrage opportunities and the adverse-selection risk,
however, how to parameterize fi and gi so that they are capable of reproducing such patterns
remains a challenging problem that we do not yet dispose a clear answer. In this chapter, we
present a preliminary study of an agent-based model on the randomness and intelligence of
market participants, which we believe will help understand the cause of state-dependencies in
order arrival intensities and thus provide useful insights on the choice of parameterizations.
We assume the existence of three types of agents: the informed trader, the noise trader
and market makers. The informed trader receives market information such as the jumps of the
eﬃcient price, which is hidden to the noise trader. He then takes advantage of this information
to gain proﬁt by sending market orders. Market makers receive also the same information but
with some delay and they place limit orders as long as the average expected gain of such orders
are positive (they are assumed to be risk-neutral). The informed trader and the market makers
represent the “intelligent” part in order book dynamics, while the “random” part is represented
by the noise trader who is assumed to send market orders according to a homogeneous Poisson
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process.
Interestingly, the above simple framework allows us to deduce a link between eﬃcient price
dynamics, proportion of noise trades, market volume, bid-ask spread and the equilibrium LOB
state. The question of how the bid-ask spread emerges from the behavior of market participants
has been discussed by many researchers. It is generally accepted that the bid-ask spread is non
zero because of the existence of three types of cost: order processing costs (Huang and Stoll
(1997)), inventory costs (Ho and Stoll (1981)) and adverse selection costs (Glosten and Milgrom
(1985)). In our framework, both the order processing costs and the inventory costs are neglected
and we consider the bid-ask spread as a purely informational phenomenon as in Glosten and
Milgrom (1985). Under our settings, the bid-ask spread emerges naturally from the fact that limit
orders placed too close to the eﬃcient price have negative expected returns when being executed:
the existence of the informed trader and the potential unexpected large price jumps prevent
market makers from placing limit orders too close to the eﬃcient price. Moreover, the equilibrium
LOB state is shown as a direct consequence of the competition between market makers, which we
believe should be closely linked with the invariant distribution of the LOB state discussed in Part I.
Although the tick value is assumed to be constant in most LOB models, it is clear that
changes of the tick value will probably lead to signiﬁcant changes in the microscopic features of
the underlying asset. The eﬀects of such changes are rarely discussed in the literature. In our
model, the tick value is considered as one of the structural parameters. This enables the study
of its roles in determining the LOB dynamics as well as the equilibrium state. The discretization
of available price levels enables also a quantitative deﬁnition of the queue priority value in our
framework, which is often termed only qualitatively as the advantages of an order placed on top
of a queue compared to an order placed at the bottom.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the core agent-based model
with zero tick value. Based on the greedy assumptions of the informed trader’s behavior, a link
is deduced between market volume, price jump and the cumulative LOB shape. We then make
an additional assumption on the zero-proﬁt of market makers, which enables us to compute
explicitly the bid-ask spread as well as the equilibrium LOB shape. In Section 3, the case of
non-zero tick value is considered. We show that the constrained bid-ask spread is equal to the
sum of the intrinsic bid-ask spread (without the tick value constraint) and the imposed tick value
constraint. The equilibrium LOB shape under positive tick value is also deduced and we give an
explicit formulation that quantiﬁes the priority value of any order at a queue. The framework
is generalized to include the market makers’ uncertainty on the eﬃcient price in Section 5. In
such case, we explain how the information is propagated from the informed trader to the market
makers, and the eﬀects of this uncertainty on the bid-ask spread when a transaction happens.
The speed of LOB recovery is discussed at the end of this section, in which we show that the
order book will gradually recover to its equilibrium state if the reaction time of the informed
trader is short enough compared to the frequency of noise trade and of information arrival.
2 Basic Model
2.1 Price Dynamics
Denote P (t ) the market underlying eﬃcient price, whose dynamics is described by the following
equation:
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P (t )= P0+Y (t ),
where Y (t ) is a compound Poisson process with jump rate λi and size distribution ψ (deﬁned
on R). We will denote B as the jump size of this process: B represents the price deviation once a
jump happens, which follows the distribution ψ.
We have:
E[Y (t )]=λi tE[B ].
So for the price process P (t ) to be a martingale, the average value of the deviation B is
assumed to be equal to zero. In such case, we have V[P (t )]=λi tE[B2], where the term λiE[B2]
represents the macroscopic volatility of the eﬃcient price process and will be denoted by σ:
σ2 =λiE[B2]. (IV.1)
σ represents the fundamental volatility of the asset, due to the nature of incoming informa-
tion, and can be considered as one of the invariant element in an asset’s dynamics when other
modiﬁable factors such as the tick value change.
2.2 Informed Trader, Noise Trader and Market Maker
Assume that there are three types of traders in the market:
• One informed trader: the informed trader receives the value of the price jump size B (and
the eﬃcient price P (t )) right before a price jump happens. He then sends his trades based
on this information to gain proﬁt. We assume that he can only send market orders.
• One noise trader: the noise trader sends random market orders to the market. We assume
that these trades follows a compound Poisson process, with arrival rate λu and volume
distribution κu in R (positive volume represents a buying order, while negative volume
represents a selling order).
• Market makers: the market makers receives the value of the price jump size B (and the
eﬃcient price P (t )) right after a price jump happens. They place limit orders and try to
make proﬁt. We assume that they are risk neutral.
Firstly, we consider the case when the tick size is equal to 0. The LOB is composed of
limit orders placed by market makers around the eﬃcient price P (t ). We denote the cumulative
available liquidities till P (t )+x by L(x). L(x) represents the total quantities of the limit selling
orders with price smaller or equal than P (t )+ x when x > 0, and the negative of the total
quantities of the limit buying orders with price larger or equal than P (t )−x when x < 0. This
function L(x) will be called the cumulative LOB shape function.
Unlike the modeling approach used in Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) and
Wyart, Bouchaud, Kockelkoren, Potters, and Vettorazzo (2008) where incoming order ﬂows have
non-zero impact on the concensus price’s dynamics, the eﬃcient price P (t ) is assumed to be
independent of the order book dynamics in the above settings. In our framework, P (t ) should
be considered as the long-term equilibrium price of the asset given current information, which
changes only when new information arrives on the market. We consider the impact of order
book events as the results of information propagation between market participants, which will be
discussed in details in Section 5.
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2.3 Some Assumptions
We ﬁrst give some regularity assumptions. Let’s denote the cumulative distribution function of B
(the price jump size) by Fψ(x), and the cumulative distribution function of Qu (the noise trader’s
trade size) by Fκu (x).
Assumption 31. Fψ(x) and Fκu (x) are both diﬀerentiable. Their probability density functions will
be denoted respectively by fψ(x) and fκu (x). fψ(x) and fκu (x) are both positive continuous functions,
and for all x ∈R (Buy-Sell Symmetry):
fψ(−x) = fψ(x)
fκu (−x) = fκu (x).
Moreover,
E[|B |] < ∞
E[|Qu |] < ∞.
For the cumulative LOB shape function L(x), we assume:
Assumption 32. The cumulative LOB shape function L(x) is a continuous increasing function with
L(0) = 0. And for all x such that |L(x)| > 0, L(x) is diﬀerentiable, with l (x) = L′(x) a continuous
function in such cases.
We can thus deﬁne the following inverse cumulative LOB shape function L−1(q) as:
L−1(q)= argmax
x
{x|L(x)= q}. (IV.2)
Note that L−1(q) is not continuous unless L(x) is strictly increasing.
2.4 Links between the Trade Size Q , Price Jump B and the LOB Cumulative
Shape L(x)
Given the function L(x), we now specify the behavior of the informed trader in the following
assumption. This assumption links the trade size Q i of the informed trader with the LOB
cumulative shape L(x) and the price jump size B received by the informed trader.
Assumption 33. Based on the received value of B and the cumulative LOB shape function L(x)
provided by the market makers, the informed trader sends his trade in a greedy way such that he wipes
out all the available liquidities in the LOB till the level P (t )+B , thus, his trade size Q i satisﬁes
(Q i is positive for a buy order and negative for a sell order), given the information signal B and the
function L(x):
Q i = L(B).
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Denote Fκi (x) the cumulative distribution function of the informed trader’s trade size, Fκu (x)
the cumulative distribution function of the noise trader’s trade size, and Fκ(x) the cumulative
distribution function of the trader’s trade size (both of the informed and noise trader), we have
the following theorem (with r = λi
λi+λu , representing the proportion of informed trader’s trade,
recall that Fψ(x) is the cumulative distribution function of the price jump size B , and L−1(q) the
inverse function deﬁned by Equation IV.2):
Theorem 1. The cumulative distribution functions Fκi (x), Fκu (x) and Fκ(x) satisfy:
Fκi (q) = Fψi (L−1(q))
Fκ(q) = rFκi (q)+ (1− r )Fκu (q). (IV.3)
2.5 The Bid-Ask Spread and the Equilibrium LOB Shape
Now the question remains for the market makers to determine the function L(x), given the
greedy behavior of the informed trader and the random behavior of the noise trader.
Let’s consider the proﬁt of passive selling orders placed between P (t )+x and P (t )+x+δp for
some x,δp > 0, given the fact that these orders are totally executed. This conditional expected
gain will be denoted by G(x,δp), and we have the following equation (with ν a random variable
that is equal to 1 if the trade is initiated by the informed trader, 0 if it is initiated by the noise
trader):
G(x,δp) =
∫ x+δp
x
l (s)sds− [L(x+δp)−L(x)]E[νB |Q ≥ L(x+δp)]
=
∫ x+δp
x
l (s)sds− [L(x+δp)−L(x)]r 1−Fκi (x+δp)
1−Fκ(L(x+δp))
E[B |B > x+δp].
If L(x)> 0 and L(x+δp)> L(x) for δp suﬃciently small (or equivalently that for all δp > 0,
sups∈[x,x+δp] l (s)> 0, we can deﬁne the average proﬁt per unity at x, denoted by G(x):
G(x) = lim
δp→0+
G(x,δp)
L(x+δp)−L(x)
= x− r 1−Fκi (L(x))
1−Fκ(L(x))
E[B |B > x]
= x− rE[B1B>x ]
1−Fκ(L(x))
= x− rE[B1B>x ]
1− rFψ(x)− (1− r )Fκu (L(x))
.
It is easy to see that G(x) is a decreasing function of L(x), so that when G(x) is positive, the
market makers will add new liquidities to the LOB (increase the value of L(x)), as they can still
make proﬁt in average. This kind of competition between market makers results in the following
zero proﬁt assumption:
Assumption 34. For every x ∈ R+, if L(x)> 0 and l (x)> 0, then the conditional expected average
gain per unity of passive orders placed at x, given the fact that they are totally executed, is equal to 0,
that is, when L(x)> 0 and l (x)> 0:
G(x) = 0.
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Equivalently, we have:
x = r E[B1B>x ]
1−Fκ(L(x))
. (IV.4)
The case corresponding to passive buying orders can be similarly obtained:
Assumption 35. For every x ∈ R−, if L(x)< 0 and l (x)> 0, then the conditional expected average
gain per unity of passive orders placed at x, given the fact that they are totally executed, is equal to 0,
that is, when L(x)< 0 and l (x)> 0:
G(x) = 0.
Equivalently, we have:
x = r E[B1B<x ]
Fκ(L(x))
. (IV.5)
Remark 1. In the continuous case, it might be diﬃcult to image how the competitions between
diﬀerent market makers happen. One can think of the case that every market maker speciﬁes his own
L(x) (cumulative liquidities that he provides till each price level), then Assumption 34 means that,
when there is still space for future proﬁt in x (G(x)> 0), other market makers will come to the market,
and increase the liquidities in the LOB so that in the end, no further proﬁt can be made by adding
liquidities anywhere.
Remark 2. The above zero proﬁt assumptions can also be seen as the generalized version of the zero
proﬁt assumption proposed in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), in which the zero proﬁt is only assumed
for the two best oﬀer limits. It is also interesting to point out that, under this generalized zero proﬁt
assumption, those fast market makers can still make proﬁt, as their orders are placed earlier in the
LOB (this point will be made clearer in the discrete case).
Now considering the ask side of the limit order book. If L(x)> 0 for all x > 0, we shall have:
lim
x→0+
G(x) = −r E[B1B>0]
1−Fκ(0)
= −2rE[B1B>0]
< 0.
As G(x) is a continuous function of x, there exists some δx > 0, such that for all x ∈ (0,δx),
G(x)< 0. Then according to Assumption 34, we should have l (x)= 0 for all x ∈ (0,δx), which
means that L(x)= 0 for all x ∈ (0,δx). This is clearly controversial.
Now assume that L(x)= 0 till some positive value η, and that L(x)> 0, for all x > η. From
Assumption 34, we have, for all x > η, if l (x)> 0:
x = rE[B1B>x ]
1− rFψi (x)− (1− r )Fκu (L(x))
.
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We shall have thus, for all x > η, if l (x)> 0:
L(x) = F−1κu (
1− rFψi (x)
1− r −
rE[B1B>x ]
(1− r )x )
= F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− r E[max(
B
x
,1)]). (IV.6)
Now if there exists some x ′ > η and δx ′ > 0, such that l (x)= 0 for all x ∈ [x ′,x ′+δx ′]. Let’s
deﬁne xr = inf{x|l (x) > 0,x > x ′+δx ′} and xl = sup{x|l (x) > 0,x < x ′}. If xr <∞, then by the
continuity of l (x) and L(x), we have:
L(xl ) = F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− r E[max(
B
xl
,1)])
L(xr ) = F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− r E[max(
B
xr
,1)]).
By Assumption 31, we have L(xr )> L(xl ). While by the fact that l (x)= 0 for all x ∈ [xl ,xr ],
we should have L(xr ) = L(xl ). These two results are clearly controversial. So either we have
l (x) = 0 for all x ≥ xl , or such x ′ and δx ′ do not exist. For the ﬁrst case, we should have
L(x) = F−1κu ( 11−r − r1−r E[max(Bx ,1)]) for all x ∈ (η,xl ), thus l (xl ) > 0 by the continuity of fκu (x),
which is controversial to the fact that l (xl )= 0. Thus for any x ′ > η, and any δx ′ > 0, one can
always ﬁnd a x ∈ [x ′,x ′+δx ′] such that l (x)> 0. Then by the continuity of the function L(x), we
have that Equation IV.6 holds for all x > η.
L(x) is thus a strictly increasing function when x ≥ η, and when x→ η−:
lim
x→η−L(x) = F
−1
κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− r E[max(
B
η
,1)])= 0.
Which means that:
1− rE[max(B
η
,1)] = 0.5(1− r )
1+ r
2r
= E[max(B
η
,1)].
The bid side case can be similarly obtained. The above arguments give the following
theorem:
Theorem 2. By Assumption 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35, the cumulative LOB shape function is uniquely
determined and satisﬁes L(x)=−L(−x). Moreover, we have, L(x)= 0, for x ∈ [−η,η], where η is the
unique solution of the following equation:
1+ r
2r
= E[max(B
η
,1)]. (IV.7)
And for x > η:
L(x) = F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− r E[max(
B
x
,1)]),
for x <−η:
L(x) = −F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− r E[max(
B
−x ,1)]).
In particular, the intrinsic bid-ask spread satisﬁes φ= 2η.
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2.6 Variance per Trade
Consider now the price variance per trade (σtr ) in our model. We have (Let’s Pi denotes the
value of the eﬃcient price after the i -th event 1, and τ the number of events till the ﬁrst trade
after the i -th event):
σ2tr = E[(Pi+τ−Pi )2]
=
∞∑
j=1
P[τ= j ]E[(Pi+ j −Pi )2|τ= j ]
= E[B2|B ≤ η]
∞∑
j=1
P[τ= j ]( j −1)
+rP[|B | > η]E[B
2|B > η]
1− rP[|B | ≤ η]
= rE[B
21|B |≤η]+ rE[B21|B |>η]
1− rP[|B | ≤ η]
= rE[B
2]
1− rP[|B | ≤ η] .
By Equation IV.7, we have:
1− rP[|B | ≤ η]= rE[|B |1|B |>η]
η
.
Thus,
σ2tr =
E[B2]η
E[|B |1|B |>η]
.
For σ2tr ∼ η2 (that is to have the linear relationship between the bid-ask spread and the
volatility per trade), one must have: E[|B |1|B |>η] ∼ η−1, which implies actually a power-low
distribution of order −3 on the price jump size B .
3 Tick Size
In this section, we study the eﬀects of introducing the tick size, denoted by α, that constraints
the minimal price change unit. The same price dynamics described in the previous section still
applies, but the cumulative LOB shape becomes now a piece-wise constant function L(x). Due to
the price discretization, the discontinuity points of L(x) actually depends on the relative position
of the current eﬃcient price P (t ) in the price grid. To deal with this, the following notations will
be used in this section. Let’s denote the smallest possible price level that is greater than or equal
to the current eﬃcient price P (t ) by P¯ (t ), and their relative distance by d := P¯ (t )−P (t ). We have
d ∈ [0,α), and the cumulative LOB shape function L(x) in such case will be denoted by Ld (x)
from now on, with ld (i ) representing the quantities placed at the i−th limit (i = 1 represents the
closest price level that is larger or equal to P (t ), while i =−1 represents the closest price level
that is smaller than P (t )).
1An event can be either a trade sent by noise trader, or an information update B which may or may not trigger a
trade, depending on whether |B | > |η| or not.
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Assumption 31 still applies in this case as well as the greedy behavior of the informed trader
(Assumption 33). For the cumulative LOB shape function Ld (x), we assume now:
Assumption 36. The cumulative LOB shape function Ld (x) is an increasing piece-wise constant
function, with discontinuities at x = d + iα for i ∈Z.
Given the value of d and the LOB shape Ld (x), the trade size Q i of the informed trader
when a new price deviation information B is received becomes a discrete value random variable,
for which we can write the probability function as (for d > 0):
Pd
κi
(Q i = Ld (d + (i −1)α)) = P (B ∈ (d + (i −1)α,d + iα]), for i > 0
Pd
κi
(Q i = Ld (d + iα)) = P (B ∈ [d + (i −1)α,d + iα)), for i < 0.
3.1 Constrained Bid-Ask Spread
Let’s compute again the average gain of passive selling orders placed at diﬀerent limits. We have,
when l (i ) (the number of limit orders placed at the i -th limit) > 0, Gd (i ) (the expected average
gain of passive orders placed at the price level d+(i −1)α given the fact that they are completely
executed, for i ∈N+) writes as:
Gd (i ) = d + (i −1)α−E[νB |Q ≥
i∑
j=1
l ( j )]
= d + (i −1)α− rE[B1B≥d+(i−1)α]
1−Fκ(Ld (d + (i −1)α))
.
Gd (i ) can be understood as the expected gain of a newly inserted inﬁnitesimal limit order at
the i−th limit, under the condition that it is executed by some market order. It is natural to use
the following zero proﬁt assumption of passive orders at each price level:
Assumption 37. For every i ∈N+, if ld (i )> 0, then the conditional expected average gain of passive
selling orders placed at d + (i −1)α, given the fact that they are totally executed, is equal to 0, that
is, when ld (i )> 0:
Gd (i )= 0.
Equivalently, we have:
d + (i −1)α= rE[B1B≥d+(i−1)α]
1−Fκ(Ld (d + (i −1)α))
. (IV.8)
When ld (i )= 0, we can deﬁne G˜d (i ), the potential conditional expected average gain per
unity of passive orders placed at d + (i −1)α by the following equation:
G˜d (i ) = d + (i −1)α− lim
δv→0+
rE[B1B≥d+(i−1)α]
1−Fκ(max(0,Ld (d + (i −2)α)+δv))
= d + (i −1)α− rE[B1B≥d+(i−1)α]
1− rFψ(d + (i −1)α)− (1− r )Fκu (max(0,Ld (d + (i −2)α)))
.
One can image that when the potential gain G˜d (i ) is positive, market makers will place
passive orders at the i−th limit. This idea gives the following assumption:
107
IV. Intelligence and Randomness of Market Participants
Assumption 38. For every i ∈N+, if ld (i )= 0, then the potential conditional expected average gain
of passive selling orders placed at d + (i −1)α, given the fact that they are totally executed, is less
than or equal to 0, that is, when ld (i )= 0:
G˜d (i )≤ 0.
Equivalently, we have:
d + (i −1)α≤ rE[B1B≥d+(i−1)α]
1− rFψ(d + (i −1)α)− (1− r )Fκu (max(0,Ld (d + (i −2)α)))
.
Remark 1. We will see latter that G˜d (i ) represents also the priority value of the ﬁrst order placed at
the i -th limit.
As for the bid side, we have the following two corresponding assumptions:
Assumption 39. For every i ∈N−, if ld (i )< 0, then the conditional expected average gain of passive
buying orders placed at d + iα, given the fact that they are totally executed, is equal to 0, that is,
when ld (i )< 0:
Gd (i )= 0.
Equivalently, we have:
d + iα= rE[B1B≤d+iα]
Fκ(Ld (d + iα))
. (IV.9)
Assumption 40. For every i ∈N−, if ld (i )= 0, then the potential conditional expected average gain
of passive buying orders placed at d + iα, given the fact that they are totally executed, is less than or
equal to 0, that is, when ld (i )= 0:
G˜d (i )≤ 0.
Equivalently, we have:
d + iα≥ rE[B1B≤d+iα]
rFψ(d + iα)+ (1− r )Fκu (min(0,Ld (d + (i +1)α)))
.
As in the continuous case, let’s consider the ﬁrst non empty ask limit kdr , we should have:
d + (kdr −1)α =
rE[B1B≥d+(kdr −1)α]
1−Fκ(ld (kdr ))
d + (kdr −1)α >
rE[B1B≥d+(kdr −1)α]
1−Fκ(0)
,
which leads to:
Fκu (l
d (kdr )) =
1
1− r −
r
1− r E[max(
B
d + (kdr −1)α
,1)].
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Thus for ld (kdr ) to be positive, we should have
1
1−r > 0.5+ r1−r E[max( Bd+(kdr −1)α ,1)], which
means:
1+ r
2r
> E[max( B
d + (kdr −1)α
,1)]. (IV.10)
Equation IV.10 gives the necessary and suﬃcient condition for kdr . Compared with Equation
IV.7, we have:
kdr =min{k ∈N+|d + (k−1)α> η},
with the operator dxe deﬁned as the smallest integer that is strictly larger than x, we have
furthermore:
kdr = 1+d
η−d
α
e.
Similarly, for the ﬁrst non-empty limit at the bid side, we shall have:
kdl = d
η+d
α
e.
Thus the conditional constrained bid-ask spread φdα, given the value of d , satisﬁes:
φdα =α(d
η−d
α
e+dη+d
α
e).
Assuming d is uniformly distributed between [0,α), we can compute the average value of the
constrained bid-ask spread by integrating φdα:
φα =
∫ α−
0
dη− s
α
e+dη+ s
α
eds.
Denote u := ηα , we have:
φu =α
∫ 1−
0
du−xe+du+xedx.
Write u = ui +u f , where ui represents the integral part of u, we have furthermore:
φα = α
∫ 1−
0
dui +u f −xe+dui +u f +xedx
= α[
∫ u f
0
(ui +1)dx+
∫ 1−
u+f
uidx+
∫ 1−u f
0
(ui +1)dx+
∫ 1−
(1−u f )+
(ui +2)dx]
= α[u f (ui +1)+ (1−u f )ui + (1−u f )(ui +1)+u f (ui +2)
= α[2ui +2u f +1]
= α+2η
= α+φ.
The above arguments are summarized in the following theorem, which proves that the
discrete spread is a linearly increasing function of the tick size α in our framework:
Theorem 3. The average constrained spread φα when the tick size is equal to α, satisﬁes the
following equation:
φα =α+φ, (IV.11)
where φ is the intrinsic bid-ask spread of the asset when the tick value is equal to 0.
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Also, the following theorem on the cumulative LOB shape can be established:
Theorem 4. By Assumption 33, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40, the cumulative LOB shape function is
uniquely determined. We have, ld (i ) = 0 for all −kdl < i < kdr , where kdl and kdr are two positive
integers determined by the following equations:
kdr = 1+d
η−d
α
e
kdl = d
η+d
α
e,
with η the unique solution of the following equation:
1+ r
2r
= E[max(B
η
,1)].
And for h ≥ kdr :
Ld (d + (h−1)α) = F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− r E[max(
B
d + (h−1)α ,1)]),
for h ≤−kdl :
Ld (d +hα) = −F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− r E[max(
B
−d −hα ,1)]).
3.2 Daily Volume
Now let’s consider the daily volume V before and after the introduction of the tick size (denote
the latter by Vα). We have, the expected value of V satisﬁes:
E[V ]=λiE[|Q i |]+λuE[|Qu |].
In the previous discussion, we implicitly assume that the distribution of the noise trader’s bet
size does not depend on the cumulative LOB shape function L(x), while the informed trader’s
bet size distribution is linked with L(x) by Assumption 33. Note that from Theorem 2, we have
an explicit expression of L(x). We have thus:
E[|Q i |] = 2P(Q i > 0)E[Q i |Q i > 0]
= 2E[L(B i )1Bi>a]
= 2
∫ ∞
a
F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− r E[max(
B
b
,1)]) fψ(b)db.
When the tick size is introduced, we shall have:
E[Vα]=λiE[|Q iα|]+λuE[|Qu |].
Where E[|Q iα|] satisﬁes:
E[|Q iα|] = 2E[Q i1Q i>0]
= 2
α
∫ α−
0
E[Q id1Q id>0]dd .
110
4. Examples
We have, for d 6= 0:
E[Q id1Q id>0] =
∞∑
h=kdr
Ld (h)(Fψ(d +hα)−Fψ(d + (h−1)α).
Thus E[Vα] is a decreasing function of α, and we have:
lim
α→∞E[Vα]=λ
uE[|Qu |].
3.3 Priority Value
Assumption 37 and 39 tell that the proﬁt of the limit order placed at the bottom of each queue is
equal to 0. Market makers may still make proﬁt if their orders are placed before. The expected
proﬁt of the limit order placed on top of each limit is actually equal to the potential average
gain G˜d (i ) when L(x) is given. Considering the proﬁt of a limit selling order placed on top of
the i−th limit, we have, for i ≥ kdr :
G˜d (i ) = d + (i −1)α− lim
δv→0+
rE[B1B≥d+(i−1)α]
1−Fκ(max(0,Ld (d + (i −2)α)+δv))
= d + (i −1)α− rE[B1B≥d+(i−1)α]
1− rFψ(d + (i −1)α)− (1− r )Fκu (max(0,Ld (d + (i −2)α)))
.
This gives us the following theorem (formulas on the priority value of limit buying orders are
similar and omitted here):
Theorem 5. The priority value at the i−th limit can be written as:
For i = kdr ,
G˜d (i ) = E[B1B≥d+(kdr −1)α]{
1
E[max( B
d+(kdr −1)α ,1)]−Fψ(d + (k
d
r −1)α)
− 1
1+r
2r −Fψ(d + (kdr −1)α)
},
(IV.12)
for i > kdr ,
Gdp (i ) = E[B1B≥d+(i−1)α]{
1
E[max( Bd+(i−1)α ,1)]−Fψ(d + (i −1)α)
− 1
E[max( Bd+(i−2)α ,1)]−Fψ(d + (i −1)α)
}.
4 Examples
4.1 Power-law Distributed Information
Assume that the absolute value of the price jump B follows a power-law distribution, that is:
fψ(x)=Cx−γ when |x| > ²> 0. Note that we should have γ> 3 to have a ﬁnite variance in price.
The tick value is set to zero in the this example.
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Fundamental Bid-Ask Spread
We have, in this case:
1+ r
2r
= E[max(B
η
,1)]
= E[max(B ,η)]
η
=
η(1− Cγ−1η−γ+1)+ Cγ−2η−γ+2
η
= (1− C
γ−1η
−γ+1)+ C
γ−2η
−γ+1
1− r
2rC
= 1
(γ−1)(γ−2)ηγ−1
η = ( 2rC
(1− r )(γ−1)(γ−2) )
1
γ−1 .
η and the ratio between the intensity of price jump and noise trade ( λ
i
λu ) are related by the
following relationship:
η ∼ ( λ
i
λu
)
1
γ−1 .
Cumulative LOB Shape
For the cumulative LOB shape function L(x), we have:
E[max(
B
x
,1)] = C
(γ−1)(γ−2)xγ−1 ,
which means:
L(x) = F−1κu (
1
1− r −
rC
(1− r )(γ−1)(γ−2)xγ−1 ).
We can see that if L(x)∼ xβ, we shall have: fκu ∼ x
−γ+1
β and vice versa.
5 Generalization
Till now, market makers are assumed to obtain the exact information on the eﬃcient price once
after it has been known to the informed trader. This is obviously unrealistic as it neglects one
important risk faced by market makers when placing limit orders: the uncertainty on the eﬃcient
price. In this section, we will study the case when such information is no longer available for
market makers.
5.1 How Information is Digested
Let’s reconsider the case of zero tick value. At the moment t , a buying transaction happens, let’s
assume that market makers hold only the exact information on the eﬃcient price right before
the transaction (denoted by P (t−), we set P (t−)= 0 without loss of generality), but no longer
112
5. Generalization
know the value of the eﬃcient price after this transaction, that is, market makers no longer
obtain the information of the price jump B . Given a buying market order (we consider only
the ask side of the LOB in the sequel for simplicity) of volume q (till the price level p ′) at time
t , assume now, that if this trade is issued by the informed trader, then after this trade, he is
going to take any liquidities below the new eﬃcient price p ′ with some reaction time, distributed
exponentially with rate r a . In such case, we have, immediately after a transaction, the gain of
limit orders placed between x and x+δp can be written as (νi is a random variable with νi = 1
if the transaction comes from the informed trader, νi = 0 if the transaction comes from the noise
trader):
g p
′
(x,δp) = νi g˜ p ′(x,δp)+ (1−νi )g (x,δp),
where g˜ p
′
(x,δp) represents the gain in the case of an informed trade, and g (x,δp) that in
the case of a noise trade.
Three diﬀerent cases can happen when the trade is initiated by the informed trader given
the fact that the limit orders placed between between x and x+δp are completely executed (and
no other event happens in-between):
• e1: The limit orders are consumed by a noise trade.
• e2: The limit orders are consumed by an informed trade, due to the arrival of a new price
jump.
• e3: The limit orders are consumed by an informed trade, without the arrival of a new
price jump.
For g˜ p
′
(x,δp), we have (deﬁne 1e i = 1 if event e i happens and = 0 otherwise, and denote by
Bnew the new price jump):
g˜ p
′
(x,δp) = 1e1
∫ x+δp
x
l (s)(s−p ′)ds+1e2 [
∫ x+δp
x
l (s)sds− (L(x+δp)−L(x))(Bnew +p ′)]
+1e3 [
∫ x+δp
x
l (s)sds− (L(x+δp)−L(x))p ′]
=
∫ x+δp
x
l (s)sds− (L(x+δp)−L(x))p ′−1e2(L(x+δp)−L(x))Bnew .
As for g (x,δp), the event e3 is not possible, we have:
g (x,δp) = 1e1
∫ x+δp
x
l (s)(s)ds+1e2 [
∫ x+δp
x
l (s)sds− (L(x+δp)−L(x))Bnew ]
=
∫ x+δp
x
l (s)sds−1e2(L(x+δp)−L(x))Bnew .
We then compute the conditional expectations of these two gains.
G˜p
′
(x,δp) = E[g˜ p ′(x,δp)|v i = 1]
=
∫ x+δp
x
l (s)sds− (L(x+δp)−L(x))p ′
−(L(x+δp)−L(x))E[1e2Bnew |v i = 1].
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For x < p ′ and x+δp < p ′, we have (denote r i = λi
λi+λu+λa and r
u = λu
λi+λu+λa ):
Gp
′
(x,δp) =
∫ x+δp
x
l (s)sds− (L(x+δp)−L(x))p ′
−(L(x+δp)−L(x)) r
iE[Bnew1Bnew>x+δp−p ′ ]
1− r iFκi (L(x+δp))− r uFκu (L(x+δp))
.
For x ≥ p ′, we have:
G˜p
′
(x,δp) =
∫ x+δp
x
l (s)sds− (L(x+δp)−L(x))p ′
−(L(x+δp)−L(x)) rE[B
new1Bnew>x+δp−p ′ ]
1− rFκi (L(x+δp))− (1− r )Fκu (L(x+δp))
.
And:
G(x,δp) = E[g (x,δp)|v i = 0]
=
∫ x+δp
x
l (s)sds− [L(x+δp)−L(x)] rE[B
new1Bnew>x+δp ]
1− rFψ(x+δp)− (1− r )Fκu (L(x+δp))
.
Thus, we have, if L(x) > 0 and L(x +δp) > L(x) for all δp suﬃciently small, the average
expected gain at the price x writes:
For x < p ′:
G˜p
′
(x) = lim
δp→0+
G˜p
′
(x,δp)
L(x+δp)−L(x)
= x−p ′− r
iE[Bnew1Bnew>x−p ′ ]
1− r iFψ(x−p ′)− r uFκu (L(x))
.
For x ≥ p ′, we have:
G˜p
′
(x) = lim
δp→0+
G˜p
′
(x,δp)
L(x+δp)−L(x)
= x−p ′− rE[B
new1Bnew>x−p ′ ]
1− rFψ(x−p ′)− (1− r )Fκu (L(x))
.
And:
G(x) = lim
δp→0+
G(x,δp)
L(x+δp)−L(x)
= x− rE[B
new1Bnew>x ]
1− rFψ(x)− (1− r )Fκu (L(x))
.
Finally, we have, (denote L−(p ′) as the cumulative LOB quantities right before the transaction
at the price level p ′ and denote r p
′ = r (1−Fψ(p
′))
1−rFψ(p ′)−(1−r )Fκu (L−(p ′)) :
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Gp
′
(x) = r p ′G˜p ′(x)+ (1− r p ′)G(x). (IV.13)
Note that Theorem 2 still applies for L−(p ′), as the exact value of the eﬃcient price right
before the transaction is assumed to be known to the market makers. r p
′
can thus be simpliﬁed
as:
r p
′ = p
′
E[Bnew |Bnew > p ′] .
Using the above equation, we have, for x < p ′, since Bnew follows the save law as B :
Gp
′
(x) = x− r p ′p ′− r (1− r
p ′)E[B1B>x ]
1− rFψ(x)− (1− r )Fκu (L(x))
− r
p ′r iE[B1B>x−p ′ ]
1− r iFψ(x−p ′)− r uFκu (L(x))
,
and for x ≥ p ′:
Gp
′
(x) = x− r p ′p ′− r (1− r
p ′)E[B1B>x ]
1− rFψ(x)− (1− r )Fκu (L(x))
− r
p ′rE[B1B>x−p ′ ]
1− rFψ(x−p ′)− (1− r )Fκu (L(x))
.
Similar to Assumption 34, the competition between market makers results in the following
generalized version of the zero-proﬁt assumption:
Assumption 41. For any x > 0, if L(x)> 0 and l (x)> 0, then the average conditional expected gain
Gc (x), deﬁned as
Gc (x)= lim
δp→0+
Gc (x,δp)
L(x+δp)−L(x) ,
satisﬁes:
Gc (x)= 0,
where Gc (x,δp) is the conditional expected gain of passive orders placed between P (t )+x and P (t )+
x+δp, given the facts that these orders are completely consumed by a market order.
Assumption 41 all together with the above arguments give the following theorem concerning
the equilibrium cumulative LOB shape immediately after a transaction:
Theorem 6. If the informed trader is assumed to react to the new proﬁtable liquidities with some
exponentially distributed reaction time (with intensity λa ) and the eﬃcient price P (t−) is assumed
to be known to the market makers, then under Assumption 31, 33 and 41, immediately after a buying
transaction happens at the price P (t−)+p ′ at time t , the cumulative LOB shape function satisﬁes:
for every x ∈R+, if L(x)> 0 and l (x)> 0, then Gp ′(x)= 0, that is:
for x < p ′:
x− r p ′p ′ = r (1− r
p ′)E[B1B>x ]
1− rFψ(x)− (1− r )Fκu (L(x))
+ r
p ′r iE[B1B>x−p ′ ]
1− r iFψ(x−p ′)− r uFκu (L(x))
,
for x ≥ p ′:
x− r p ′p ′ = r (1− r
p ′)E[B1B>x ]
1− rFψ(x)− (1− r )Fκu (L(x))
+ r
p ′rE[B1B>x−p ′ ]
1− rFψ(x−p ′)− (1− r )Fκu (L(x))
.
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Consider now the new best ask price ap
′
immediately after the transaction at price p ′. We
shall have, if ap
′ < p ′:
(ap
′ − r p ′p ′) = r (1− r
p ′)E[B1B>ap′ ]
1− rFψ(ap ′)− (1− r )/2
+
r p
′
r iE[B1B>ap′−p ′ ]
1− r iFψ(ap ′ −p ′)− r u/2
.
To simplify our analysis, we make the following assumption on the informed trader’s reaction
speed:
Assumption 42. The reaction rate λa of the informed trader is much larger than the information
arrival rate λi and the noise trade arrival rate λu , that is:
r i ≈ 0
r u ≈ 0.
We have, under the above assumption:
(ap
′ − r p ′p ′) ≈ r (1− r
p ′)E[B1B>ap′ ]
1− rFψ(ap ′)− (1− r )/2
.
We can see that when ap
′ = p ′, (ap ′ − r p ′p ′) > r (1−r
p′ )E[B1
B>ap′ ]
1−rFψ(ap′ )−(1−r )/2 by the fact that p
′ > η, so
indeed ap
′ < p ′ when λa is suﬃciently large compared to λu and λi .
We have the following two approximations:
(ap
′ − r p ′p ′)1+ r
2r
≈ (1− r p ′)E[B1B>ap′ ]+ (ap
′ − r p ′p ′)Fψ(ap
′
),
1+ r
2r
≈ (1− r p ′)E[B1B>ap′ ]
ap ′ − r p ′p ′ +Fψ(a
p ′).
We shall have thus, r p
′
p ′ < ap ′ < p ′.
Under Assumption 42, the average conditional expected gain Gp
′
(x) when x < p ′ can be
approximated by:
Gp
′
(x) ≈ x− r p ′p ′− r (1− r
p ′)E[B1B>x ]
1− rFψ(x)− (1− r )Fκu (L(x))
. (IV.14)
Replacing Equation IV.14 in the deduction of Theorem 6, we have:
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Theorem 7. If the informed trader is assumed to react to the new proﬁtable liquidities with some
exponentially distributed reaction time (with intensity λa ) and the eﬃcient price P (t−) is assumed
to be known to the market makers, then under Assumption 31, 33 and 41, immediately after a buying
transaction happens at the price P (t−)+p ′ at time t , the cumulative LOB shape function satisﬁes:
for every x ∈R+, if L(x)> 0 and l (x)> 0, then Gp ′(x)= 0. Moreover, if Assumption 42 applies, then
the best ask price ap
′
immediately after the transaction satisﬁes:
r p
′
p ′ < ap ′ < p ′.
And the cumulative LOB shape function L(x) can be approximated by the following equation when
x < p ′:
L(x) ≈ F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r (1− r p ′)E[max(B ,x)]− r r p ′(p ′−x)Fψ(x)
(1− r )(x− r p ′p ′) ).
In particular, we have, for x = p ′:
L(p ′) ≈ F−1κu (
1
1− r −
r
1− r E[max(
B
p ′
,1)])
= L−(p ′),
with L−(p ′) the cumulative LOB shape function right before the transaction at the price P (t−)+p ′.
Theorem 7 suggests that in such settings, the cumulative number of orders immediately after
a trade event at p ′ stayes almost the same, while there will be no quantities available between
[p ′,p ′+δp) for some δp > 0, as the condition Gp ′(x)= 0 cannot be satisﬁed for x ∈ [p ′,p ′+δp)
due to the discontinuity of the value function at p ′. The question about how the LOB recovers
to its previous state or converges to a new equilibrium state will be discussed latter.
Power-Law Distributed Information
We give here an example of power-law distributed information. When fψ(x)=Cx−γ for x ∈ (²,∞),
we can compute:
E[B |B > p ′] =
∫ ∞
p ′
x fψ(x)
1−Fψ(p ′)
dx
=
∫ ∞
p ′
x−γ+1(γ−1)
p ′−γ+1
dx
= (γ−1)p
′
(γ−2) .
Thus:
r p
′ = γ−2
γ−1 .
And:
117
IV. Intelligence and Randomness of Market Participants
1+ r
2r
≈ C (a
p ′)2−γ
γ−1
γ−2a
p ′ −p ′
+1− C (a
p ′)1−γ
γ−1
1− r
2r
≈ C (a
p ′)2−γ
γ−1
γ−2a
p ′ −p ′
− C (a
p ′)1−γ
γ−1
1− r
2r
≈ C (ap ′)1−γ( a
p ′
γ−1
γ−2a
p ′ −p ′
− 1
γ−1).
Let ap
′ = r p ′p ′+x, then the best ask price ap ′ satisﬁes the following equation in this example:
1− r
2r
≈ C (ap ′)1−γ(r
p ′p ′
x
+ r p ′).
LOB Recovery Speed
Consider the average expected conditional gain of passive selling orders placed at x at time
t +δt (denoted by Gp ′(x,δt )), given the fact that no trade arrives between (t , t +δt ]. We have,
similar to Equation IV.13, for x < p ′:
Gp
′
(x,δt )= r p ′
δt G˜
p ′
δt (x)+ (1− r
p ′
δt )Gδt (x),
with r p
′
δt representing the conditional probability that the last transaction is sent by the
informed trader, given the fact that no trade arrives between (t , t +δt ):
r p
′
δt = r p
′ e−(λ
i+λu+λa )δt
r p ′e−(λi+λu+λa )δt + (1− r p ′)e−(λi+λu )δt
= 1
1+ 1−r p′
r p′
eλaδt
,
and G˜p
′
δt (x) the average expected conditional gain of passive selling orders placed at x at
time t +δt in the case that the last transaction is an informed trade, Gδt (x) that in the case of a
noise trade. It is easy to see that Gδt (x)=G(x) and G˜p
′
δt (x)= G˜p
′
(x), thus, for x < p ′:
Gp
′
(x,δt )= r p ′
δt G˜
p ′(x)+ (1− r p ′
δt )G(x).
When δt →∞, r p ′
δt → 0, and Gp
′
(x,δt )→G(x), that is, if the trade is intiated by the noise
trader, the LOB shape will gradually recover after this trade to its stationary state, with speed
∼ e−λa t .
6 Conclusion and perspectives
In this chapter, we introduce an agent-based model on the LOB dynamics. Based on a greedy
assumption on the behavior of the informed trader and a zero-proﬁt assumption on the market
makers, a link between the proportion of noise trade, bid-ask spread, dynamics of the eﬃcient
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price and the equilibrium LOB state is established. The eﬀect of introducing the tick value
constraint is then discussed, and we show that the constrained bid-ask spread is equal to the sum
of the tick value and the intrinsic bid-ask spread that corresponds to the case of zero tick value.
Price discretization also enables the explicit computation of the priority value when the tick
value is positive. The model is then extended to study the consequence of adding the uncertainty
on the eﬃcient price on the market makers. Two main subjects are discussed in this generalized
model: the information propagation between the informed trader and the market makers and
the LOB recovery speed.
Although many interesting discoveries have been made in this chapter, a lots remain to be
done. Till now, only market makers are allowed to insert limit orders, this is clearly unrealistic.
In real market, the roles of the informed trader and that of the market makers are often mixed,
as the informed trade has also the possibility of placing passive limit orders. By placing limit
orders to the market, the informed trader may leak some information to the market makers,
which may lead to an adjustment of their estimated value of the eﬃcient price. The consequences
of introducing such interactions are still unknown to us.
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